Encyclopedia of Systems and Control

Living Edition
| Editors: John Baillieul, Tariq Samad

Strategic Form Games and Nash Equilibrium

  • Asuman Ozdaglar
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_27-1


This chapter introduces strategic form games, which provide a framework for the analysis of strategic interactions in multi-agent environments. We present the main solution concept in strategic form games, Nash equilibrium, and provide tools for its systematic study. We present fundamental results for existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and discuss their efficiency properties. We conclude with current research directions in this area.


Strategic form games Nash equilibrium Existence Uniqueness Efficiency 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer ScienceMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA