Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

Living Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Crime (Incentive to)

  • Derek Pyne
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_245-1

Abstract

The standard economic model of crime assumes criminal incentives depend on (1) the expected payoff from crime, (2) the penalty if apprehended and convicted, (3) the probability of apprehension and conviction, and (4) attitudes toward risk. At times, penalties for failed criminal attempts are also taken into account.

Keywords

Environmental Crime Prison Condition Cumulative Prospect Theory Negative Incentive Criminal Incentive 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Thompson Rivers UniversityKamloopsCanada