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Ranked Matching

2005; Abraham, Irving, Kavitha, Mehlhorn

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Encyclopedia of Algorithms

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  1. Abdulkadiroĝlu, A., Sönmez, T.: Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems. Econom. 66(3), 689–701 (1998)

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  3. Abraham, D.J., Irving, R.W., Kavitha, T., Mehlhorn, K.: Popular matchings. In: Proceedings of the 16th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pp. 424–432. SIAM, Vancouver (2005)

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  4. Gale, D., Shapley, L.S.: College admissions and the stability of marriage. Am. Math. Mon. 69, 9–15 (1962)

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  9. Irving, R.W., Kavitha, T., Mehlhorn, K., Michail, D., Paluch, K.: Rank-maximal matchings. In: Proceedings of the 15th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pp. 68–75. SIAM, New Orleans (2004)

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. CSA Department, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India

    Kavitha Telikepalli

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  1. Kavitha Telikepalli
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer ScienceMcCormick School of Engineering and Applied Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA

    Ming-Yang Kao Professor of Computer Science

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag

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Telikepalli, K. (2008). Ranked Matching. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30162-4_331

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