Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

EU Microsoft Competition Case

  • Luca RubiniEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_594


The investigation and litigation that involved Microsoft before the EU authorities in the 2000–2012 period is arguably the first case that put the complex issues of the new economy to the test of EU competition laws. The case, which attracted a lot of attention, also beyond competition law circles, was a complex one, at various levels – technical, economic, and legal – and one that eventually interrogated the ultimate goals of competition policy in a given legal system. This entry takes the reader through the various issues and findings of the European Commission and the Court of First Instance of the European Union before offering few notes of analysis and a view on the future implications of this landmark case.

EL classification K4 Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.


  1. Andreangeli A (2010) Tying, technological integration and Article 82 EC: where do we go after the Microsoft case? In: Rubini L (2010), pp 318–343Google Scholar
  2. Banasevic N, Hellström P (2010) Windows into the world of abuse of dominance: an analysis of the Commission’s 2004 Microsoft Decision and the CFI’s 2007 judgment’. In: Rubini L (2010), pp 47–75Google Scholar
  3. Bellis JF, Kasten T (2010) The Microsoft Windows Media Player tying case. In: Rubini L (2010), pp 127–165Google Scholar
  4. Bork RH, Sidak JG (2012) What does the Chicago School teach about Internet search and the antitrust treatment of Google. J Comp Law Econ 8(4):633–700Google Scholar
  5. Economides N, Lianos I (2010) The quest for appropriate remedies in the EC Microsoft cases: a comparative appraisal. In: Rubini L (2010), pp 393–462Google Scholar
  6. Evans DS, Fisher FM, Rubinfeld DL, Schmalensee RL (2000) Did microsoft harm consumers? Two opposing views. AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
  7. Forrester IS (2010) Victa placet mihi causa: the compulsory licensing part of the Microsoft case In: Rubini L (2010), pp 76–126Google Scholar
  8. Fox EM (2008) The efficiency paradox. In: Pitofsky (ed) How the Chicago School overshot the mark: the effect of conservative economic analysis on US antitrust. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 77–100Google Scholar
  9. Fox EM (2010) The EC Microsoft case and the duty to deal: the transatlantic divide. In: Rubini L (2010), pp 274–281Google Scholar
  10. Gavil AI, First H (2014) The Microsoft antitrust cases. Competition policy for the twenty-first century. MIT Press, Cambridge, MACrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Gil-Moltó MJ (2010) Economic aspects of the Microsoft case: networks, interoperability and competition. In: Rubini L (2010), pp 344–368Google Scholar
  12. Jackson C (2010) The basic technology issues at stake. In: Rubini L (2010), pp 3–46Google Scholar
  13. Kaplow L (1992) Rules versus standards: an economic analysis. Duke Law J 42:557–629CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Kerber W (2008) Should competition law promote efficiency? Some reflections of an economist on the economic foundations of competition law. In: Drexl J, Idot L, Moneger J (eds) Economic theory and competition law. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton, pp 93–120Google Scholar
  15. Lianos I, Motchenkova E (2012) Market dominance and quality of search results in the search engine market, TILEC discussion paper DP 2012/036, 31 October 2012Google Scholar
  16. Liebowitz SJ, Margolis SE (2001) Winners, losers & Microsoft. Competition and antitrust in high technology. The Independent Institute, OaklandGoogle Scholar
  17. Page WH, Lopatka J (2007) The Microsoft case. Chicago University Press, ChicagoCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Peritz JRR (2010) The Microsoft chronicles. In: Rubini L (2010), pp 205–257Google Scholar
  19. Pollock R (2010) Is Google the next Microsoft? Competition, welfare and regulation in online search. Rev Netw Econ 9(4):1–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Rubini L (2010) Microsoft on trial. Legal and economic analysis of a transatlantic antitrust case. Edward Elgar Publishing, NorthamptonGoogle Scholar
  21. Vesterdorf B (2008) Article 82 EC: where do we stand after the Microsoft judgment? Glob Antitrust Rev 1–41Google Scholar
  22. Vesterdorf B (2010) Epilogue. In: Rubini L (2010), pp 487–489Google Scholar
  23. Walsh A (2010) Microsoft v Commission: interoperability, emerging standards and innovation in the software industry. In: Rubini L (2010), pp 282–317Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of BirminghamBirminghamUK