Encyclopedia of Algorithms

2008 Edition
| Editors: Ming-Yang Kao

False-Name-Proof Auction

2004; Yokoo, Sakurai, Matsubara
  • Makoto Yokoo
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30162-4_141

Keywords and Synonyms

False-name-proof auctions; Pseudonymous bidding ; Robustness against false-name bids      

Problem Definition

In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids under multiple identifiers (e. g., multiple e-mail addresses). If only one item/good is sold, a bidder cannot make any additional profit by using multiple bids. However, in combinatorial auctions, where multiple items/goods are sold simultaneously, submitting multiple bids under fictitious names can be profitable. A bid made under a fictitious name is called a false-name bid.

Here, use the same model as the GVA section. In addition, false-name bids are modeled as follows.
  • Each bidder can use multiple identifiers.

  • Each identifier is unique and cannot be impersonated.

  • Nobody (except the owner) knows whether two identifiers belongs to the same bidder or not.

The goal is to design a false-name-proof protocol, i. e., a protocol in which using false-names is useless, thus bidders voluntarily...

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Recommended Reading

  1. 1.
    Iwasaki, A., Yokoo, M., Terada, K.: A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids. Decis. Support. Syst. 39, 23–39 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Yokoo, M.: The characterization of strategy/false-name proof combinatorial auction protocols: Price-oriented, rationing-free protocol. In: Proceedings of the 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 733–739 (2003)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Yokoo, M., Sakurai, Y., Matsubara, S.: Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids. Artif. Intell. 130, 167–181 (2001)MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Yokoo, M., Sakurai, Y., Matsubara, S.: The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: New fraud in Internet auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 46, 174–188 (2004)MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Yokoo, M., Sakurai, Y., Matsubara, S.: Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids. Decis. Support. Syst. 39, 23–39 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Makoto Yokoo
    • 1
  1. 1.Information Science and Electrical EngineeringKyushu UniversityFukuokaJapan