Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Shapley Value

  • André CasajusEmail author
  • Helfried Labrenz
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_437


The Shapley value (Shapley 1953) probably is the most eminent (single-valued) solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU games)1. A (TU) game is a pair (N, v) consisting of a nonempty and finite set of players N and a coalition function\( v\in \mathbb{V}(N):= \left\{f:2N\to \mathrm{\mathbb{R}}|f\left(\O \right)=0\right\} \)

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.HHL Leipzig Graduate School of ManagementLeipzigGermany
  2. 2.Institut für Unternehmensrechnung, Finanzierung und Besteuerung, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche FakultätUniversität LeipzigLeipzigGermany
  3. 3.LSI Leipziger Spieltheoretisches InstitutLeipzigGermany