Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Exploring the Deterrent Impact of Financial Supervisory Liability

  • Robert J. DijkstraEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_677


This entry provides a law and economics analysis of financial supervisory liability. It discusses the deterrent impact of financial supervisory liability by using existing law and economics theory and empirical evidence.

JEL Classification

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Tilburg Institute for Private LawTilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands