Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello


  • Pavel KuchařEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_30


How does the process of consensus formation affect the accuracy and reliability of our knowledge? Cognitive and epistemic division of labor creates a problem of trust in the use and application of knowledge. Consequently, the reliability of scientific consensus depends on whether the incentives, which the self-interested members of scientific communities face, are aligned in the right way.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics and FinanceUniversity of Guanajuato, DCEA-Sede MarfilGuanajuatoMexico
  2. 2.Facultad de Economía-División de Estudios de PosgradoUniversidad Nacional Autónoma de MéxicoCiudad de MéxicoMexico