Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Passive Minority Interests

  • Nikolaos E. ZevgolisEmail author
  • Panagiotis N. Fotis
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_742


Passive minority interests consist of various types of non-controlling interests in competitors, such as minority shareholdings and interlocking directorships. Loans and other financial products involving competitors may also play a crucial role in creating mutual interactions among the parties. A minority interest is the portion of a consolidated entity that is not owned by the consolidating entity. A consolidated entity may be formed through management/shareholding control and also depends on the prevailing accounting/regulatory environment.

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Further Reading

  1. Fotis P, Zevgolis N (2016) The competitive effects of minority shareholdings legal and economic issues. Hart Publishing, BloomsburyGoogle Scholar

List of Cases

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Hellenic Competition CommissionAthensGreece