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Agency Problems

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Abstract

Within modern economic analysis, early recognition of the importance of agency problems goes back to at least Marschak (1955), Arrow (1963) and Pauly (1968). These early works are followed by the classical contributions of Mirrlees (1975), Holmstrom (1979), Shavell (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983).

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© 2008 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

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Anderlini, L., Felli, L. (2008). Agency Problems. In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-58802-2_15

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