Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice

2014 Edition
| Editors: Gerben Bruinsma, David Weisburd

Naming and Shaming of Corporate Offenders

Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5690-2_438

Synonyms

Overview

Pressure from the social environment of business is a major explanatory factor for corporate compliance. The threat of negative publicity, reputation damage, and social stigma may prevent business offenses or socially irresponsible or unethical business behavior. Therefore, both public and private regulatory actors attempt to activate social control by naming and shamingfirms that offend legal or social norms. Exposing corporate misbehavior to the public may trigger stakeholders to impose “reputation sanctions” that largely exceed the impact of legal sanctions, such as fines. Public enforcement authorities therefore increasingly make use of publicity in their enforcement strategies, and disclose names of offenders in an attempt to increase the impact of regulatory sanctions. Similarly, NGOs actively “name and shame” firms involved in socially or environmentally harmful behavior to invoke extralegal pressure in...

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Recommended Reading and References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Erasmus School of Law, Criminology DepartmentRotterdamThe Netherlands