Generally, one could say that a model represents something different than itself. A model can be defined as “a mental construction that based on the reality, reproduces the main components and relationships of the analyzed segment of the reality.” Simply put, models serve as tools for understanding reality. These models should not be regarded as entirely realistic but as simplified versions of the reality to be explained and, thus, always in some sense selective. Such comprehension of models has been used in empirical science since Galileo and are seen as isomorphic representations of reality, because they are simpler than reality but emphasizing its main features or, at least, those most relevant to the object of research (Cavero 2004). However, similar to the fact that there is no consensus concerning the meaning of model, there is no consensus concerning the meaning of isomorphism. Zbigniew William Wolkowski says that isomorphism may be defined in three different ways: Firstly, as...
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