The Canberra Plan and the Diversification of Australasian Philosophy: 1990s

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Abstract

The story of Philosophy in Australasia during the 1990s is one of diversification and maturation. The metaphysical naturalism of previous decades continues though it becomes more sophisticated and itself diversifies. The Canberra Plan became a self-conscious approach to philosophy though not without its critics. Perhaps in contrast to expectations fostered by preceding decades, one finds in Australasian philosophy a resurgence of Dualism, interest in arguments for God and anti-Utilitarian moral philosophy. In this chapter, I concentrate on the development of Functionalist philosophy of mind leaving the Dualism to one side, the resurgence in philosophy of religion, the emergence of Practical Ethics and Applied Philosophy in a widened context for doing philosophy and questions raised about the method and nature of philosophy by the moral philosophy of Raimond Gaita. The treatment is selective and cannot do justice to the breadth and variety of the discipline during the 1990s. I select to try to convey some of that breadth and variety. As always, philosophy in Australia is adventurous, vigorous and fundamental.

Keywords

Moral Judgement Normative Reason Virtuous Person Mental Causation Intentional Content 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of PhilosophyAustralian Catholic UniversityStrathfieldAustralia

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