Computational Complexity

2012 Edition
| Editors: Robert A. Meyers (Editor-in-Chief)

Voting Procedures, Complexity of

  • Olivier Hudry
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_204

Article Outline

Glossary

Definition of the Subject

Introduction

Common Voting Procedures

Complexity Results

Further Directions

Acknowledgments

Bibliography

Keywords

Linear Order Condorcet Winner Vote Procedure Plurality Rule Borda Score 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang and Bernard Monjardet for their help. Their commentswere very useful to improve the text.

Bibliography

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Olivier Hudry
    • 1
  1. 1.École Nationale Supérieure des TélécommunicationsParisFrance