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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics pp 1126–1130Cite as

Independent Regulatory Authorities

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Abstract

Independent regulatory agencies are now considered to be the sign of modern economic regulatory systems. They proliferated since the 1980s, and it is believed that they are enhancing the efficiency of regulation. In this entry, I will use law and economics to develop some rationale to explain their diffusion and emergence.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Law School, CRDP, Université de Paris Nanterre, Nanterre, France

    Régis Lanneau

Authors
  1. Régis Lanneau
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Régis Lanneau .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. MRE and University of Montpellier, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Faculté d’Economie, Université de Montpellier and LAMETA-UMR CNRS, Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  3. DiGSPES, University of Eastern Piedmont, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

  4. IEL, Torino, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Lanneau, R. (2019). Independent Regulatory Authorities. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_647

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