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De Jure/De Facto Institutions

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Abstract

Recent works in Law and Economics distinguish between the so-called de jure and de facto institutions. We define these two types of institutions, as well as indicate their place in the broad institutional system, in particular relative to the formal/informal and external/internal distinctions applied in (new) institutional economics. We also mention the possible interrelationships between de facto and de jure institutions, linking them to economic outcomes, and provide examples of de jure/de facto analyses in Law and Economics. Finally, we reflect on controversies and lacunas in the literature and present an outlook for future research.

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Acknowledgments

The authors acknowledge the support of the National Science Centre of Poland (project #2014/13/B/HS4/00402).

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Correspondence to Jacek Lewkowicz .

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Lewkowicz, J., Metelska-Szaniawska, K. (2019). De Jure/De Facto Institutions. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_661-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_661-2

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  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

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Chapter history

  1. Latest

    De Jure/De Facto Institutions
    Published:
    29 August 2020

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_661-3

  2. De Jure/De Facto Institutions
    Published:
    13 March 2019

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_661-2

  3. Original

    De Jure/De Facto Institutions
    Published:
    29 August 2017

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_661-1