Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

2019 Edition
| Editors: Alain Marciano, Giovanni Battista Ramello

Constitutional Political Economy

  • Stefan VoigtEmail author
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_1


Economists used to be interested in analyzing decisions assuming the rules to be given. Scholars of Constitutional Political Economy (CPE) or constitutional economics have broadened the scope of economic research by analyzing both the choice of basic rule systems (constitutions) as well as their effects using the standard method of economics, i.e., rational choice.

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Further Reading

  1. Voigt S (1997) Positive constitutional economics – a survey. Public Choice 90:11–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Voigt S (2011) Empirical constitutional economics: onward and upward? J Econ Behav Organ 80(2):319–330CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Law and EconomicsUniversity of HamburgHamburgGermany