Abstract
Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 USCA §1) states that, ‘[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.’ Antitrust law makes a violation of Section 1 a criminal offence and also establishes a private enforcement system to effect deterrence efficiently by establishing a private remedy for treble damages.
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© 2002 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Gertner, R.H., Rosenfield, A.M. (2002). Agreement under the Sherman Act. In: Newman, P. (eds) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_9
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