Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Cooperative Game and the Law

  • Samuel FereyEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_635


While noncooperative game theory applied to the law is now a subfield of law and economics literature, cooperative game theory has a more strange history. Many of the founding fathers of the cooperative game theory (Shapley, Shubik, Owen, Aumann) were interested in legal examples to illustrate their games; however, law and economics literature has not systematically investigated the meaning of cooperative game theory for the law and is still mostly noncooperative oriented. The aim of the entry is to draw a general picture of what cooperative game theory may add to the law and economics literature. We focus on the positive and normative aspects of cooperative game theory, and we provide illustrative examples in different fields (private law, public law, regulation, theory of the law).

Cooperative Game Theory and the Law: A Missed Rendezvous?

In their famous book Game Theory and the Lawpublished in 1994, Baird, Gertner, and Picker said nothing about cooperative games and the...

This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.


  1. Aivazian VA, Callen JL (1981) The Coase theorem and the empty core. J Law Econ 24:175–181CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Aivazian VA, Callen JL (2003) The core, transaction costs, and the Coase theorem. Constit Polit Econ 14:287–299CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Aumann RJ (1985) What is game theory trying to accomplish ? In: Arrow K, Honkapohja S (eds) Frontiers of economics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp 5–46Google Scholar
  4. Aumann RJ, Maschler M (1985) Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud. J Econ Theory 36:195–213CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Baird DG, Gertner RH, Picker RC (1994) Game theory and the law. Harvard University Press, HarvardGoogle Scholar
  6. Beal S, Deschamps M (2016) On compensation schemes for data sharing within the European REACH legislation. Eur J Law Econ 41:157–181CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Bittlingmayer (1982) Decreasing average cost and competition: a new look at the Addyston Pipe case. J Law Econ 25:201–229CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Coase RH (1981) The Coase theorem and the empty core: a comment. J Law Econ 24:183–187CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Crettez B, Deloche R (2014) Cost sharing in a condo under law’s umbrella. Working paperGoogle Scholar
  10. Dehez P, Tellone D (2013) Data games: sharing public goods with exclusion. J Public Econ Theory 15:654–673CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Ferey S, Dehez P (2016a) Multiple causation, apportionment and the Shapley value. J Leg Stud 45:143–171CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Ferey S, Dehez P (2016b) Overdetermined causation, contribution and the Shapley value. Chicago-Kent Law Rev 91:637–658Google Scholar
  13. Gale D, Shapley LS (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. Am Math Mon 69:9–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Gonzalez S, Marciano A (2017) New insights on the Coase theorem and the emptiness of the core. Revue d’Économie Politique 127:579–600CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Gonzalez S, Marciano A, Solal P (2016) The Social cost problem, rights and the (non)empty core. Working paper. Available on https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2863952
  16. Lardon A (2017) Coalition games and oligopolies. Revue d’Économie Politique 127:601–636CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Littlechild SC, Thomson GF (1977) Aircraft landing fees: A game theory approach. Bell J Econ 8:186–204CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Maschler M, Solan E, Zamir S (2013) Game theory. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Myerson R (1977) Graphs and cooperation in games. Math Oper Res 2:225–229CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Owen G (1977) Values of games with a priori unions. In: Moeschlin O, Hein R (eds) Mathematical economics and game theory: essays in honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Springer, New-YorkGoogle Scholar
  21. Roth AE (1984) The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory. J Political Econ 92:991–1016CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Shapley L, Shubik M (1967) Ownership and the production function. Q J Econ 81:88–111CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Telser L (1985) Cooperation, competition, and efficiency. J Law Econ 28:271–295CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Wiley JS (1987) Antitrust and core theory. J Law Econ 54:556–589Google Scholar
  25. Zhao J (2014) Estimating the merging costs and organizational costs: methodology and the case of 1887–1914 sugar monopoly. Working paper, University of SaskatchewanGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CNRS, BETAUniversity of LorraineNancyFrance