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Tax Evasion by Individuals

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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics
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Abstract

The basic deterrence model of tax evasion is described, its main predictions are derived, and limitations and flexibility are outlined. Further, the model is interpreted in light of some key institutional features characterizing tax enforcement in OECD countries. Throughout the survey, findings originating from the deterrence model are contrasted with predictions which result from a simple model of criminal activity and law enforcement.

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Correspondence to Laszlo Goerke .

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Goerke, L. (2019). Tax Evasion by Individuals. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_22

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