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Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science pp 1509–1518Cite as

Cooperative Games

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Definition of the Subject

Cooperative game theory :

It is one of the two counterparts of game theory. It studies the interactions among coalitions of players. Its main question is this: Given the sets of feasible payoffs for each coalition, what payoff will be awarded to each player? One can take a positive or normative approach to answering this question, and different solution concepts in the theory lean towards one or the other.

Core:

It is a solution concept that assigns to each cooperative game the set of payoffs that no coalition can improve upon or block. In a context in which there is unfettered coalitional interaction, the core arises as a good positive answer to the question posed in cooperative game theory. In other words, if a payoff does not belong to the core, one should not expect to see it as the prediction of the theory if there is full cooperation.

Shapley value :

It is a solution that prescribes a single payoff for each player, which is the average of all marginal...

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Abbreviations

Game theory :

Discipline that studies strategic situations.

Cooperative game :

Strategic situation involving coalitions, whose formation assumes the existence of binding agreements among players.

Characteristic or coalitional function:

The most usual way to represent a cooperative game.

Solution concept :

Mapping that assigns predictions to each game.

Core :

Solution concept that assigns the set of payoffs that cannot be improved upon by any coalition.

Shapley value :

Solution concept that assigns the average of marginal contributions to coalitions .

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, USA

    Roberto Serrano

  2. IMDEA‐Social Sciences, Madrid, Spain

    Roberto Serrano

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  1. Roberto Serrano
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. RAMTECH LIMITED, 122 Escalle Lane, Larkspur, CA, 94939, USA

    Robert A. Meyers Ph. D. (Editor-in-Chief) (Editor-in-Chief)

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Serrano, R. (2009). Cooperative Games. In: Meyers, R. (eds) Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30440-3_98

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