Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Fiscal System

  • Cécile BazartEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_176



Fiscal systems gather all the taxes and contributions levied to fund the State. These taxes and contributions share the characteristics of being compulsory and unrequited payments to the government, in the OECD sense. Historically, fiscal systems have shown their scalable nature as they are embedded in larger economic, social, political, and cultural systems. It is possible to distinguish the positive analysis and the normative analysis of fiscal systems. The positive analysis enlightens fiscal systems characteristics in terms of tax structure, while the normative analysis questions the qualities of a good tax system.

Positive Analysis of Fiscal Systems

Fiscal systems are large collection processes aiming to fulfil the imperatives of financial returns, efficiency, and fairness associated with State intervention, as summarized by Musgrave in 1959, with the three-function framework. The first function, of resource allocation,...

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CEE-M – Univ Montpellier – CNRS – INRA – SupAgroUniversity of MontpellierMontpellierFrance
  2. 2.Laboratoire Montpellierain d’économie théorique et appliquée (LAMETA)University of Montpellier 1MontpellierFrance