Definition
Class action and other forms of aggregate litigation introduce in the legal procedure a powerful means for gathering dispersed interests and channeling them into a type of action in which the different parties concur to promote individual and social interest. They can restore the full working of the legal system, and in addition they can be a powerful device for promoting social welfare when other institutional arrangements seem to be ineffective or inefficient.
Introduction
Class action and other forms of aggregate litigation are the answer to an organizational puzzle in civil procedure dealing with reconciling enforcement of the dispersed victims’ rights, the lack of proper incentive for promoting a legal action, and the social interest of producing the public goods of deterrence and, possibly, regulatory change (Ramello 2012). The underlying problem is the twofold partial or total failure of...
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Ramello, G.B. (2019). Class Action and Aggregate Litigations. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_553
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