Article Outline
Glossary
Definition of the Subject
Introduction
Formal Model and Early Results
Quasi-Linear Utilities and the VCG Mechanism
The Importance of the Domain’s Dimensionality
Budget Balancedness and Bayesian Mechanism Design
Interdependent Valuations
Future Directions
Bibliography
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Abbreviations
- A social choice function:
-
A function that determines a social choice according to players’ preferences over the different possible alternatives.
- A mechanism :
-
A game in incomplete information, in which player strategies are based on their private preferences. A mechanism implements a social choice function f if the equilibrium strategies yield an outcome that coincides with f.
- Dominant strategies:
-
An equilibrium concept where the strategy of each player maximizes her utility, no matter what strategies the other players choose.
- Bayesian–Nash equilibrium :
-
An equilibrium concept that requires the strategy of each player to maximize the expected utility of the player, where the expectation is taken over the types of the other players.
- VCG mechanisms:
-
A family of mechanisms that implement in dominant strategies the social choice function that maximizes the social welfare.
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Lavi, R. (2012). Mechanism Design. In: Meyers, R. (eds) Computational Complexity. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_119
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