Abstract
Alimony is a payment, at divorce, from one spouse to the other; the literal meaning of the word is nourishment or substance (see Cohen 1987). Before the enactment of contemporary no-fault divorce regimes, alimony was either regarded as a remedy for breach of contract or as a continuation of marital support. Subsequently, as the introduction of no-fault divorce regimes in the Western world made breach of marital promises irrelevant for the determination of alimony, it has been determined on grounds such as need and available resources. These are, however, ambiguous concepts and so give no clear guidelines as to how courts should implement alimony. Instead, it has been argued that alimony should be grounded on efficiency, that is, it should be awarded to induce the spouses to behave efficiently within marriage. (for discussion of how, historically, alimony has been awarded, see Weitzman 1981; Cohen 1987; Ellman 1989; for the suggestion that alimony should be awarded to promote efficiency see Landes 1978; Ellman 1989; and for a discussion of principles for the calculation of alimony see Ellman 1989; Bolin 1994).
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© 2002 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Bolin, K. (2002). Alimony. In: Newman, P. (eds) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_12
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