Noninterference is a property that restricts the information flow through a system. It can be used to express aspects of confidentiality and integrity.
Goguen and Meseguer introduced noninterference in 1982 as a declarative definition of the property “no illegitimate information flow can occur” for deterministic state machines. Subsequently, numerous security properties were proposed in order to relax the restrictive original definition or to adapt the intuition underlying noninterference to other models of computation.
A process A is said to be noninterfering with another process B across a system M if A’s input to M has no effect on M’s output to B. This property implies that no information flows from A to B...
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Mantel, H. (2011). Information Flow and Noninterference. In: van Tilborg, H.C.A., Jajodia, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_874
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5905-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-4419-5906-5