Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Central Bank Independence

  • Reference work entry
  • First Online:
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

  • 45 Accesses

Abstract

Central bank independence refers to the freedom of monetary policymakers from direct political or governmental influence in the conduct of policy.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Bibliography

  • Alesina, A. and Summers, L. 1993. Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance. Journal of Money Credit, and Banking 25, 157–62.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bade, R. and Parkin, M. 1988. Central bank laws and monetary policy. Working paper. Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barro, R. and Gordon, D. 1983. A positive theory of monetary policy in a natural-rate model. Journal of Political Economy 91, 589–610.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Campillo, M. and Miron, J. 1997. Why does inflation differ across countries? In Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, ed. C. Romer and D. Romer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cukierman, A. 1992. Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cukierman, A., Webb, S. and Neyapti, B. 1992. Measuring the independence of central banks and its effects on policy outcomes. World Bank Economic Review 6, 353–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Debelle, G. and Fischer, S. 1994. How independent should a central bank be? In Goals, Guidelines and Constraints Facing Monetary Policymakers, ed. J. Fuhrer. Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eijffinger, S. and de Haan, J. 1996. The political economy of central-bank independence. Special Papers in International Economics, No. 19. Princeton University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grilli, V., Masciandaro, D. and Tabellini, G. 1991. Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries. Economic Policy 6, 341–92.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Posen, A. 1993. Why central bank independence does not cause low inflation: there is no institutional fix for politics. In Finance and the International Economy, vol. 7, ed. R. O’Brien. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rogoff, K. 1985. The optimal commitment to an intermediate monetary target. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, 1169–89.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Walsh, C. 2003. Monetary Theory and Policy, 2nd edn. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors
  1. Carl E. Walsh
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Steven N. Durlauf Lawrence E. Blume

Copyright information

© 2008 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

About this entry

Cite this entry

Walsh, C.E. (2008). Central Bank Independence. In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-58802-2_209

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-58802-2_209

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-333-78676-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-58802-2

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation