Advertisement

Constitutional Features of Presidential Elections and the Failure of Cross-ethnic Coalitions to Institutionalize

  • M. Bashir MobasherEmail author
Living reference work entry

Abstract

This article studies the constitutional features of Afghan presidential elections and their impact on coalition-building. Based on the constitution, Afghan presidential elections are candidate-centric, zero-sum games, prone to pre-electoral bargaining, majoritarian, double ballots, religiously exclusive, and constrained by electoral cycles, as well as presidential term limits. Examining the presidential electoral features, this article argues that they do not have unidirectional impacts on coalition-building: some electoral features incentivize the formation of cross-ethnic coalitions, while others hinder their institutionalization. Therefore, while some function as constructive features, others are obstructive to coalition-building. This article proposes that the obstructive features of presidential elections can be remedied through institutional designs. The remedies proposed in this article include holding concurrent elections and adopting nomination thresholds.

Keywords

Presidential elections Electoral features Cross-ethnic Coalition-building 

References

  1. Bijlert MV (2009) How to win an Afghan election: preceptions and practices. Afghan Analyst Network, KabulGoogle Scholar
  2. Blais A, Indridason IH (2007) Making candidates count: the logic of electoral alliances in two-round legislative elections. J Polit 69(1):192: 214CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Carey JM (1999) Constitutional choices and the performances of presidential regimes. J Soc Sci 11(1):93: 122Google Scholar
  4. Clark K (2015) The cabinet and the parliament: Afghanistan’s government in trouble before it is formed. Afghanistan Analyst Network. Available via https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-cabinet-and-the-parliament-afghanistans-government-in-trouble-before-it-is-formed/
  5. Cox GW (1997) Making votes count, strategic coordination in world’s electoral systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UKCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Davis PB (1980) The future of presidential tenure. Pres Stud Q 10(1):472: 473Google Scholar
  7. Druzin H (2013) Karzai not only at odds with US, but his countrymen, too. Star and Stripes. Available via http://www.stripes.com/karzai-not-only-at-oddswith-us-but-his-countrymen-too-1.254874
  8. Duverger M (1984) Presidential elections and party system in Europe (trans: Rowen HH). In: McCormick RL (ed) Political parties and the modern state. Rutgers University Press, New JerseyGoogle Scholar
  9. Horowitz DL (2001) Ethnic groups in conflict. University of California Press, BerkeleyGoogle Scholar
  10. Jones MP (1995) Electoral laws and the survival of presidential democracies. University of Michigan Press, MichiganGoogle Scholar
  11. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) Problems of democratic transition and consolidation, p 181Google Scholar
  12. Lijphart A (1977) Democracy in plural societies. Yale University Press, LondonGoogle Scholar
  13. Lijphart A (2008) Thinking about democracy: power sharing and majority rule in theory and practice. Routledge, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  14. Linz JJ (1994) Presidential or parliamentary democracy. In: Linz JJ, Valenzuela A (eds) The failure of presidential democracy. JHU Press, MarylandGoogle Scholar
  15. Mainwaring S, Shugart MS (1997) Presidentialism and democracy in Latin America. Cambridge University Press, LondonCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Martínez CV (2015) Presidential term limits. Political and economic effects of reelection in Latin America (1990–2010). Dissertation, University of EssexGoogle Scholar
  17. Mobasher MB (2016) Understanding ethnic-electoral dynamics: how ethnic politics affect electoral laws and election outcomes in Afghanistan. Gonzaga L Rev 51(2):355: 415Google Scholar
  18. Mobasher MB (2017) Electoral choices, ethnic accommodation, and the consolidation of cross-ethnic coalitions: critiquing the runoff clause of the afghan constitution. Pac Rim L Pol’y J 26(3):413: 462Google Scholar
  19. Neale TH (2009) Presidential terms and tenure: perspectives and proposals for change, Congressional Research Service. Available via http://www.whitehousetransitionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Terms-Tenure_101909-1.pdf
  20. Nogare CD, Ricciuti R (2008) Term limits: do they really affect fiscal policy choices? Working paper 2199, CESIFOGoogle Scholar
  21. Pridham G, Lewis PG (1996) Stabilizing fragile democracies. Routledge, LondonGoogle Scholar
  22. Sharan T (2014) Dynamic Qudrat Shabaka Hai Seyasi Dar Intekhabat Ryasat Jamhuri 2009 [The dynamics of political networks in the presidential election of 2009]. In: Ahmadi MN, Ismaelzada MM (eds) Democracy Afghani: Fursat Ha Wa Chalish Ha [Afghan democracy: challenges and opportunities]. Andisha, KabulGoogle Scholar
  23. Stoll H (2013) Changing societies, changing party systems. Cambridge University Press, New YorkCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Suleiman EN (1992) Presidentialism and political stability in France. In: Linz JJ, Valenzuela A (eds) The failure of presidential democracy. JHU Press, MarylandGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceAmerican University of AfghanistanKabulAfghanistan

Section editors and affiliations

  • Paul Carnegie
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Government, Development & International AffairsThe University of the South PacificSuvaFiji

Personalised recommendations