Definition of the Subject
- Cooperative game theory :
It is one of the two counterparts of game theory. It studies the interactions among coalitions of players. Its main question is this: Given the sets of feasible payoffs for each coalition, what payoff will be awarded to each player? One can take a positive or normative approach to answering this question, and different solution concepts in the theory lean towards one or the other.
It is a solution concept that assigns to each cooperative game the set of payoffs that no coalition can improve upon or block. In a context in which there is unfettered coalitional interaction, the core arises as a good positive answer to the question posed in cooperative game theory. In other words, if a payoff does not belong to the core, one should not expect to see it as the prediction of the theory if there is full cooperation.
- Shapley value :
It is a solution that prescribes a single payoff for each player, which is the average of all marginal...
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- Game theory :
Discipline that studies strategic situations.
- Cooperative game :
Strategic situation involving coalitions, whose formation assumes the existence of binding agreements among players.
- Characteristic or coalitional function:
The most usual way to represent a cooperative game.
- Solution concept :
Mapping that assigns predictions to each game.
- Core :
Solution concept that assigns the set of payoffs that cannot be improved upon by any coalition.
- Shapley value :
Solution concept that assigns the average of marginal contributions to coalitions .
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Books and Reviews
Myerson RB (1991) Game Theory: An Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Osborne MJ, Rubinstein A (1994) A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge
Peleg B, Sudholter P (2003) Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games. Kluwer, Amsterdam. 2nd edn. Springer, Berlin
Roth AE, Sotomayor M (1990) Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game‐Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Editors and Affiliations
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Serrano, R. (2009). Cooperative Games. In: Meyers, R. (eds) Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30440-3_98
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-0-387-75888-6
Online ISBN: 978-0-387-30440-3