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Separation of Power

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Definition

Separation of powers is a principle pertaining to state governance, envisaging that responsibilities of the government are divided into distinct branches, in order to assure that none of these branches exercise the key functions of another. In consequence, state power is deconcentrated, and checks and balances are provided for. In economics, this principle is primarily the focus of the research program of constitutional economics (and, more broadly, public choice), emphasizing its role as a form of specialization, as well as a source of constraints enhancing the constitutional commitment mechanism. We present the theoretical economic approaches to the separation of powers, illustrating them with examples of empirical studies.

Introduction

For centuries, the structure of power in the state raised the interest of political and social thinkers, as well as practitioners. Separation of powers constituted an important focus of these considerations. The crucial aspect of this...

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Correspondence to Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska .

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Metelska-Szaniawska, K. (2020). Separation of Power. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_656-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_656-2

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

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Chapter History

  1. Latest

    Separation of Power
    Published:
    31 July 2020

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_656-2

  2. Original

    Separation of Power
    Published:
    10 November 2017

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_656-1