Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

Living Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Rule of Law and Economic Performance

  • Rosolino A. Candela
  • Ennio Piano
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_736-1

Abstract

This entry explores the connection between the rule of law and economic performance. First, we analyze the role of interjurisdictional competition, and how the rule of law emerged as a by-product of this competitive process, initially in Western Europe. Second, we discuss the role of intrajurisdictional competition between interest groups, which reinforced the emergence of the rule of law within states. Finally, we discuss the mechanism by which the rule of law successfully or unsuccessfully became established in Western offshoots, particularly in Africa and the Americas, affecting the long-term economic performance of these areas.

JEL Codes

O12 P14 P16 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media LLC 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Political Theory ProjectBrown UniversityProvidenceUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA