Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security

2011 Edition
| Editors: Henk C. A. van Tilborg, Sushil Jajodia

MD4-MD5

  • Nicky Mouha
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_595

Synonyms

Related Concepts

Definition

MD4 and MD5 are cryptographic hash functions designed by Rivest. Several hash functions have been influenced by their design. Practical attacks exist for MD4 and MD5, with high impact on commonly used applications.

Theory

Description

The MD4 [1] and MD5 [2] algorithms are cryptographic  Hash Functions designed by Rivest. A cryptographic hash function converts a variable-length input into a fixed-length output. It is important that certain security requirements are met, such as  Preimage Resistance,  Second Preimage Resistance, and  Collision Resistance. For both algorithms, the output length is 128 bits.

MD4 and MD5 are iterated hash functions, using the Merkle-Damgård mode of iteration. Messages are padded using the Merkle-Damgård strenghtening technique and split into...

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Recommended Reading

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nicky Mouha
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Electrical EngineeringKatholieke Universiteit LeuvenLeuven-HeverleeBelgium