Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello


  • Benny GeysEmail author
  • Karsten Mause
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_370


Politicians are persons involved in the process of public policymaking in their role as members of governments, parliaments, political parties, and other political bodies at the (sub)national level (e.g., local government, state legislature, national parliament, etc.) as well as within the supranational political arena (e.g., United Nations Security Council, European Union institutions, and so on). Many politicians get into office through a democratic election, while others are selected or appointed to a public office. For many politicians, politics is a full-time job, while for others, it remains an activity in addition to a main job as a lawyer, teacher, or entrepreneur. This entry takes stock of what law and economics (LE) scholars have contributed to the large social science literature on politicians.

The Law and Economics of Politicians

Analyzing what politicians do belongs to the “core business” of political scientists. However, the law and economics discipline has...

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsNorwegian Business School BIOsloNorway
  2. 2.Vrije Universiteit BrusselIxellesBelgium
  3. 3.Department of Political Science (IfPol)University of MünsterMünsterGermany