Encyclopedia of Algorithms

2016 Edition
| Editors: Ming-Yang Kao

Majority Equilibrium

  • Qizhi FangEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_217

Years and Authors of Summarized Original Work

  • 2003; Chen, Deng, Fang, Tian

Problem Definition

Majority rule is arguably the best decision mechanism for public decision-making, which is employed not only in public management but also in business management. The concept of majority equilibrium captures such a democratic spirit in requiring that no other solutions would please more than half of the voters in comparison to it. The work of Chen, Deng, Fang, and Tian [1] considers a public facility location problem decided via a voting process under the majority rule on a discrete network. This work distinguishes itself from previous work by applying the computational complexity approach to the study of majority equilibrium. For the model with a single public facility located in trees, cycles, and cactus graphs, it is shown that the majority equilibrium can be found in linear time. On the other hand, when the number of public facilities is taken as the input size (not a constant), finding a...

Keywords

Condorcet winner 
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Recommended Reading

  1. 1.
    Chen L, Deng X, Fang Q, Tian F (2002) Majority equilibrium for public facility allocation. Lect Notes Comput Sci 2697:435–444MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Demange G (1983) Spatial models of collective choice. In: Thisse JF, Zoller HG (eds) Locational analysis of public facilities. North-Holland Publishing Company, AmsterdamGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Hansen P, Thisse JF (1981) Outcomes of voting and planning: condorcet, weber and rawls locations. J Publ Econ 16:1–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Schummer J, Vohra RV (2002) Strategy-proof location on a network. J Econ Theory 104:405–428MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Tullock G (1959) Some problems of majority voting. J Polit Econ 67:571–579CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Mathematical SciencesOcean University of ChinaQingdao, Shandong ProvinceChina