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Hospitals/Residents Problem

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Encyclopedia of Algorithms

Synonyms

College admissions problem; Stable admissions problem; Stable assignment problem; Stable b-matching problem; University admissions problem

Years and Authors of Summarized Original Work

1962; Gale, Shapley

Problem Definition

An instance I of the Hospitals/Residents problem (HR) [6, 7, 18] involves a set \(R =\{ r_{1},\ldots ,r_{n}\}\) of residents and a set \(H =\{ h_{1},\ldots ,h_{m}\}\) of hospitals. Each hospital h j ∈ H has a positive integral capacity, denoted by c j . Also, each resident r i ∈ R has a preference list in which he ranks in strict order a subset of H. A pair (r i , h j ) ∈ R × H is said to be acceptable if h j appears in r i ’s preference list; in this case r i is said to find hjacceptable. Similarly each hospital h j ∈ H has a preference list in which it ranks in strict order those residents who find h j acceptable. Given any three agents x, y, z ∈ R ∪ H, x is said to prefer y to z if x finds each of y and z acceptable, and y precedes z on x’s preference...

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Recommended Reading

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Correspondence to David F. Manlove .

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Manlove, D.F. (2016). Hospitals/Residents Problem. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_180

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