Abstract
Before returning to Australia from Oxford, Peter Singer (1973) concluded one of his earliest papers with the timely comment that ‘It is . . . necessary, before embarking on a discussion of morality, to make quite clear in what sense one is using terms like “moral judgment”, and what follows and what does not follow from such a use of the term. This is an essential preliminary; but it is only a preliminary. My complaint is that what should be regarded as something to be got out of the way in the introduction to a work of moral philosophy has become the subject-matter of almost the whole of moral philosophy in the English-speaking world’ (Singer 1973, p. 56). The preoccupation with linguistic analysis bemoaned by Singer would shortly give way to a global renaissance of work in normative and applied ethics, and philosophers in Australia and New Zealand have figured quite prominently in these developments while also producing cutting-edge work in metaethics and moral psychology. Although Australasian philosophy was traditionally much better known for its contributions to metaphysics than to moral philosophy, the emergence of influential work in normative ethics, metaethics and moral psychology over the last two decades has done much to raise the profile of Australasian moral philosophy internationally.
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Notes
- 1.
In this chapter I focus on work in moral philosophy done by philosophers working in Australia and New Zealand at the time they produced it, and so I therefore mostly exclude work done overseas by Australian- or New Zealand-born philosophers. Also, I concentrate primarily on work in the analytic rather than the continental tradition, and particularly on major developments in Australasian moral philosophy since 1950. The period in Australian philosophy prior to 1950 has been ably covered by others, such as Grave (1984), Scarlett (1992), Coady (1998), and Franklin (2003), and in Australasian philosophy more broadly, in the various entries under individual departments and topics, in Oppy and Trakakis (2010).
- 2.
In his preface to the 1981 Hackett reissue of Sidgwick’s 1874 Methods of Ethics, John Rawls comments that English moral philosophy has been dominated by Utilitarianism for over two centuries.
- 3.
For discussion of Bentham’s panopticon and its use in Port Arthur, see Driver (2007, pp. 42–43). Also, a little-known fact here is that Cambridge philosopher Henry Sidgwick, whose 1874 book The Methods of Ethics is hailed by many contemporary moral philosophers as the most fully and systematically worked out form of utilitarianism thus far developed, graduated from Rugby School in the same class as Tom Wills, who is credited with creating Australian rules football in the late 1850s by blending the rules of rugby with those of the Australian indigenous game known as ‘marn-grook’. It is intriguing to speculate about whether Wills, who also became a star cricketer for Cambridge University (and later founded the Melbourne and Geelong football clubs), consulted Sidgwick about the rules for the new game that he was devising. Sidgwick refers to various games (and especially cricket) in his writings, including in his discussion of pleasure, but there is apparently no mention of Australian football in Sidgwick’s published writings.
- 4.
Note that Peter Singer’s interest in Utilitarianism and its strong commitment to impartiality, along with his wariness of any objectivist metaethic, seems to have been influenced by his strong sense of the horrors of Nazism, which directly impacted on his parents and grandparents. See Singer’s replies in Jamieson (1999). Also, an important contribution to discussions of moral relativism is Levy (2002a).
- 5.
Also important here are Chin Liew Ten’s (1980) criticisms of Mill’s ‘proof’ of the principle of utility.
- 6.
A good example of more recent Australian work on decision theory and consequentialism is Colyvan et al. (2010).
- 7.
In his subsequent book, McCloskey (1971) discusses these criticisms in relation to Mill’s utilitarianism, and demonstrates how Mill is an act utilitarian rather than a rule utilitarian.
- 8.
The 2008 Australian Catholic University Eureka Prize for Research in Ethics was awarded to Cullity for this book, and he decided to donate the $10,000 prize money to charity (see The Age 12 October 2010).
- 9.
Michael Smith (2005) has argued that virtually all ethical theories can be understood as forms of consequentialism, at least when it is construed in a minimalist way as telling us that we ought to do that which we have most reason to do. See also Smith (2009) for a discussion of how the idea of rights as side-constraints can also be understood in consequentialist terms, and Jackson and Smith (2006).
- 10.
This book, published as part of Blackwell’s ‘Great Debates in Philosophy’ series, originated as a mini-conference on ‘Consequentialism, Kantianism, and Virtue Ethics’ held at Monash University in 1995, and featured the authors along with local speakers. The three authors cite Smart and Williams’ Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973) as ‘the closest predecessor’ to this volume.
- 11.
Mulgan currently has a chair in philosophy at the University of St Andrews, and he has recently published Understanding Utilitarianism (2007).
- 12.
- 13.
This book won the 2009 American Philosophical Association prize for the best book by a young philosopher published in the previous 2 years.
- 14.
In cases of tragic dilemmas Hursthouse holds that a decision about what to do in such a dilemma is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would (acting in character) decide, ‘but the action decided upon may be too terrible to be called “right” or “good”’ (1999, p. 79). Here Hursthouse also makes a valuable contribution to debates in moral philosophy about what are often called ‘evaluative remainders’ (see Stocker 1990, 1996), and about what the emotions which are usually thought appropriate in regard to such remainders (e.g. regret, remorse, or even guilt) might show about utilitarian and consequentialist approaches, which find it difficult to recognise how such emotions could be appropriate, if what the agent did was the right course of action to take.
- 15.
Hursthouse acknowledges that certain traits may serve some of these ends better than other of these ends. See also Perrett and Patterson (1991).
- 16.
Swanton’s work has also influenced, and been influenced by, other non-eudaimonist approaches to virtue ethics, such as that developed by Michael Slote (see, e.g., Slote 1992, 2001), who has been a regular visitor to the University of Auckland—though Slote’s agent-based approach differs significantly from Swanton’s target-centred account. For recent Australasian work on agent-based virtue ethics, see Cox (2006) and van Zyl (2009). In 2002 the University of Canterbury held a conference on ‘Virtue ethics: Old and New’, in which many of the world’s most prominent virtue ethicists participated, and this resulted in an important edited collection: Gardiner (2005). See also the contributions discussing virtue ethics in Pigden (ed) (2009). Other examples of Australian books on virtue ethics are van Hooft (2006, 2013).
- 17.
See also Green and Mews (eds) (2011) and Broad (forthcoming). University of NSW philosopher and mathematician James Franklin led an ARC-funded research project from 2006 to 2008 on restraint and the virtue of temperance, while Australian Catholic University philosopher Bernadette Tobin has written extensively on Aristotelian virtue and moral education: see, e.g. Tobin (1989, 2000).
- 18.
- 19.
- 20.
- 21.
Gaita also wrote a best-selling memoir about his childhood, Romulus My Father (Melbourne: Text, 1998), which subsequently became a highly acclaimed film.
- 22.
See also Ramsay (1997) and Oderberg and Laing (eds) (1997).
- 23.
For instance, La Trobe University philosopher Janna Thompson began teaching a semester-length subject on feminism that was widely known for its popularity.
- 24.
In counterpoint to Lloyd, see Green (1995), which contests the claim that philosophical ideals of reason have excluded the feminine.
- 25.
See also the influential work of expatriate New Zealand philosopher Annette Baier, whose article ‘The Need for More than Justice’ (1987) was a key stimulus for these debates. In her widely cited article ‘Trust and Anti-Trust’ (1986), Baier comments that the great moral philosophers have, by and large, been single males who had minimal dealings with women. They were, she says, mostly ‘clerics, misogynists and puritan bachelors’ who focused ‘single-mindedly on cool, distanced relations between more or less free and equal adult strangers’ (1986, p. 248).
- 26.
Martha Nussbaum engaged in a memorable exchange with Peter Singer when she gave the 2003 Tanner Lectures in Human Values at the Australian National University. Nussbaum’s lectures subsequently formed the basis of her (2006) book.
- 27.
Also, Singer has inspired many of his graduate students to become leading bioethicists in their own right (such as Julian Savulescu and Udo Schuklenk), and he has shown himself very capable of helping his students to develop arguments which conflict with his own views.
- 28.
Michael Tooley subsequently worked for some time in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Western Australia, as did Mary Anne Warren, who made important contributions in applied ethics and feminist perspectives on ethics.
- 29.
Clarke and Oakley were awarded the 2004 Australian Catholic University Eureka Prize for Research in Ethics for this work.
- 30.
Levy’s 2007 book, Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century, won the 2009 Australian Catholic University Eureka Prize for Research in Ethics, and Levy is also the founding editor of the international refereed journal, Neuroethics, which began in 2008.
- 31.
This book won the 2011 Australian Catholic University Eureka Prize for Research in Ethics.
- 32.
- 33.
- 34.
See also Jackson and Pettit’s (1995) development of a moral analogue to functionalism in philosophy of mind, analysing terms such as good, right, and fair in terms of the role that they typically play in ‘folk morality’. This sort of approach to philosophical analysis more generally is an important part of what is sometimes referred to as the ‘Canberra Plan’. See also Hamilton (2008).
- 35.
In her well-known paper ‘Moral Saints’, Susan Wolf (1982) uses a different argument to support a similar view about morality.
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Thanks to Nick Trakakis and Graham Oppy for their advice, and to Keith Campbell, Roger Crisp, Satoshi Kodama, and Barry and Carmel Oakley for their comments and suggestions.
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Oakley, J. (2014). Moral Philosophy in Australasia. In: Oppy, G., Trakakis, N. (eds) History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_21
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