Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics pp 1–7Cite as

Tax Evasion by Individuals

  • Living reference work entry
  • Latest version View entry history
  • First Online:

  • 140 Accesses

Abstract

The basic deterrence model of tax evasion is described, its main predictions are derived, and limitations and flexibility are outlined. Further, the model is interpreted in light of some key institutional features characterizing tax enforcement in OECD countries. Throughout the survey, findings originating from the deterrence model are contrasted with predictions which result from a simple model of criminal activity and law enforcement.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

References

  • Allingham MG, Sandmo A (1972) Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis. J Public Econ 1(3–4):323–338

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alm J (1999) Tax compliance and tax administration. In: Hildreth WB, Richardson JA (eds) Handbook on taxation. Marcel Dekker, New York, pp 741–768

    Google Scholar 

  • Alm J (2012) Measuring, explaining, and controlling tax evasion: lessons from theory, experiments and field studies. Int Tax Public Financ 19(1):54–77

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alm J, Torgler B (2011) Do ethics matter? Tax compliance and morality. J Bus Ethics 101(4):635–651

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alm J, McClelland GH, Schulze WD (1992) Why do people pay taxes? J Public Econ 48(1):21–39

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Andreoni J, Erard B, Feinstein J (1998) Tax compliance. J Econ Lit 36(2):818–860

    Google Scholar 

  • Cowell FA (2004) Carrots and sticks in enforcement. In: Aaron H, Slemrod J (eds) The crisis in tax administration. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, pp 230–275

    Google Scholar 

  • Crocker KJ, Slemrod J (2005) Corporate tax evasion with agency costs. J Public Econ 89(9–10):1593–1610

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Feld LP, Frey BS (2002) Trust breeds trust: how taxpayers are treated. Econ Gov 3(2):87–99

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Franzoni LA (2004) Discretion in tax enforcement. Economica 71(283):369–389

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Franzoni LA (2009) Tax evasion and avoidance. In: Garoupa N (ed) Criminal law and economics, vol 3, 2nd edn, Encyclopedia of law and economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton, pp 290–319

    Google Scholar 

  • Goerke L (2003) Tax evasion and tax progressivity. Public Financ Rev 31(2):189–203

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hashimzade N, Myles GD, Tran-Nam B (2013) Applications of behavioural economics to tax evasion. J Econ Surv 27(5):941–977

    Google Scholar 

  • Macho-Stadler I, Pérez-Castrillo D (2004) Settlement in tax evasion prosecution. Economica 71(283):349–368

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marchese C (2004) Taxation, black markets, and other unintended consequences, Chapter 10. In: Backhaus JG, Wagner RE (eds) Handbook of public finance, vol 1. Kluwer, Boston, pp 237–275

    Google Scholar 

  • OECD (2009) Tax administration in OECD and selected non-OECD countries: comparative information series (2008). OECD, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • OECD (2013) Taxing wages 2013. OECD, Paris

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Pencavel JH (1979) A note on income tax evasion, labor supply, and nonlinear tax schedules. J Public Econ 12(1):115–124

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Polinsky AM, Shavell S (2007) The theory of public enforcement of law, Chapter 6. In: Polinsky AM, Shavell S (eds) Handbook of law and economics, vol 1. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 403–456

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Sandmo A (2012) An evasive topic: theorizing about the hidden economy. Int Tax Public Financ 19(1):5–24

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Slemrod J (2007) Cheating ourselves: the economics of tax evasion. J Econ Perspect 21(1):25–48

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Slemrod J, Yitzhaki S (1987) The optimal size of a tax collection agency. Scand J Econ 89(2):183–192

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Slemrod J, Yitzhaki S (2002) Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration, Chapter 22. In: Auerbach AJ, Feldstein M (eds) Handbook of public economics, vol 3. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 1423–1470

    Google Scholar 

  • Yitzhaki S (1974) A note on income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis. J Public Econ 3(2):201–202

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yitzhaki S (1987) On the excess burden of tax evasion. Public Financ Q 15(2):123–137

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. IAAEU (Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union), Trier University, 54286, Trier, Germany

    Laszlo Goerke

Authors
  1. Laszlo Goerke
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Laszlo Goerke .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Lehrst. Finanzwissenschaft/ Finanzsoziologie, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Thüringen, Germany

    Jürgen Backhaus

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this entry

Cite this entry

Goerke, L. (2015). Tax Evasion by Individuals. In: Backhaus, J. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_22-2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_22-2

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Tax Evasion by Individuals
    Published:
    31 July 2015

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_22-2

  2. Original

    Tax Evasion by Individuals
    Published:
    18 June 2014

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_22-1

Search

Navigation