Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics

2019 Edition
| Editors: David M. Kaplan

Food and Agricultural Trade Sanctions

Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1179-9_561



States faced with behavior by foreign governments that are perceived to be objectionable have a variety of policy responses ranging from doing nothing to declaring war. Among the foreign policy tools available, various types of sanctions have frequently been deployed both by individual states and collectively through international organizations such as the United Nations (UN). Sanctions involve the suspension of normal relations with foreign countries with the aim of forcing the offending government to alter its behavior. They are often seen as more effective than diplomatic responses but less costly than outright war. Economic sanctions, the most common type of sanction, are defined by Hufbauer et al. (2007) as “… the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations.” Governments may also initiate sanctions that are less directly...

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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Agricultural EconomicsUniversity of Nebraska-LincolnLincolnUSA
  2. 2.University of Nebraska College of LawBostonUSA