Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

Living Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Tax Evasion by Individuals

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_22-2

Abstract

The basic deterrence model of tax evasion is described, its main predictions are derived, and limitations and flexibility are outlined. Further, the model is interpreted in light of some key institutional features characterizing tax enforcement in OECD countries. Throughout the survey, findings originating from the deterrence model are contrasted with predictions which result from a simple model of criminal activity and law enforcement.

Keywords

Disposable Income Relative Risk Aversion Absolute Risk Aversion Public Enforcement Marginal Fine 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.IAAEU (Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union), Trier UniversityTrierGermany