Definition
The basic functionality of a mix network is to provide sender anonymity, i.e., the identity of the originator of a message is difficult or impossible to discern for any given message delivered to any given recipient. A mix network can also provide receiver anonymity, i.e., the identity of the intended recipient of a message is difficult or impossible to discern for any given message originating from any given sender.
Background
It is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which message secrecy in communication is desirable. In such scenarios, encryptionis a crucial tool. Unfortunately, encryption of message contents by itself may not be sufficient. Even if the contents of sensitive messages are protected, much can be inferred merely by the fact that one party is sending a message to another party. If an authoritarian regime already suspects that one party to a communication is a dissident, then the other parties to the communication become suspect as well. Accessing a...
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Franklin, M.K. (2011). Mix Networks. In: van Tilborg, H.C.A., Jajodia, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_209
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5906-5_209
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