Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Auctions

  • Reference work entry
  • First Online:
Complex Social and Behavioral Systems

Part of the book series: Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Series ((ECSSS))

  • 870 Accesses

  • Originally published in
  • R. A. Meyers (ed.), Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, © Springer Science+Business Media LLC 2018

Glossary

All-pay first-price auction:

Bidders submit sealed bids. The high bidder wins the item. In case of a tie, the auctioneer randomly assigns the item to one of the high bidders with equal probability. All bidders (including losing bidders) pay their bid.

Bayesian Nash equilibrium:

A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a collection of bidding strategies so that (i) no bidder has an incentive to deviate and (ii) beliefs are consistent with the underlying informational assumptions.

Bidding strategy:

A bidding strategy for a buyer is a mapping from the buyer’s signal into bid prices.

Dutch auction:

Price falls until one bidder presses her button. That bidder gets the object at the current price. Losers pay nothing.

English auction:

Bidders call out successively higher prices until one bidder remains. The item is allocated to the last remaining bidder at the price at which the second last bidder dropped out.

First-price auction:

Bidders submit sealed bids. The high bidder wins the item and...

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 379.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 499.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Bibliography

  • Athey S, Levin J, Seira E (2011) Comparing open and sealed bid auctions: evidence from timber auctions. Q J Econ 126:207–257

    Google Scholar 

  • Bazerman MH, Samuelson WF (1983) I won the auction but don’t want the prize. J Confl Resolut 27(4):618–634

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergemann D, Pesendorfer M (2007) Information structures in optimal auctions. J Econ Theory 137:580–609

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Bergemann D, Brooks B, Morris S (2017) First-price auctions with general information structures: implications for bidding and revenue. Econometrica 85(1):107–143

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Cassady R (1967) Auctions and Auctioneering. University of California Press, Berkeley

    Google Scholar 

  • Graham DA, Marshall RC (1987) Collusive bidder behavior at single-object second-price and English auctions. J Polit Econ 95(6):1217–1239

    Google Scholar 

  • Guerre E, Perrigne I, Vuong Q (2000) Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions. Econometrica 68(3):525–574

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Hong H, Paarsch HH (2006) An introduction to the structural econometrics of auction data. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Hortacsu A, McAdams D (2016) Empirical work on auctions of multiple objects. J Econ Lit (forthcoming)

    Google Scholar 

  • Klemperer P (1999) Auction theory: a guide to the literature. J Econ Surv 13(3):227–286

    Google Scholar 

  • Krishna V (2002) Auction theory. Academic, San Diego

    Google Scholar 

  • Li T, Zheng X (2009) Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: theory and evidence from procurement auctions. Rev Econ Stud 76(4):1397–1429

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Maskin E, Riley J (1984) Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers. Econometrica 52(6):1473–1518

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Maskin E, Riley J (2000) Asymmetric auctions. Rev Econ Stud 67:413–438

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Maskin E, Riley J (2003) Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions. Games Econ Behav 45:395–409

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Matthews S (1987) Comparing auctions for risk averse buyers: a buyer’s point of view. Econometrica 55(3):633–646

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • McAfee P, McMillan J (1987) Auctions and bidding. J Econ Lit 25:699–738

    Google Scholar 

  • Milgrom PR, Weber RJ (1982) A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica 50:1089–1122

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Myerson RB (1981) Optimal auction design. Math Oper Res 6:58–73

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Persico N (2000) Information acquisition in auctions. Econometrica 68(1):135–148

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Pesendorfer M (2000) A study of collusion in first-price auctions. Rev Econ Stud 67(3):381–411

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Porter RH (1995) The role of information in U.S. offshore oil and gas lease auctions. Econometrica 63(1):1–27

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Porter RH, Zona JD (1993) Detection of bid rigging in procurement auctions. J Polit Econ 101(3):518–538

    Google Scholar 

  • Riley JG, Samuelson WF (1981) Optimal auctions. Am Econ Rev 71:381–392

    Google Scholar 

  • Tamer E (2003) Incomplete simultaneous discrete response model with multiple equilibria. Rev Econ Stud 70(1):147–165

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Vickrey W (1961) Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J Financ 16(1):8–37

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Wilson R (1977) A bidding model of perfect competition. Rev Econ Stud 44:511–518

    MATH  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

    Martin Pesendorfer

Authors
  1. Martin Pesendorfer
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Martin Pesendorfer .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Sao Paulo, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance, Sao Paulo, Brazil

    Marilda Sotomayor

  2. Dept. of Economics and Economic History, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE, Barcelona, Spain

    David Pérez-Castrillo

  3. Istituto Applicazioni del Calcolo (IAC), Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR), Rome, Italy

    Filippo Castiglione

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature

About this entry

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this entry

Pesendorfer, M. (2020). Auctions. In: Sotomayor, M., Pérez-Castrillo, D., Castiglione, F. (eds) Complex Social and Behavioral Systems . Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Series. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_669

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation