Introduction
Technology – human ideas on using the laws of nature – has always been at the heart of economic development. With the patent system, first introduced in Venice in 1474, technical ideas became tradable in their own rights. Such exchange promises gains in impersonal markets based on the patents, changing the economic organization and structure, and shifting the risk bearing and risk sharing between specialized firms for invention, intermediary trading/investment, innovation, and customers, resulting in a potentially more efficient sharing of risk and thus potentially a more performing economic system.
The topic discussed here are mechanisms and contracts for coordination between hierarchies, rather than within hierarchies, based on the patent system as an exchange system. Government subsidies and secrecy are replaced by markets(using excluding and...
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Ullberg, E. (2013). From Personal to Impersonal Exchange in Ideas. In: Carayannis, E.G. (eds) Encyclopedia of Creativity, Invention, Innovation and Entrepreneurship. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-3858-8_505
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