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Cooperative Games

  • Reference work entry
  • First Online:
Complex Social and Behavioral Systems

Part of the book series: Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Series ((ECSSS))

  • Originally published in
  • R. A. Meyers (ed.), Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, © Springer Science+Business Media LLC 2017

Glossary

Characteristic or coalitional function:

The most usual way to represent a cooperative game.

Cooperative game:

Strategic situation involving coalitions, whose formation assumes the existence of binding agreements among players.

Core:

Solution concept that assigns the set of payoffs that cannot be improved upon by any coalition.

Game theory:

Discipline that studies strategic situations.

Shapley value:

Solution concept that assigns the average of marginal contributions to coalitions.

Solution concept:

Mapping that assigns predictions to each game.

Definition of the Subject

Cooperative:

It is one of the two counterparts of game theory. It studies the interactions among coalitions of game theory players. Its main question is this: Given the sets of feasible payoffs for each coalition, what payoff will be awarded to each player? One can take a positive or normative approach to answering this question, and different solution concepts in the theory lean towards one or the other.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA

    Roberto Serrano

Authors
  1. Roberto Serrano
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Roberto Serrano .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Sao Paulo, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance, Sao Paulo, Brazil

    Marilda Sotomayor

  2. Dept. of Economics and Economic History, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE, Barcelona, Spain

    David Pérez-Castrillo

  3. Istituto Applicazioni del Calcolo (IAC), Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR), Rome, Italy

    Filippo Castiglione

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Serrano, R. (2020). Cooperative Games. In: Sotomayor, M., Pérez-Castrillo, D., Castiglione, F. (eds) Complex Social and Behavioral Systems . Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Series. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_98

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