Encyclopedia of Systems and Control

2015 Edition
| Editors: John Baillieul, Tariq Samad

Network Games

  • R Srikant
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5058-9_35


Game theory plays a central role in studying systems with a number of interacting players competing for a common resource. A communication network serves as a prototypical example of such a system, where the common resource is the network, consisting of nodes and links with limited capacities, and the players are the computers, web servers, and other end hosts who want to transfer information over the shared network. In this entry, we present several examples of game-theoretic interaction in communication networks and present a simple mathematical model to study one such instance, namely, resource allocation in the Internet.


Congestion games Network economics Price-taking users Routing games Strategic users 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • R Srikant
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and the Coordinated Science LabUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignChampaignUSA