Glossary
- Player :
-
A participant in a game
- Action set :
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The set of actions that a player may choose
- Action profile :
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A list of actions, one for each player
- Payoff :
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The utility a player obtains from a given action profile
Definition of the Subject
Game theory concerns the interaction of decision makers. This interaction is modeled by means of games. There are various approaches to constructing games. One approach is to focus on the possible outcomes of the decision-makers’ interaction by abstracting from the actions or decisions that may lead to these outcomes. The main tool used to implement this approach is the cooperative game. Another approach is to focus on the actions that the decision-makers can take, the main tool being the non-cooperative game. Within this approach, strategic interactions are modeled in two ways. One is by means of dynamic, or extensive form games, and the other is by means of static, or strategic games. Dynamic games stress the sequentiality of the various...
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Volij, O. (2009). Static Games. In: Sotomayor, M., Pérez-Castrillo, D., Castiglione, F. (eds) Complex Social and Behavioral Systems . Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Series. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_517
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