Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science

2009 Edition
| Editors: Robert A. Meyers (Editor-in-Chief)

DynamicGames with an Application to ClimateChange Models

  • Prajit K. Dutta
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30440-3_137

Definition of the Subject

The study of dynamic games is an important topic within game theory . Dynamic games involve thestudy of problems that are a) inherently dynamic in nature (even without a game‐theoretic angle) and b) are naturally studied froma strategic perspective. Towards that end the structure generalizes dynamic programming – which is the most popular model within whichinherently dynamic but non‐strategic problems are studied. It also generalizes the model of repeated games within which strategic interaction isoften studied but which structure cannot handle dynamic problems. A large number of economic problems fit these two requirements.

In this paper we examine the dynamic game model. The structure is discussed in detail as well as its principal results. Then the paper introducesa leading important application, the economics of climate change. It is shown that the problem is best studied as a dynamic commons game. Somerecent models and associated results are then...

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Prajit K. Dutta
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsColumbia UniversityNew YorkUSA