Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

Living Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Independent Judiciary

  • George TridimasEmail author
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_12-1
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Abstract

After describing the closely related concepts of judicial independence and independent judicial review of policy, this entry offers an overview of four issues: (1) Reasons for establishing an independent judiciary, including its ability to resolve problems of information asymmetry between citizens – principals and public officials – agents, transform constitutional declarations to credible commitments and provide a mechanism of political insurance; (2) mechanisms for appointing judges and the jurisdiction of courts; (3) modeling the role of the judiciary as an additional veto player in games of collective decision-making and policy implementation; and (4) the judiciary as an explanatory variable and its effect on economic variables of interest like economic growth and the size of the government.

Keywords

Judicial Review Political Group Collective Choice Veto Player Incomplete Contract 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Accounting, Finance and EconomicsUlster Business School, University of UlsterNewtownabbeyUK