Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Public Enforcement

  • Iljoong KimEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_391


This essay starts with discussions regarding what public enforcement is and why it is necessary. We explain economic rationales under which public enforcement becomes a superior sanctioning mode, in controlling many undesirable acts, to a wide variety of non-public sanctioning counterparts. Nonetheless, given that a large portion of the literature considers the high-cost aspect of public enforcement, the essay emphasizes the importance of lowering administrative costs and overcoming bureaucracy. From a similar perspective, we also examine the combination of public and non-public enforcement as well as the joint use of different modes of public enforcement.

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsSungKyunKwan University (SKKU)Jongno-GuSouth Korea