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Inspection Games

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Complex Social and Behavioral Systems

Part of the book series: Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Series ((ECSSS))

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  • Originally published in
  • R. A. Meyers (ed.), Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, © Springer Science+Business Media LLC 2017

Glossary

Deterrence:

In an inspection game, deterrence is said to be achieved by a Nash equilibrium in which the inspectee behaves legally, or in accordance with the agreed rule.

Extensive form:

The extensive form of a noncooperative game is a graphical representation which describes a succession of moves by different players, including chance moves, and which can handle quite intricate information patterns.

Inspector leadership:

Leadership in inspection games is a strategic concept by which, through persuasive announcement of her strategy, the inspector can achieve deterrence.

Mixed strategy:

A mixed strategy for a player in a noncooperative game is a probability distribution over that player’s pure strategies.

Nash equilibrium:

A Nash equilibrium in a noncooperative game is a specification of strategies for all players with the property that no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from her specified strategy. A solutionof a noncooperative game is a Nash equilibrium which...

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Armed Forces University Munich, Neubiberg, Germany

    Rudolf Avenhaus

  2. Institute for Chemistry and Dynamics of the Geosphere, Forschungszentrum Jülich, Jülich, Germany

    Morton J. Canty

Authors
  1. Rudolf Avenhaus
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  2. Morton J. Canty
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Rudolf Avenhaus .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Sao Paulo, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance, Sao Paulo, Brazil

    Marilda Sotomayor

  2. Dept. of Economics and Economic History, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE, Barcelona, Spain

    David Pérez-Castrillo

  3. Istituto Applicazioni del Calcolo (IAC), Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR), Rome, Italy

    Filippo Castiglione

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Avenhaus, R., Canty, M.J. (2020). Inspection Games. In: Sotomayor, M., Pérez-Castrillo, D., Castiglione, F. (eds) Complex Social and Behavioral Systems . Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Series. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_287

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