Research in Related Disciplines and Non-Anglophone Areas

  • Frans H. van EemerenEmail author
  • Bart Garssen
  • Erik C. W. Krabbe
  • A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans
  • Bart Verheij
  • Jean H. M. Wagemans
Living reference work entry


This chapter discusses developments which have taken place, more or less independently, outside the research traditions treated in the earlier chapters. First, attention is paid to research in some disciplines and research programs that connect with argumentation theory and may even have some overlap with it. In Sect. 12.2 critical discourse analysis is discussed, in Sect. 12.3 historical controversy analysis, in Sect. 12.4 persuasion research and related quantitative research projects, and in Sect. 12.5 studies stemming from relevance theory which promote an argumentative turn in cognitive psychology.

The next chapters concentrate on developments in argumentation research that have taken place in non-Anglophone parts of the world, in which research results are often published in other languages than English. Concentrating on contributions which have not yet been discussed in other chapters, in Sect. 12.6 an overview of argumentation research in the Nordic countries is given, in Sect. 12.7 of argumentation studies in German-speaking areas, and in Sect. 12.8 of argumentation studies in Dutch-speaking areas. The study of argumentation in French-speaking areas is discussed in Sect. 12.9, and the study of argumentation in Italian-speaking areas in Sect. 12.10.

The next areas focused on are Eastern Europe, in Sect. 12.11, and Russia and other parts of the former USSR, in Sect. 12.12. Section 12.13 is devoted to the state of the art in argumentation theory in Spanish-speaking areas and Sect. 12.14 to the state of the art in Portuguese-speaking areas. Next, in Sect. 12.15 argumentation research in Israel is discussed, and in Sect. 12.16 argumentation research in the Arab world. The chapter concludes with an overview of the study of argumentation in Japan in Sect. 12.17 and an overview of the study of argumentation in China in Sect. 12.18.

12.1 Broader Disciplinary and International Scope

There are a great number of contributions to the study of argumentation that deserve to be mentioned which are not part of the generally recognized research traditions we have discussed in the previous chapters. For the most part these contributions are less familiar to the broader circle of argumentation theorists because they either stem from disciplines related to argumentation theory or have been developed areas which are not part of the Anglophone world. Some of them deal with a subject matter different from argumentation in which argumentation plays nevertheless an important role. Others are part of research projects on argumentation carried out in academic communities outside the Anglophone world. It is worthwhile to conclude the overview of the state of the art in argumentation theory given in this handbook with a brief discussion of the main characteristics of these contributions.

First, we will pay attention to research conducted in disciplines different from argumentation theory or by researchers who are not argumentation theorists, which is closely linked to the study of argumentation, so that it is useful to explore its relationship with argumentation theory. Such a close connection exists, for instance, with the flourishing approach to the study of discourse known as critical discourse analysis . The relationship between critical discourse analysis and argumentation theory will be discussed in Sect. 12.2. Next, in Sect. 12.3, we focus on the connection with argumentation theory of the prolific scholarship concerning historical controversies in science and other areas designated as historical controversy analysis. In Sect. 12.4, we discuss the relations of the empirical tradition of persuasion research and related types of quantitative research with argumentation theory. In Sect. 12.5, we turn to a development which has taken place more recently, the so-called argumentative turn in cognitive psychology, because in the future this development may lead to interesting combinations of insights from argumentation theory and insights from psychology.

Argumentation is studied all over the world by scholars from various intellectual backgrounds. Some of these scholars approach argumentation from a philosophical angle, generally adopting a normative perspective. Other scholars choose a rhetorical angle, usually with the purpose of analyzing specific argumentative practices. Still others favor a linguistic angle, aiming for a description of the functional use of elements of discourse in different kinds of argumentative practices. Most topics in the study of argumentation are in fact examined from various perspectives by means of various kinds of approaches. This goes, for example, for a topic such as relevance but also for unexpressed premises, argument schemes, and argumentation structures. In the examination of some other topics, such as the cognitive processing of argumentative discourse, the stylistic aspects of argumentation, the acquisition and teaching of argumentative skills, and the use of argumentation in special fields, specific types of approaches seem dominant. It is striking that in all cases just mentioned, a great number of authors have contributed a vast amount of publications.

In discussing argumentation research carried out in different parts of the world, we will start from the different kinds of native languages and communicative environments of the researchers. Our overview takes off with the study of argumentation in the Nordic countries. Beginning with Denmark, we sketch in Sect. 12.6 the state of the art in argumentation theory in Scandinavia and Finland. In Sect. 12.7, argumentation studies in the German-speaking countries which are not part of the theoretical approaches discussed earlier are brought to the fore. They include contributions from Germany, Austria, and the German-speaking part of Switzerland.

The prominent pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation has already been dealt with in Chap. 10, but there is still other scholarly work left to report about that is conducted in Dutch-speaking areas. In Sect. 12.8, we deal with studies of argumentation from the Netherlands and the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium. Although the linguistic tradition dominant in French argumentation theory is already treated in Chap. 9, various other interesting lines of approach are developed in France and the French-speaking parts of Switzerland, Belgium, and Canada. They are discussed in Sect. 12.9. Argumentation research conducted by Italian scholars which has not already been discussed when we reported about linguistic approaches to argumentation in Chap. 9 is treated in Sect. 12.10.

In Sect. 12.11, we discuss the study of argumentation in Eastern Europe, concentrating on developments in Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia. In Sect. 12.12, the study of argumentation in Russia and other parts of the former USSR is at issue. This means that prominent research that has been conducted in Russian research centers such as Moscow and St. Petersburg will be discussed but also argumentation research conducted in other former Soviet republics, such as Armenia, where modern argumentation theory in this part of the world started.

In Sect. 12.13, we concentrate on argumentation research in Spain and the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America, paying specifically attention to developments in Chile, Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico. A similar overview of the state of the art in argumentation theory in the Portuguese-speaking countries is presented in Sect. 12.14, proceeding from a discussion of the state of the art of argumentation theory in Portugal to argumentation studies in Brazil.

In Sect. 12.15, we discuss some remaining contributions to the study of argumentation stemming from Israel, which are not treated in other chapters of this handbook. Recent developments in argumentation theory in the Arab world are discussed in Sect. 12.16, going on from early research in Morocco to activities in other Arab countries.

In Sect. 12.17, we provide an overview of argumentation studies in Japan, which are as a rule linked with rhetoric and the American debate tradition. The study of argumentation in China and its connections with logic and Western argumentation theory are the focus of attention in Sect. 12.18.

12.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) refers to a body of work by scholars with a background mainly in linguistics who aim to analyze from a critical perspective the ways in which language is used in practice. According to Teun A. van Dijk, one of the leading protagonists of critical discourse analysis, they focus on “social problems, and especially [on] the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination” (2001, p. 96). Critical discourse analysis seeks to have an effect on social practice and social relationships of disempowerment, dominance prejudice, and discrimination and therefore “sees itself as politically involved research with an emancipatory requirement” (Titscher et al. 2000, p. 147).1 Instead of being characterized by one shared approach or method, various strands of research can be distinguished in critical discourse analysis. Most relevant to argumentation theory are Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl’s discourse–historical approach (Wodak 2009; Reisigl and Wodak 2009) and the argumentative approach of critical discourse analysis developed by Isabela and Norman Fairclough (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012).

All research in critical discourse analysis concentrates on the relationship between text and context. According to the discourse–historical approach, a speech event can only be properly understood if its manifest and latent meanings (implicatures, presuppositions, allusions, etc.), which are crucial to a critical analysis, are all read in context. Therefore, in critically analyzing speech events all contextual levels on which these speech events function need to be taken into account, together with the historical social and political backgrounds against which the speech events have come into being. This means that the reference points used in the discourse–historical approach in contextualizing speech events include not only their immediate physical and linguistic environment but also other speech events they are related to and the wider historical and sociopolitical framework in which they are embedded. Argumentation strategies are explicitly included among the discursive strategies by which individuals or groups present themselves and others positively or negatively in the discourse that are identified and examined in the discourse–historical approach (e.g., Reisigl and Wodak 2001).

In an essay about the possibilities of combining critical discourse analysis with the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, Constanza Ihnen and John Richardson (2011) point out that pragma-dialectics and critical discourse analysis, in particular the discourse–historical approach, have a lot in common. They share, for instance, the assumptions that language use is a goal-oriented activity, subjected to contextual constraints, and that the use of language is aimed not only at understanding but also at acceptance. In addition, they share a pragmatic linking of the meaning of discourse to the context of use, a strong emphasis on the strategic aspects of discourse, and an explicit concern with evaluation or “critique.”2 Recognizing the advantages involved in using theoretical instruments from pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren 2010) in critical discourse analysis, Ihnen and Richardson advocate their application of insights from this argumentation theory to a critical analysis of argumentative discourse and the strategic maneuvering taking place in argumentative discourse.3

Several critical discourse analysts have indeed made use of insights from pragma-dialectics in their analyses. Among them are Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, who use the model of a critical discussion in their critical examination of linguistic strategies of argumentation (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). Albert Atkin and John Richardson use the theoretical grounding provided by the pragma-dialectical argument schemes in reconstructing implicit premises and standpoints and identifying the justificatory relations between the reasons that are advanced and the standpoints that are defended (Atkin and Richardson 2007). Important differences between pragma-dialectics and critical discourse analysis are, of course, that the scope of the latter is by definition broader than argumentative discourse.4 In addition, instead of one general method, a variety of methods of analysis are used, but also, and more distinctively, critical discourse analysis has an ideological focus5 and starting point.6

In the linguistically oriented approach to critical discourse analysis developed by Norman Fairclough (2001, 2003) and others, a great deal of attention is paid to differences in the ways in which messages are phrased and their ideological implications. The idea behind this approach, which is sometimes labeled critical linguistics , is that the use of a language always involves making choices from the available linguistic potential and that such choices have a certain meaning. Fairclough, who is one of the founding fathers of critical discourse analysis, has made it clear that, to determine this meaning, it is always necessary to compare the formulation that has been chosen with other options that have not been chosen. In Language and Power, he formulates a series of questions that can be helpful in interpreting a text critically. They relate to the language functions of representation, interaction, and evaluation and concern the use of vocabulary, the way in which grammar is employed, and certain textual characteristics.7 Although Fairclough does not focus on argumentation, his observations concerning the way in which choices in language use affect the meaning of what is said are in fact also highly relevant to the analysis of argumentative discourse, in particular when the focus is on strategic maneuvering.

Together with Isabela Ieţcu-Fairclough, who paved the way by including insights from pragma-dialectics in her studies of argumentative discourse and strategic maneuvering (e.g., Ieţcu-Fairclough 2008, 2009), Fairclough developed at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century a new, argumentative approach to the analysis of political discourse in critical discourse analysis. In their book Political Discourse Analysis, Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) argue emphatically that in critical discourse analysis, the largely argumentative nature of political discourse and the centrality of practical argumentation had earlier not been sufficiently taken into account. The discourse conducted in the deliberative activity types of the political domain involves in the first place practical argumentation aimed at justifying or criticizing decisions or action claims. In line with pragma-dialectics and its critical conception of reasonableness (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992a), Fairclough and Fairclough view a reasonable decision or action claim as the outcome of a dialectical procedure of critical questioning. Following this dialectical procedure is, in their view, the only possible guarantee that a reasonable (although not automatically the best) decision will be achieved.

Drawing on insights concerning argument schemes developed in argumentation theory by Walton (2007) and Walton, Reed, and Macagno (2008), Fairclough and Fairclough suggest a schema for practical argumentation in which a normative action claim is defended by premises referring to the circumstances in which the action takes place, a desirable goal and a presumptive means–end relationship. They put this argument schema to good use in critical discourse analysis by employing it as a tool for a reconstructive analysis and evaluation of argumentation put forward in a wide range of texts on the economic crisis in the early twenty-first century.

The argumentative approach that Fairclough and Fairclough have taken enables a reinterpretation of crucial concepts critical discourse analysis has traditionally worked with in terms of argumentation theory. It makes, for instance, clear that, as a process of public justification, legitimation is argumentative by nature; similarly, political visions or imaginaries are goal premises in practical arguments. Power, an ever-present concern of critical discourse analysts, is in this argumentative approach viewed as a reason for action. In the same vein, discourses provide agents with reasons for action: premises in their practical arguments. Thus, practical reasoning is seen as the interface between agency and structure: In practical reasoning agents draw on discourses which reflect to a large extent social, institutional, or moral orders that have an objective status for the agents. As objective structures, these order-reflecting discourses provide agents with reasons for action that impose constraints on decision-making. According to Fairclough and Fairclough, in political discourse the actors are expected to abide by the norms and commitments that make up the institutional fabric of the political system and constitute the implicit ‘contract’ the citizens are engaged in. The political domain is thus inherently connected with argumentation and deliberation because, being essentially an institutional order, it involves obligations, commitments, and the like that provide agents with reasons for action. Acting within the political field presupposes the existence of such reasons, specific to the field, which political actors have to take into account in deliberating what to do.

Crucially, the analysis and evaluation of argumentation are in this approach viewed as the appropriate grounding for normative and explanatory social critique, including ideological critique. Critical discourse analysts are out to answer such questions as why certain discourses achieve hegemony, why they go unchallenged, and why they tend to become naturalized as common sense – these questions are part of explanatory critique. The role of power as a reason for action can figure prominently in such analyses. By looking at action claims based on premises that do not withstand critical examination (for instance, unacceptable representations of the context of action, unacceptable goal or value premises, or normative priorities that are not rationally defensible), critical discourse analysts can engage in normative critique. Questions as to whether or not a proposed course of action based on such premises is likely to contribute to human well-being and whether a proposed course of action emerges from (democratic) deliberation free from constraints that prevent a reasonable outcome will also be prominent in this type of analysis. The possibilities for critical questioning of arguments can be viewed as a vehicle for social critique and for the evaluation of arguments – the two are clearly interrelated. In this way, Fairclough and Fairclough are making a fundamental connection between argumentation theory and critical discourse analysis.

12.3 Historical Controversy Analysis

Within the International Association for the Study of Controversies (IASC), controversies are examined by scholars who aim to make enlightening analyses of the way in which a certain controversy comes about, develops, and comes to an end or – not atypically – remains in place. A considerable amount of these analyses concentrate on cases of controversy in the history of science, but due attention has also been paid to other kinds of historic and present-day controversies. Controversies have been studied by means of descriptive (historical or sociological) approaches and by means of normative (philosophical) approaches. Early collections of studies already testify to the plethora of approaches (see Engelhardt and Caplan 1987; Machamer et al. 2000).

Thanks to Marcelo Dascal of Tel Aviv University, who may be considered the intellectual leader of the study of controversies, a growing group of philosophers examines controversies in the history of philosophy and the sciences “by trying to be as descriptive as possible,” not “by way of imposing pre-ordained normative schemata on the historical debates” (Dascal 2001, p. 314). According to Dascal (2001), “controversies are necessary for the formation, evolution and evaluation of philosophical theories, and thereby for the progress […] of philosophical knowledge” (p. 314). The examination of the nature and the role of controversies in the history of philosophy are therefore relevant for scholars studying philosophical and scientific development. With Kant, Dascal believes that philosophers should not apply “pure reason to issues that lie beyond its capacity” (p. 313). In his view, they should not try to decide philosophical controversies, but to learn something from controversies about “the limitation and powers of pure reason” (p. 313). A case in point is Dascal’s (2001) analysis of the infamous Searle-Derrida polemic, which, at first glance, may look like an irrational dispute, but proves to be much more – in spite of the sarcastic and bitter tone of debate. In his analysis, Dascal shows exactly where Derrida and Searle diverge, but also points out shared assumptions and beliefs.

According to Dascal (1998), scientific controversies are “the locus where critical activity – essential for science – is exercised and its norms established, applied, and modified” (pp. 15–17). Science has manifested itself in its history as a sequence of controversies and therefore controversies are not anomalies but the “natural state” of science. Systematically investigating scientific controversies is a major task for the philosophy and history of science because these controversies provide the “relevant dialogical context where the meaning of theories is shaped” (p. 17). In controversies, Dascal continues, “entrenched beliefs, data, methods, interpretations, and procedures can be challenged – which paves the way for the possibility of radical innovation” (p. 17). It is by observing and analyzing scientific controversies that “the de facto nature of the workings of scientific rationality (or irrationality) can be determined” (p. 17).8 This does not mean, however, that controversy studies are limited to philosophical and scientific polemical exchanges: They should also deal with historical and contemporary social and political conflicts and conflict resolution.

In order to facilitate the analysis of philosophical and scientific controversies, Dascal developed a threefold typology of debates: “discussion,” “dispute,” and “controversy.” In fact, he introduced the category of controversy as a response to the existing dichotomy between discussion and dispute. Traditionally, Dascal (2001, p. 316) claims discussion has been viewed as a rule-based rational procedure, while dispute has been characterized as governed by “extra-rational factors.” He believes that for an analysis of philosophical and scientific polemical exchanges, the third category of controversy is necessary because so many philosophical and scientific debates are rational but there is no general agreement on the rules for the rational procedure, so that they are neither discussions nor disputes.

The most important distinguishing factors underlying Dascal’s three types are “their overall aims, general thematic and hierarchical structure, the way they are conceptualized by the contenders, and the corresponding assumptions about their rules (if any) and their mode or resolution” (2001, p. 314). According to Dascal, a discussion is a type of dialogue about a “well-circumscribed topic or problem” (p. 314). The desired end result of a discussion is a “solution which consists in correcting the mistake thanks to the application of procedures accepted in the field (e.g., proof, computation, repetition of experiments, etc.)” (p. 315). A dispute starts, just like a discussion, with a well-defined problem, but, according to Dascal, the contenders see the confrontation “as rooted in differences of attitudes, feelings, or preferences” rather than in some kind of mistake (p. 315). Because there are no mutually accepted procedures for deciding the dispute, it has no solution and can, in Dascal’s terminology, at best be “dissolved.” This means that the dispute is terminated by an external arbitrary procedure, such as calling the police or throwing dice. In principle, ending, i.e., dissolving, a dispute by some kind of external intervention does not change the contenders’ belief in the correctness and justification of their positions.

A controversy is a type of debate that occupies an intermediate position between a discussion and a dispute. According to Dascal (2001), just like in discussions and disputes, in controversies the debate starts with a specific and well-defined problem “but it spreads quickly to other problems and reveals profound divergences” (p. 315). Controversies resemble disputes because the parties realize that a mistake is not at the root of the debate. Because the differences involve “opposed attitudes and preferences, as well as disagreements about the extant methods for problem-solving,” the oppositions between the parties are not perceived simply as mistakes to be corrected, nor are there accepted procedures for deciding these matters – which causes the controversy to continue. However, controversies do not reduce to mere unsolvable conflicts of preferences. In Dascal’s view, the contenders pile up arguments “they believe increase the weight of their positions in light of the adversaries’ objections, thereby leading, if not to deciding the matter in question, at least to tilting the ‘balance of reason’ in their favor” (2001, p. 315). Controversies are neither solved nor dissolved; they are, in Dascal’s terminology, at best “resolved.” Resolution is reached when the contenders decide that one of the positions has been defended best, agree to a modification of the positions, or agree that the nature of the differences has been mutually clarified. Not victory is the objective of a controversy (as in a dispute), nor proof (as in a discussion), but rational persuasion.9

The three types of debate can be further distinguished by specifying the differences between the nature of the opposition, the types of procedure that are to be followed, and the ends that are aimed for. Going by their ends, “discussions are basically concerned with establishing the truth, disputes with winning, and controversies with persuading the adversary and/or competent audience to accept one’s position” (Dascal 2001, p. 316). In discussions, the opposition between the conflicting theses is mostly perceived as purely logical, in disputes mostly as “ideological,” i.e., attitudinal and evaluative, and in controversies as involving a broad range of divergences regarding the interpretation and relevance of facts, evaluations, attitudes, goals, and methods. Procedurally, Dascal explains, discussions are related to a “problem-solving” model, disputes to a “contest” model, and controversies to a “deliberative” model (p. 316). An actual confrontational exchange, by the way, will rarely be a “pure” example of one of these three types; for one reason, because the ways in which the various contenders perceive and conduct a given exchange need not be identical. The models of the three types of debate are therefore to be understood as empirically based prototypes.

From a pragmatic perspective, Dascal (2008) makes a distinction between two strategic uses of dichotomies in controversy debates: “dichotomization” and “de-dichotomization.” Dichotomization is “radicalizing a polarity by emphasizing the incompatibility of the poles and the inexistence of intermediate alternatives, by stressing the obvious character of the dichotomy as well as of the pole that ought to be preferred.” De-dichotomization consists of showing that the opposition between the poles “can be constructed as less logically binding than a contradiction,” so that “emphasis on possible alternatives is created.” The two debate types, “discussions” and “dispute,” for instance, are traditionally viewed as dichotomously opposed to each other. Because Dascal regards the dichotomous models not sufficient for an account of all varieties of debate, he de-dichotomizes the opposition by adding the non-dichotomous category of “controversy.”

Many scholars studying scientific and other kinds of controversies start from Dascal’s definition of controversy and his typology of debates. Anna Carolina Regner of the Brazilian University of the Sinos River Valley (UNISIONOS), for example, uses Dascal’s approach in analyzing the polemic between Darwin and Mivart concerning the origin of species (Regner 2008). In explaining her approach, Regner refers to Pera’s (1994) dialectical view of science, but her approach is, like that of most other controversy scholars, in the first place rhetorical (see also Sect. 12.14).

As Gábor Kutrovátz (2008) observes, “typically, discourse-oriented analyses treat scientific communication in rhetorical terms” under “the umbrella term ‘rhetoric of science’” (p. 231). He notices that “‘the term rhetoric’ carries an undesirable connotation that rhetoricians of science have to confront: it is understood, in a majority of discursive situations, as an ornamental use of language that is able to persuade an audience in contrast to ‘rational’ means of convincing” (p. 234). “Taken in this sense,” Kutrovátz remarks, “what could be more orthogonal to rhetoric than science where claims are to be accepted according to the soundest reasons?” This is why most controversy scholars – in line with a great many argumentation theorists – tend to agree with Pera’s (1994) general conception of rhetoric as the theory and practice of persuasive argumentation.10 The distinction from the contested meaning is, according to Pera, “intensified by the term’s intimate relation to another term, dialectics, presented here not as an alternative to rhetoric but as the ‘logic of such [persuasive] practice or act’” (1994, p. viii).

As is shown by the essays collected in van Eemeren and Garssen (2008), controversy scholars make clear that controversy always has to do with confrontation and tenacious efforts to put an end to the confrontation by means of argumentation. Intrinsic in a controversy seems to be that it concerns a difference of opinion that is perceived to have acquired a state of quasi-permanency – a state of “lingering on.” The problem of apparent insolubility may even reach a point where it is generally acknowledged that it will be impossible to resolve the difference of opinion. Presumably, in classifying types of controversy, a distinction can be made between different “degrees of being controversial,” with at the highest point a mere squabble and at the lowest point “deep disagreements” comparable with what Woods (1992) calls standoffs of force five. Another characteristic of controversies seems to be that one ends up in a controversy rather than starting one.

Just as argumentation theorists are by definition interested in controversy, controversy scholars always pay a great deal of attention to argumentation. Regner, for one, acknowledges that studies such as her analysis of the Darwin–Mivart controversy “fall under a theory of argumentation” (2008, p. 51). This does not mean, however, that controversy scholars always draw the practical consequence from this acknowledgement by actively exploiting in their examinations the analytical and methodical insights argumentation theory has to offer.

Most controversy scholars who are inclined to connect their studies with the study of argumentation and communication take a rhetorical perspective, but they often also refer to pragmatics and discourse analysis. Regner, for instance, states that studies of such polemics as between Darwin and Mivart “cannot avoid contextual (and thus pragmatic) considerations” (2008, p. 51). Without utilizing the pragma-dialectical notion of strategic maneuvering, she analyzes what she calls the “argumentative strategies” employed by Mivart and Darwin and provides useful insights in both parties’ ways of influencing the presumed audience. Some other interesting examples of strategic maneuvering are tackled, in particular with regard to topical selection, by Thomas M. Lessl (2008) of the University of Georgia in his analysis of the controversies concerning evolution and greenhouse warming. In an analysis of a remarkable controversy on civic Jewish rights and the integration of Jewish citizens in Germany at the end of the eighteenth century, Mirela Saim (2008) of McGill University makes a series of interesting observations concerning strategic maneuvering in revealing how the interaction between the parties in a debate can move from discussion to controversy. The German scholar Gerd Fritz (2008) focuses on “the implicit theory of controversy that people apply in their practice” (p. 109). He considers it useful to concentrate on the empirical study of communication principles “to get a more vivid picture of how rationality is put into practice” (p. 110). Some controversy scholars want to utilize, next to rhetoric, also dialectical and pragmatic angles of approach. One of them is the Brazilian Ademar Ferreira (2008).11 A more recent collection of essays shows an increasing coherence in the theoretical approach that is chosen (Dascal and Boantza 2011).

Conspicuous examples of controversy scholars who explicitly use conceptual instruments from argumentation theory in their analyses are the Hungarian philosophers of science Gábor Kutrovátz and Gábor Á. Zemplén. In “Rhetoric of science, pragma-dialectics, and science studies,” Kutrovátz (2008) argues that the study of scientific communication could benefit from application of insights from argumentation theory as can be found in the pragma-dialectical theory, where dialectical, pragmatic, and rhetorical angles of approach are combined. He emphasizes that starting from a dialectical framework has significant advantages over starting from a purely rhetorical framework when the quality of arguments needs to be taken into account. Kutrovátz observes that as far as argumentation theory goes – he is concentrating on pragma-dialectics – the full potential for different applications (in his case in the realm of scientific argumentation) “still needs to be exploited” (p. 237).

In “Scientific controversies and the pragma-dialectical model,” Zemplén (2008), who is convinced of the “indispensability of rhetorical insights for a meaningful study of scientific controversies” (p. 263), uses pragma-dialectical insights concerning the identification, structure, and strategic use of argumentative moves in reconstructing the Newton–Lucas optical debate in the 1670s to make clear how the analysis of scientific debate can benefit from making use of dialectical insights from argumentation theory.12 According to Zemplén, using such analytical tools allows historians of science “to move away from treating positions in an abstract space of ideas (like this is the relevance of the notion of crucial experiments for the ‘Newtonian method’), and to locate them in the argumentative discourse” (p. 268). This “radical contextualization” makes it possible to view methodological norms “as responding to their immediate argumentative context – especially if inconsistencies in the use of norms can be found, like in the case of Newton’s use of his crucial experiment” (p. 268).

12.4 Persuasion Research and Related Quantitative Research

By far the most well-known type of quantitative research related to argumentation theory is persuasion research. Persuasion research has a long tradition, especially in the United States. In that country, since the 1950s empirical studies have been conducted, mostly from a social-psychological perspective. Although in research into persuasiveness argumentation plays an important role, it is certainly not the only factor that is studied. Persuasion research that does focus on argumentation deals with the persuasive effects of the way in which argumentation is presented (message structure) and with the persuasive effects of the contents of argumentation (message content) . In recent years, both types of persuasion research cumulate in large-scale “meta-analyses” (O’Keefe 2006). In Sect. 8.8 of this volume, we give a description of the various kinds of studies in American persuasion research that are relevant to argumentation theory.

Outside the United States, one of the most productive research groups examining the connection between argumentation and persuasion is the team of communication scholars from the University of Nijmegen in the Netherlands. Most of their research concentrates on message content. It is in the first place aimed at describing the persuasiveness of different types of arguments.

Hans Hoeken (2001), for one, examined the perceived and actual persuasiveness of three different types of evidence: anecdotal, statistical, and causal evidence.13 His research addresses the relationship between the perception of the quality of an argument and its actual persuasiveness. Participants not only rated the extent to which they accepted the claim, but they also indicated their opinion about the strength of the argument. One would expect these scores to correlate: The type of argument rated as the strongest should also be the most convincing. To find out whether the perception of argument strength corresponds with actual persuasiveness, both variables were measured.

The experimental results indicate that the various types of evidence had a different effect on the acceptance of the claim. However, the differences only partly replicate the pattern of results obtained in other studies. In Hoeken’s study, statistical evidence proved to be stronger than anecdotal evidence. Contrary to expectations, causal evidence proved not to be the most convincing type of evidence. It was in fact just as persuasive as anecdotal evidence and less persuasive than statistical evidence. Corresponding with the actual persuasiveness, statistical evidence is rated as stronger than anecdotal evidence. Ratings of the strength of the argument are in both cases strongly related to the actual persuasiveness. In contrast, causal evidence received higher ratings compared to its actual persuasiveness. It was rated as stronger than anecdotal evidence, despite the fact that both types of evidence yielded similar claim acceptance ratings. The correlation between the perceived strength of an argument and its actual persuasiveness is lower for causal evidence compared to the correlations for the other two types of evidence.

Hoeken and Lettica Hustinx (2009) are particularly interested in the persuasiveness of statistical evidence and anecdotal evidence occurring in different types of arguments. They found that, if the evidence is part of an argument by generalization, statistical evidence is more persuasive than anecdotal evidence. If the evidence is part of an argument by analogy, statistical evidence and anecdotal evidence are equally persuasive. However, if the case at issue in the anecdotal evidence is dissimilar from the case at issue in the claim, statistical evidence is again more persuasive.

Jos Hornikx and Hoeken (2007) address the question of whether evidence functions in the same way in different cultures.14 They report on two experiments concerning the relative persuasiveness of anecdotal, statistical, causal, and expert evidence. In these experiments, the quality of statistical and expert evidence was manipulated. Hornikx and Hoeken conclude that cultural differences do indeed influence the effectiveness in persuasion of different argument types. In both experiments, cultural differences in susceptibility were found. In the first one, strong statistical evidence had more impact on the acceptance of claims by the Dutch participants than it had on their acceptance by the French participants. In the case of weak statistical evidence the Dutch participants and the French participants were equally unwilling to accept the claim. A similar effect was obtained for strong and weak expert evidence: Strong expert evidence had a larger impact on the Dutch participants than on the French participants, whereas weak expert evidence did not have much of an effect on either the Dutch or the French participants.

Hoeken, Rian Timmers, and Peter Jan Schellens (2012) raise the question of what criteria people use to distinguish strong arguments from weak arguments and how these criteria relate to the norms proposed in normative argumentation theory.15 In an experiment they asked respondents without training in argumentation theory to rate the acceptance of a series of claims about the desirability of a claim supported by an argument from analogy, or an argument from authority, or an argument from consequences. Participants proved sensitive to the violation of most, but not all, criteria specific to argument type. The participants’ criteria proved to be in line with the evaluative questions pertaining to these types of argument distinguished in normative argumentation theories.

Not all quantitative empirical studies of argumentation can be qualified as persuasion research. A second type of quantitative research concentrates on the pre-theoretical quality notions or norms of reasonableness of ordinary arguers. A typical example is the research carried out by van Eemeren, Garssen, and Meuff els to test the intersubjective acceptability of the pragma-dialectical norms for judging the reasonableness of argumentative discourse (see Sect. 10.12).16 Judith Sanders, Robert Gass, and Richard Wiseman (1991) are interested in possible differences in the way in which different ethnic groups evaluate in argumentation the strength or quality of warrants. Specifically, they sought to examine whether African Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans, Middle Eastern Americans, and White Americans evaluate warrant potency differently depending on the type of warrant or the topic of the argument. They compared these assessments with assessments of the same arguments by experts in the field of argumentation and debate (p. 709). In their research, Sanders, Gass, and Wiseman construed a series of arguments in which topic, type of warrant (example, analogy, and cause–effect), and argument strength were varied. Before the test, the argument strength had been assessed by 14 nationally recognized American argumentation scholars. They were presented with arguments on the various topics and asked to classify these arguments according to the type of warrant (example, analogy, cause–effect) and overall argument strength. Arguments that enjoyed consensus in terms of warrant type and argument strength were selected for the experiment. The results indicate that ethnicity alone does not create a preference for argument based on a particular type of warrant.

Dale Hample and Judith Dallinger (1986, 1987, 1991) are interested in the editorial standards people apply in designing their own arguments: If in a given situation a person thinks of half a dozen possible arguments, why are some of them indeed presented and others suppressed? Hample and Dallinger report on a series of studies in which this question was investigated. They stimulated their respondents with lists of possible arguments and asked for their judgments. It was the respondents’ task to indicate whether they would accept or reject each of the arguments and what rationale they would use to justify rejection. Among the most frequently reported criteria for rejection of arguments are: “won’t work,” “don’t threaten, bribe, or punish,” “only use true arguments,” and “only use relevant arguments.” There prove to be three main categories of criteria: those related to effectiveness criteria, person-centered criteria, and discourse competences. Hample and Dallinger also looked for predictors that would account for the rationale of preferences. They cautiously conclude that “situation” has considerable impact on endorsement.

Hample and Pamela Benoit (1999) explore which perceptual connection ordinary people make between arguing and fighting. In earlier research they had found that naïve social actors believe that the more explicit an argument is, the more destructive it is for the relationship between the arguers. For these respondents, arguments do not seem to be alternatives to violence; instead, arguments appear to be companions to fights or causes of them. Hample and Benoit intend to explain why in an American context people have the prejudice that “arguments” are typically destructive. Every time people identify something as a paradigm case of arguing, they judge that the episode is potentially hurtful. When the disagreement and the central claim were not explicit, the discourse did not seem to count as an argument (1999, p. 306). The findings in Hample and Benoit suggest that people see arguments as dangerous (threatening) episodes. This shows that naïve social actors who are native speakers of English have a perception of argument that differs from the scholarly understanding of “argument.”

Judith Bowker and Robert Trapp (1992) study laymen’s norms for sound argumentation: Do ordinary arguers apply predictable, consistent criteria on the basis of which they distinguish between sound and unsound argumentation? Bowker and Trapp’s large-scale empirical study into the reasonableness concepts of ordinary arguers consists of five steps. In the first step – eliciting situations characteristic of sound and unsound argument – respondents were asked to respond to an “open” question aimed at making them describe a situation in which another person had attempted to convince them of the acceptability of a standpoint. The respondents were expressly instructed to describe only situations in which the argument put forward was in their opinion good, irrespective of whether they had actually been convinced by it. In the second step, a list of descriptive terms was drafted based on the answers given by the respondents as to what is characteristic of sound versus unsound argumentation. In the third step, the long list of descriptive terms was edited. In the fourth step, Bowker and Trapp applied two statistical procedures to reduce the huge quantity of empirical data obtained in the third step to manageable proportions. In the fifth step, again, an explorative data technique was unleashed on this collection of items, resulting in four interpretable factors. These are the factors that finally “must provide insight into the question of how good argumentation distinguishes itself from poor argumentation” (1992, p. 220). Bowker and Trapp’s (1992, p. 228) conclusion is that the judgments of the respondents partially correlate with the reasonableness norms applied by informal logicians such as Johnson and Blair, and Govier.

Margrit Schreier, Norbert Groeben, and Ursula Christmann introduced the concept of argumentational integrity to develop ethical criteria for assessing contributions to argumentative discussions in daily life (Schreier et al. 1995). According to this concept, arguments not only have to be valid but also sincere and just. The German researchers conducted a series of experimental follow-up studies on argumentational integrity. In the course of these studies, they tried to develop the concept of argumentational integrity based on the experimental findings. In this sense, their method can be called “empiricistic.”

Schreier, Groeben, and Christmann observe that when during an argumentative discussion one of the parties performs unfair manipulations or knowingly misrepresents the facts or discredits other parties in an attempt to impress their own standpoint, such behavior will, as a rule, be judged negatively by the other participants. According to the researchers, such negative judgments indicate that argumentative discussions are regulated by specific norms and values that have been transgressed by the discussion party concerned.

Theoretically, Schreier, Groeben, and Christmann further develop the concept of argumentative integrity starting from – what they call – the prescriptive use of the term argumentation. According to them, the use of this term is based on two characteristic objectives of an argumentative discussion: rationality and collaboration. The following requirements must be fulfilled to give these two characteristic objectives of argumentation their due:
  1. 1.

    Formal validity: Arguments must be valid, both in form and in content.

  2. 2.

    Sincerity/truth: The participants in an argumentative discussion must be sincere. This means that they may only express those opinions and convictions they regard as correct (and may only put forward argumentation in support of these opinion and convictions).

  3. 3.

    Justness at content level: “[A]rguments must be just with respect to the other participants” (1995, p. 282). An unjust argument could, for instance, discredit the other participant.

  4. 4.

    Procedural justness: The argumentative procedure must be undertaken in a just manner, which means that all participants must have equal opportunity to provide their own contributions to the resolution of the difference of opinion, according to their own individual (relevant and defensible) beliefs.


Based on these four requirements, Schreier, Groeben, and Christmann define the concept of argumentational integrity as “the requirement to not consciously violate the argumentative conditions” (1995, p. 276).

A third type of quantitative research that can be distinguished focuses on cognitive processes. James Voss, Rebecca Fincher-Kiefer, Jennifer Wiley, and Laurie Ney Silfies (1993), for instance, are concerned with the cognitive processing of arguments. They present a model of informal argument processing and describe experiments that provide support for the model. The main points covered by the model are the following: (1) When a claim is encountered, an individual evaluates its truth value. In this process the individual’s attitude regarding the contents of the claim plays a part. The evaluation goes more rapidly if people strongly agree or disagree with the content of the claim than when there is less certainty regarding their agreement. (2) The claim and the attitude form together a complex that activates reasons related to the claim. The reasons activated tend to provide relatively strong support for the claim and are consistent with a person’s attitude or they are reasons that support rather than oppose the claim. (3) When a claim and a reason are presented together, a person’s knowledge, beliefs, and/or values may be activated. The data indicate that value activation is a function of a person’s perceived strength of the reason–value relations. The model thus emphasizes that components of mental representation, such as knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and values, play a significant role in processing informal arguments.

Dale Hample, Fabio Paglieri, and Ling Na (2011) are interested in the question of when people are inclined to start a discussion. What factors predict engagement and which factors predict that no argument will be voluntarily forthcoming? People do not always have to argue when arguing is invited – or in pragma-dialectical terms, arguers can find themselves partway into a possible confrontation stage, needing to make the next move. In response to the protagonist’s contribution, we might change the topic, fall silent, concede, or otherwise avoid engagement, or we might express disagreement. Should any of these reactions occur, then the original protagonist might move away from the matter – or initiate the opening stage of the discussion. In the opening stage, arguers make joint decisions about how to proceed. However, somewhere in the confrontation stage, or in the transition to the opening stage, people must decide whether or not to engage in arguing. The study concerned is a social scientific investigation of when the decision to engage is made and when it is rejected.

Hample, Paglieri, and Na (2011) consider various “costs” and “benefits” of engaging in discussion. The costs of arguing refer to the cognitive effort involved, one’s emotional exposure, and one’s estimates of unwelcome relational consequences. The benefits of arguing refer to what an arguer might get out of the interaction if it were to go well. The likelihood of winning is important in projecting possible benefits to an argument. A key consideration in whether outcomes might be attainable is whether the other arguer is expected to be reasonable, or stubborn or truculent. The civility of a possible argument has to do with whether it will be pleasant and productive, or angry and destructive. Whether an argument is thought to be resolvable or not has important consequences for relational satisfaction and other valued outcomes. People feel that it is appropriate to engage in some arguments but not in others and this has implications for whether participation would be more or less costly. The results of the experiments conducted imply that winning and appropriateness are important predictors for the decision to engage in discussion. Further analysis revealed that winning was far more important than appropriateness. The other person’s expected “reasonability” was relevant in some but not all situations.

In another research project, Susan Kline (1995) tries to identify the argumentative competencies that are important for children to acquire, and to pinpoint the kinds of interactions with parents and peers that facilitate the development of these competencies. Kline examines two hypotheses: (1) “Collaborative influence opportunities will be positively associated with persuasive argument skill. Children who identified more collaborative influence opportunities were also more likely to use sophisticated persuasive arguments to create consensus and facilitate behavioural commitment” (1995, p. 270). (2) “[N]on-collaborative influence opportunities would not be significantly associated with persuasive argument skill” (1995, p. 271). Sixty children were interviewed individually. The interviewers engaged the children in two structured tasks: an influence opportunity task (the child was asked to identify ways in which other people try to convince the child to think or act in certain ways) and a persuasive argument task (the child was asked to respond to four hypothetical situations that had the child influence others).

According to Kline, the findings of her study “indicate that persuasive argument practices are associated with the kind of influence opportunities children perceive themselves to have in their everyday life” (1995, p. 271). Children who perceive themselves to have a number of collaborative influence opportunities – that is, opportunities in which they can engage in mutual influence – have more highly developed persuasive skills than children who do not perceive themselves to have such influence opportunities. Overall, the results suggest that interactions in which they are given the opportunity to influence others and to be influenced with arguments may provide the best context for children to develop their persuasive skills.

12.5 The Argumentative Turn in Cognitive Psychology

Within the field of the psychology of reasoning and decision-making, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber (2011) have recently proposed an “argumentative theory.”17 In some ways, the theory is related to “argumentation theory” as discussed in this volume, but since it is developed in the field of experimental psychology, it uses different concepts and yields a different type of results.

The argumentative theory proposed by Mercier and Sperber links the phenomenon of “reasoning” with that of “argumentation” by hypothesizing that the (main) function of reasoning is argumentative. The hypothesis was already suggested in earlier work by Sperber (2000, 2001) and is based on the detection of certain flaws in the view, dominant in the field of experimental psychology, that reasoning serves an “overall epistemic and/or practical function: it generates new beliefs, creates knowledge, and drives us towards better decisions” (Mercier 2011, p. 308). According to this view, the main function of reasoning is “to correct misguided intuitions, helping the reasoner reach better beliefs and make better decisions” (Mercier 2012, p. 259). The view propounded in the argumentative theory is that the main function of reasoning is “to argue: to produce arguments so we can convince others and to evaluate others’ arguments so as to be convinced only when appropriate” (Mercier 2012, pp. 259–260).

Putting forward this hypothesis on the function of reasoning enables Mercier and Sperber to (re)interpret many of the findings of tests conducted in experimental psychology. Whereas many scholars in psychology assume in accounting for their findings that the function of reasoning is corrective, in the sense that it helps people to correct their initial (and in some cases false) intuitions concerning the acceptability of opinions, Mercier and Sperber set out to account for the results of empirical tests starting from the assumption that the function of reasoning is argumentative.

One of the main advantages of this new perspective is that the mistakes or biases that are manifest in human reasoning processes, e.g., “confirmation bias,” can now be explained in a different and more satisfactory way:

Reasoning can lead to poor outcomes not because human beings are bad at it but because they systematically look for arguments to justify their beliefs or their actions. The argumentative theory, however, puts such well-known demonstrations of ‘irrationality’ in a novel perspective. Human reasoning is not a profoundly flawed general mechanism; it is a remarkably efficient specialized device adapted to a certain type of social and cognitive interaction at which it excels. (Mercier and Sperber 2011, p. 72)

Mercier and Sperber admit that a great many of the predictions regarding human reasoning can also be accounted for in different ways than by hypothesizing that reasoning has an argumentative function. According to them, however, making use of the argumentative theory of reasoning has the advantage of offering an “integrative perspective: It explains wide swaths of the psychological literature within a single, overarching framework” (2011, p. 72).

The argumentative theory of reasoning connects with the differentiation made within argumentation theory between the “production” of arguments, on the one hand, and the “evaluation” of arguments, on the other. The field of cognitive psychology provides empirical evidence that cognitive biases, interpreted as deviations from (mainly) logical norms regarding the quality of argumentation, occur in contexts where people produce arguments. These findings can be explained by assuming that the production of arguments “involves an intrinsic bias in favor of the opinions or decisions of the arguer whether they are sound or not” (Mercier and Sperber 2011, p. 72). With regard to the evaluation of arguments however, it appears to make a difference in what context people who are arguing are operating. When people are involved in a debate, for instance, it matters whether they put an interest in winning the debate or aim at finding the right answer or the best solution for a certain problem. There is an interesting parallel here with Aristotle’s distinction between “eristic” debates, in which the discussants aim at winning at the cost of reasonableness, and “dialectical” debates, in which the discussants will try not to hinder the “common business” of producing a good argument.18 In the case of an eristic type of debate, the other party’s arguments are mainly perceived as arguments that should be refuted, and therefore cognitive biases occur. But in the dialectical case of a problem-solving debate or “group reasoning” process, where people are cooperating in testing various hypotheses to find the truth or the solution, there is empirical evidence that they are actually quite good at evaluating the quality of arguments:

[C]ontrary to common bleak assessments of human reasoning abilities, people are quite capable able to do so in an unbiased way, provided that they have no axe to grind. In group reasoning experiments where participants share an interest in discovering the right answer, it has been shown that truth wins. (Mercier and Sperber 2011, p. 72, original italics)

As to this apparent epistemic asymmetry between the human reasoning capacities when people are involved in the production or in the evaluation of arguments, Mercier and Sperber conclude that people reason in a less biased way “when they are after the truth rather than trying to win a debate” (2011, p. 72). The argumentative theory further predicts that

when reasoning is used in the proper circumstances – among people who disagree but are ready to change their mind when confronted with good arguments – it can produce considerable epistemic benefits. More specifically, what makes a group discussion a propitious context for reasoning to yield epistemic improvements is the back and forth between the positions of producer and evaluator of argument. (Mercier 2012, p. 262)

Assuming that the function of reasoning is argumentative, in other words, may explain the phenomenon that in group discussions, where people make explicit what counts for and against a particular thesis, it will be easier for them to find out what is the truth regarding a particular problem.

As to the potentially fruitful collaboration between scholars from experimental psychology and argumentation theorists, Mercier (2012, p. 265) emphasizes that some of the differences that exist at present need to be overcome. So far, for example, experimental psychologists have taken the logical approach to the various types of argument as the starting point for their research, whereas argumentation theorists have also developed typologies of arguments from a dialectical and rhetorical perspective. As Mercier observed in an earlier article, “most tasks in this literature [on human reasoning] involve participants either evaluating the conclusion of an argument (in the logical sense) or trying to determine if a logically valid conclusion follows from some premises” (2011, p. 306), whereas the various models that have been developed in argumentation theory, e.g., the Toulmin model of argumentation (see Chap. 4) and the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion (see Chap. 10), “may be very helpful heuristics in designing psychological theories” (2011, p. 307).19

As to further research, Mercier (2012, p. 266) proposes to take typologies regarding argument(ation) schemes and their associated critical questions developed in argumentation theory as a starting point for experimental studies regarding the evaluation of arguments. In this way, it might become clear which cognitive mechanisms are at play when people evaluate certain types of arguments as they have been classified from an argumentation theoretical point of view.

Some other psychologists have emphasized the connection between the theory of cognitive biases operative in the field of social and cognitive psychology and the theory of fallacies developed in logical and dialectical approaches in the field of argumentation theory. Summarizing the findings of a symposium organized during the European Conference on Cognitive Science in 2011, Hahn, Oaksford, Bonnefon, and Harris argue that “much of what has been identified as biased and fallacious in people’s reasoning may be the result of ignoring the appropriate argumentative context, the lack of an appropriate graded notion of argument strength and the lack of appropriate classificatory schemes for consequentionalist arguments” (2011, p. 2).

In Hahn and Hornikx (2012), a number of studies have been collected that may count as a first step in connecting the research carried out in the field of cognitive psychology to theoretical notions developed in argumentation theory. According to the editors, the research field of “psychology of argumentation” is still in its infancy. Like Mercier (2011, p. 306), they point out that so far cognitive psychological research has mainly focused on the logical approach to argumentation, conceptualizing argumentation as a set of interrelated premises and a conclusion which can be described in a formal and structural way rather than as a social exchange of viewpoints aimed at increasing the acceptability of a standpoint within a specific context.

Overall, the psychology of argumentation is a promising new field of research, which is closely connected to argumentation theory. Given the methodological and conceptual differences between the two fields, scholars need to be working on the translation of crucial concepts from argumentation theory into cognitive psychological terms, on the reinterpretation of the findings of the experimental research that has been carried out, and on developing and conducting new experiments on the basis of Mercier and Sperber’s replacement of the “corrective theory” of human reasoning by the “argumentative theory” of human reasoning.

12.6 Argumentation Studies in the Nordic Countries

In the Nordic countries, the study of argumentation has important roots in the semantic and practice-oriented dialectical approach to the clarification of discussions of the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, described in Sect. 3.8. Other sources are the Finnish-Swedish logical tradition exemplified in Jaakko Hintikka’s formal-dialectical systems described in Sect. 6.3 and the modern Danish rhetorical tradition that started in the 1970s. In the 1980s and 1990s, the rise of pragma-dialectics and informal logic also stimulated the development of argumentation theory in this region. In fields such as linguistics, political science, law, education, and artificial intelligence, specific discipline-related problems were another impetus.

Rather than in fundamental theorizing, the growing interest in argumentation theory manifests itself since the 1990s in the Nordic countries primarily in textbooks on argumentation and critical thinking, studies about the nature of argumentation in a particular context, and a great number of MA theses. In higher education, argumentation is often taught in connection with philosophy of science, scientific reasoning, or reasoning skills pertaining to a specific research area or profession. More and more critical thinking has also found its way to university courses and textbooks. Argumentation and the rhetorical devices used in argumentative discourse are nowadays even taught in high school. In addition to education-related publications, there is a remarkable increase in publications reporting about qualitative research of argumentative discourse, for instance, with regard to biblical and other religious texts.

In describing the development of argumentation theory in the Nordic countries, we will start with Denmark, go on to Sweden and to Norway, and after discussing Scandinavia turn to Finland. In Denmark, the Danish philosopher Flemming Steen Nielsen contributed in 1997 from the perspective of philosophy and logic a historical monograph on Alfred Sidgwick’s argumentation theory (Nielsen 1997). Vincent Fella Hendricks, Morten Elvang-Gøransson, and Stig Andur Pedersen (1995) provided 2 years earlier an example of an approach to argumentation based on the theory of AI-logics. There is also some evidence of philosophical interest in studying the fallacies (e.g., Lippert-Rasmussen 2001, on begging the question). Most publications with a philosophical background however are practically oriented (e.g., Collin et al. 1987; Iversen 2010; Hendricks 2007).

In the 1980s, Lita Lundquist studied argumentation from a linguistic perspective, making use of text linguistics. Besides two monographs on text coherence (Lundquist 1980) and text analysis (Lundquist 1983), she published several articles in which she shows that the argumentative constraints that, according to Anscombre and Ducrot, certain words and expressions impose at the sentence level can be helpful in explaining argumentative relations at the macro-level of argumentative texts (Lundquist 1987). Anscombre and Ducrot’s concept of “polyphony” can be used to establish a criterion for determining whether a particular discourse may be considered argumentative (Lundquist 1991). In the framework of conversation analysis, another Danish linguist, Annette Grinsted (1991), concentrated on differences between Danish and Spanish negotiation styles. Marie Lund Klujeff (2008), who exploits linguistic insights in pursuing a rhetorical approach, examined figurative speech in exchanges between an author and a rapper to determine the argumentative function of the use of rhetorical figures and style.

The rhetorical tradition in Scandinavia started in Denmark at the University of Copenhagen, where rhetoric was already a field of scholarship in the 1970s, thanks to Jørgen Fafner, who founded a productive research group. In the 1980s the Swedes caught up with the Danes and later also the Norwegians, especially after in 1997 the journal Rhetorica Scandinavica was launched and in 1999 the first Nordic Conference on Rhetoric had been held. From then on, a joint Scandinavian tradition developed, and the productivity increased considerably.20

When Christian Kock took over Fafner’s professorship in rhetoric in 1997, he continued the tradition of research on political argumentation and public debate that had been dominant at the University of Copenhagen since the 1980s. In Retorik der flytter stemmer: Hvordan man overbeviser I offentlig debat [Rhetoric that shifts votes: How to persuade in public debates], Kock presented in 1994, together with Charlotte Jørgensen and Lone Rørbach, an empirical study in which they examined 10 years of a Danish debate program on television (Jørgensen et al. 1994).21 Outside Copenhagen, rhetoric remained in Denmark, like in other countries, a subject studied in fields as disparate as Danish, literature, classical studies, and communication studies.

The rhetoricians from Copenhagen have continued their historical, theoretical, and practical research concerning deliberation and argumentation, public speaking and debate in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Jørgensen, for instance, concentrated on normative rhetoric and argumentation (Jørgensen 2003). She compared the interpretations given by Gross and by Crosswhite to Perelman’s universal audience (Jørgensen 2009), but also examined the relevance of intention in argumentation (Jørgensen 2007) and certain speech act phenomena in political argumentation (Jørgensen 2007). Kock (2003a, 2007c) further developed his outspoken views on rhetoric and argumentation. He clarified his claim that rhetorical argumentation is always about choice for action, instead of truth, and developed norms for “legitimate dissensus” (e.g., Kock 2007a, b, 2009a, b).22 Among the series of doctoral dissertations on rhetoric that were at the beginning of the twenty-first century completed at the Copenhagen Business School is Jonas Gabrielsen’s study Topik [Topos], which describes the development of the notion of topos toward a persuasive activity (Gabrielsen 2008).23

In Sweden, there is a strong logical tradition, but not much argumentation research has been carried out from a logical perspective. Early contributions relating to artificial intelligence were made by Richard Hirsch, who developed a heuristic model for the expression, evaluation, and revision of belief structures in artificial interactive argumentation (Hirsch 1987, 1989, 1991). In this model, argumentation occurs when a belief conflicts with, or is incompatible with, some other belief. This conflict initiates a search for a resolution or an elimination of the incompatibility. Hirsch illustrates his model by analyzing cases of belief revision in interactive argumentation. In 1995, he formulated desiderata for process and product representation in face-to-face interactive argumentation (Hirsch 1995).

A Swedish contribution to the study of argumentation by analogy is made by Juthe, who is preparing a doctoral dissertation at the University of Amsterdam. In Juthe (2005) he gives a characterization of this type of argumentation. Some arguments that are not presented as such should, in his view, nevertheless be interpreted as arguments by analogy. In Juthe (2009) he gives an account of parallel argument as a special type of argument by analogy in which an argument is refuted by presenting a flawed argument similar to the argument that is to be refuted. In general, the premises used in parallel argument are true or plausible, but the conclusion is evidently untrue or implausible. Juthe discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the use of parallel argument (p. 167).

Bertil Rolf and Charlotte Magnusson sketched in 2003 a software approach to the development of the art of argumentation (Rolf and Magnusson 2003). A theoretical contribution from a philosophical and logical perspective concentrating on authority-based argumentative strategies is the doctoral dissertation that Taeda Tomic defended in 2002 at the University of Uppsala. Tomic discusses three models for the evaluation of such strategies (Tomic 2002).24 In 2007, she examined the relationship between communicative freedom and the evaluation of argumentative strategies (Tomic 2007a).25 26 Another philosophical doctoral dissertation relevant to argumentation theory, this time focusing on reasoning by analogy in law, was in 2007 defended in Lund by David Reidhav (2007).

There are also various Swedish studies of argumentation from a linguistic perspective, making use of pragmatic insights. Viveka Adelswärd brought conversation analysis to bear in analyzing argumentation in institutionalized contexts such as job interviews (Adelswärd 1987, 1988), interviews with conscientious objectors (Adelswärd 1991), and discourse in the courtroom (Adelswärd et al. 1988). Åsa Brumark (2007) provides more insight in argumentation at the Swedish dinner table. Mihai Frumeșelu (2007) examines linguistic and argumentative typologies of concessions. Lars Melin devoted in 2003 a monograph to manipulation by means of language (Melin 2003). A linguistic study about decision-making related to argumentation theory is Gunnarsson (2006).

In What else can I tell you? Cornelia Ilie (1994) aimed to provide a pragmatic framework for dealing with rhetorical questions as they occur in everyday English. By giving a systematic interpretation and evaluation of their argumentative functions, she attempts to account for the argumentativeness of rhetorical questions in political speeches. From her analysis, she concludes that in such speeches rhetorical questions fulfill three major functions: (1) opinion manipulation by defending the politician’s position or attacking the position of their opponent; (2) facilitation of the storage of the politician’s message in the audience’s memory; and (3) creation or maintenance (by irony or sarcasm) of a sense of togetherness with the audience and induction or reinforcement of negative attitudes toward political opponents. In Ilie (1995), she concentrates on rhetorical questions in the courtroom,27 but she also continues her research regarding political discourse in later publications. In these publications she often deals with specific argumentative phenomena – such as refutation of arguments through the use of definitions (Ilie 2007).

The study of rhetoric grew in Sweden out the study of literature, with Kurt Johannesson as the founding father. Johannesson, the first professor of rhetoric in Uppsala in modern times, published in 1990 a textbook that is still widely used: Retorik – eller konsten att övertyga [Rhetoric – or the art of persuasion] (Johannesson 1990). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, with the appointments of Brigitte Mral and Lennart Hellspong at the universities of Örebro and Södertörn, other Swedish universities also started a line of research in rhetoric.28 Among Mral’s publications is Women’s rhetoric (Mral et al. 2009), a collection of essays about argumentative strategies used by women in public life. Among Hellspong’s publications relevant to argumentation theory is “Arguing from clichés,” an article co-authored by Cornelia Ilie (Ilie and Hellspong 1999).

Among the representatives of a younger generation approaching argumentation from a rhetorical perspective is Marie Gelang, who joined Jens E. Kjeldsen – a Danish scholar working in Norway and later also in Sweden – in studying nonverbal communication as argumentation (Gelang and Kjeldsen 2011).29 Other rhetorical contributions to argumentation theory have been made in the doctoral dissertations of Barbro Wallgren-Hemlin (1997), Att övertyga från predikstolen [Persuading from the pulpit]; Anders Eriksson (1998), Traditions of rhetorical proof. Pauline argumentation in 1 Corinthians; Anders Sigrell (1999), At övertyga mellan raderna [To convince between the lines]30; Charlotte Hommerberg (2011), Persuasiveness in the discourse of wine; and Maria Wolrath Söderberg (2012), Topos som meningsskapare: Retorikens topiska perspektiv på tänkande och lärande genom argumentation [Topoi as meaning makers: Thinking and learning through argumentation – a rhetorical perspective]. Sigrell also studied the normativity of the progymnasmata exercises (Sigrell 2007) and connected these exercises with pragma-dialectics and pedagogy (Sigrell 2003).

Although in Norway the study of argumentation has not in the first place developed from a philosophical or logical perspective, the education-oriented approach to argumentation of Tone Kvernbekk, one of the most prominent Norwegian argumentation theorists, is close to informal logic (e.g., Kvernbekk 2003a, b, 2007a, b, 2009, 2011). Also important is the monograph on rational argumentation in which Dagfinn Føllesdal, Lars Walloe, and Jon Elster (1986), who connect argumentation theory with philosophy of science, analyze and compare the types of arguments most common in the social sciences, physics, and the humanities. From a linguistic perspective, Margareth Sandvik (1995) gives her view on the methodological implications of integrating pragma-dialectics and conversation analysis in the study of interactive argumentation. She also focuses on criteria for winning and losing a political debate (Sandvik 1999).31

As Kjeldsen (1999b) makes clear in his overview of the history of rhetoric in Norway, compared with Denmark and Sweden, this country was a late starter in this field. Due to the activities of Georg Johannesen, who became in 1996 the first Norwegian professor of rhetoric, scholarship in rhetoric increased from the 1980s onwards. In the 1990s, media scholar Jostein Gripsrud initiated in Bergen a multidisciplinary project that stimulated the general acceptance of rhetoric considerably, resulting in the appointment of new professors and the institutionalization of rhetoric programs in the universities of Oslo and Bergen. When at the end of the twentieth century the journal Rhetorica Scandinavica was launched and the tri-annual Nordic conferences got organized, the emancipation process was completed, and Norwegian rhetoric was fully incorporated in the broader Scandinavian context. As a consequence of the emphasis laid on research of sakprosa [nonfictional, factual prose], in the first decade of the twenty-first century, a remarkable increase of productivity can be noticed. 32

Although in Norway the link between the study of rhetoric and the study of argumentation is not always so strong, argumentation theory has certainly benefitted from the growth in rhetoric.33 In the 1990s, Jostein Gripsrud initiated at the University of Bergen a multidisciplinary research project that started – stimulated by the media scholar Peter Larsen – a firm research tradition in visual rhetoric. In 2002, Kjeldsen defended in Bergen a doctoral dissertation on visual rhetoric that connects clearly with argumentation theory (Kjeldsen 2002).34 He made this connection even more explicit in essays about visual argumentation in political advertising (Kjeldsen 2007) and visual tropes and figures as argumentation (Kjeldsen 2011b).35 Both in Bergen and in Oslo rhetoric, persuasion and argumentation have also been studied from a legal perspective. One of the results is the monograph Språk og Argumentasjon [Language and argumentation] by Eivind Kolflaath (2004).36

In Finland, the study of argumentation in philosophy was stimulated both by a keen interest in philosophical methodology and by an awareness of the developments in argumentation theory that had taken place elsewhere. This resulted in the publication of theoretical studies as well as textbooks. The theoretical studies reflect, on the one hand, the engagement of Finnish philosophers with Aristotle and, on the other hand, their engagement in the advancement of modern formal logic. The former is, for instance, illustrated in the way in which Marja-Liisa Kakkuri-Knuuttila (1993) presents Aristotle’s topics as a general method for reasonable argumentation,37 and the latter in the contributions that Hintikka, currently the most prominent Finnish logician, has made to the study of the fallacies (e.g., Hintikka 1989).38 Widely used textbooks dealing with argumentation and critical thinking are published from both angles (e.g., Kakkuri-Knuuttila 1998, and Hintikka and Bachman 1991, respectively).39

The textbook Argumentti ja kritiikki: Lukemisen, keskustelun ja vakuuttamisen taidot [Argument and critique: The skills of reading, discussing and persuading], edited by Kakkuri-Knuuttila, is in fact the most influential general contribution to Finnish argumentation theory. It was first published in 1998 and had in 2007 its 7th edition. Argumentti ja kritiikki has chapters on interpretation, the question–answer method, argument analysis, formal theory, fallacies, debate, rhetoric (including rhetoric in economic policy-making), argument in science, concept formation, the structure of research, and argumentation and philosophy of science.

The study of argumentation has been practiced at the University of Turku since the early 1990s, when Georg Brutian from Armenia visited Finland to take part in one of the conferences organized by Juhani Pietarinen (see Pietarinen 1992). Juho Ritola’s epistemological approach to the fallacies is an offshoot of this tradition.40 Ritola’s (2004) doctoral dissertation, Begging the question: A study of a fallacy, is a sequel to his earlier essays on circular arguments (Ritola 1999) and question-begging (Ritola 2003, 2007, 2009). In 2009, a conference on Finnish argumentation theory organized by Ritola resulted in the publication of Tutkimuksia argumentaatiosta [Studies on argumentation] (Ritola 2012). This volume contains essays on the general norms of argumentation, the nature and teaching of critical thinking, and empirical studies of the use of argumentation in learning processes.

An outstanding example of an approach to argumentation starting from the problems of a specific discipline is given by Aulis Aarnio, who studied the problem of legal justification in the philosophical context of rationality and reasonableness (Aarnio 1987).41 Other examples relate to the fields of linguistics and education. In the 1980s, Sonja Tirkkonen-Condit examined argumentation from a cross-linguistic perspective. She discusses in Tirkkonen-Condit (1985) problems involved in translating argumentative texts from English into Finnish. In Tirkkonen-Condit (1987) she compared the location of the main thesis in Finnish newspaper editorials with its location in British newspapers. Tiina Renko (1995) discussed problems of interpretation and identification in dealing with argument as a theoretical notion.

At the Faculty of Education of the University of Jyväskylä, Leena Laurinen and Miika Marttunen have studied argumentation empirically, concentrating in particular on argumentation in computer environments. In 1995, Marttunen wrote about practicing argumentation through computer conferencing (Marttunen 1995). His doctoral dissertation, completed in 1997, is Studying argumentation in higher education by electronic mail (Marttunen 1997). Together with Laurinen he discussed in 1999 learning argumentation in face-to-face communication and e-mail environments (Marttunen and Laurinen 1999). The two of them reported in 2003, together with Marta Hunya and Lia Litosseliti, on argumentative skills of secondary school students in Finland, Hungary, and the United Kingdom (Marttunen et al. 2003). In the same year, they examined with Timo Salminen grounding and counter-argumentation during face-to-face communication and synchronous network debates in secondary school (Salminen et al. 2003). A related case study about the quality of argumentation in master’s theses was in 2007 at the University of Helsinki conducted by Marita Seppänen (Seppänen 2007). The latest contributions by Marttunen and Laurinen to the study of argumentation in educational context have focused on collaborative learning through construction of joint argumentative diagrams in secondary schools (Marttunen and Laurinen 2007; Salminen et al. 2010), quality of argumentation in secondary school students’ structured and unstructured chat discussions (Salminen et al. 2012), and promoting social work students’ argumentative problem-solving skills through online and face-to-face role-play simulations (Vapalahti et al. 2013).

Although in Finland rhetorical research is rather thin on the ground, according to Mika Hietanen (2007b), some relevant research has taken place in the humanities, theology, and the social sciences, in particular in political analysis.42 A case in point in theology is Hietanen’s own doctoral dissertation, defended in 2005 at Åbo Akademi University and published as Paul’s Argumentation in Galatians: A Pragma-dialectical Analysis of Galatians (Hietanen 2007a).43 Hietanen analyzes Paul’s argumentation with the help of the extended pragma-dialectical theory, thus including rhetoric in his perspective.44 A popular book on classical rhetoric is Juhana Torkki’s Puhevalta: Kuinka kuulijat vakuutetaan [The power of speech: How the listener is convinced] (Torkki 2006).

Like in other countries, in Finland the rhetorical study of argumentation is more and more concentrated in departments of speech communication, which are in this country strongly influenced by the German Sprechkunde [Art of speaking] tradition but also by the public speaking tradition of American speech communication. The biggest Finnish communication department, housed at the University of Jyväskylä, organized already in 1986 an international conference on text, interpretation, and argumentation that resulted in a book publication (Kusch and Schröder 1989). Currently, speech communication can also be studied at the universities of Tampere, Helsinki, Turku, and Vaasa, often in connection with media studies, but the emphasis is different in each program. Although Turku has a new rhetoric tradition and Tampere has expertise on courtroom rhetoric and parliamentary debate,45 argumentation research is nowhere really prominent.46

12.7 Argumentation Studies in German-Speaking Areas

Just after the Second World War rhetoric and argumentation studies were mistrusted in the German-speaking countries because the Nazis had so successfully made use of rhetorical propaganda (Kienpointner 1991, p.129). Since the 1970s however, there is a growing amount of research on argumentation. The approaches to argumentation that have since then been developed are predominantly linguistic, philosophical, or rhetorical in nature.

Linguistic studies of argumentation, inspired by speech act theory, conversation analysis, and discourse analysis, started in Germany in the early 1970s with the study of argumentative dialogues and speech acts such as “to argue,” “to explain,” and “to prove.”47 They are usually based on a corpus of written or spoken argumentative texts and aim for empirical description.

A method for describing argumentative discourse based on pragmatic stylistics was developed by Albert Herbig (1992), who tested his method empirically. Barbara Sandig and Ulrich Püschel (1992) edited a volume on styles of argumentation. The theoretical framework of the studies concerned is constituted by speech act theory and conversation analysis, “text-internal” stylistics (propositional, prosodic, and illocutionary aspects) and “text-external” stylistics (emotional, competitive, cooperative, gender-specific, political, intercultural dimensions). Jochen Rehbein (1995) favors a linguistic approach to argumentation in which pragmatic, historical, and cognitive insights are implemented. He analyzes the use of complex referential expressions in argumentative discourse. Walter Kindt (1988, 1992a, b) combines the formal analysis of argumentation in natural language with insights from Aristotelian topics. Linguistic studies influenced by conversation analysis tend to concentrate on conflict management in dialogue and conflict-solving strategies. Psychological and sociological approaches are then often combined with research techniques and concepts from conversation analysis. As is shown by Johannes Schwitalla (1987), argumentation not only is a means to solve conflicts but also serves to maintain consensus and confirm group identity.48

A speech communication scholar dealing with argumentative discourse is Norbert Gutenberg, who has contributed to the processes of listening, understanding, and judgment (1984), but also to rhetoric, dialectic, and truth management, and the study of the relation between dialectic and rhetoric (1987). Ines Bose and Gutenberg (2003) show that analyzing argumentation in spoken language requires taking account of prosody.

Kienpointner (1992) presents a typology of argument schemes in order to give a complete description of the different types of argumentation that are used in the German language community. He bases his typology on the distinction between different types of warrants (p. 43). Kienpointner’s elaborate typology is in fact an eclectic compilation of classical and modern classifications.49

Kienpointner distinguishes between the following main classes of argument schemes: (1) schlussregelbenützende Argumentationsschemata [warrant-using argument schemes], (2) schlussregeletablierende Argumentationsschemata [warrant-using argument schemes], and (3) Schemata die weder Schlussregeln einfach benützen noch etablieren [argument schemes that neither use nor establish warrants] (1992, p. 243).50 The first of these three main classes consists of argument schemes in which the premise is connected to the conclusion by way of a warrant that is assumed to be already acceptable. In this sense, the warrant is “used.” This main class is subdivided into four subclasses: (1) “schemes of classification,” including argument schemes based on “definition,” “genus-species argumentation,” and “part-whole argumentation”; (2) “schemes based on a comparison”; (3) “schemes of contradistinction based on contrary oppositions, contradictions, incompatibilities, and converse oppositions”; and (4) “causal argument schemes,” including cause–effect argumentation, argumentation based on motives, and means–end argumentation. The second main class consists of argument schemes in which a warrant-like statement expressed in the conclusion is justified by means of inductive argumentation: “the warrant is the conclusion and is not a premise in the argumentation” (Kienpointner 1992, p. 243). This main class comprises only one argumentation type: “inductive argumentation in the restricted sense.” The third main class consists of argument schemes that cannot be classified in the first or the second main class. It comprises “illustrative argumentation,” “argumentation based on analogy,” and “argumentation based on authority.”51

In German philosophical approaches to argumentation, two traditions have been most influential: the dialogue logic of the Erlangen School and Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality. The influence of the Erlangen School is manifested in the philosophical work of the Hamburger Arbeitsgruppe Argumentationstheorie [Hamburg research group on argumentation theory], directed by Harald Wohlrapp of the University of Hamburg.52 Wohlrapp (1977) has modified the views of the Erlangen School by introducing insights from Kuhn and Feyerabend, from action theory, from Peirce, and from Hegelian dialectics.53 In his view, argumentation is not to be seen as an instrument for conflict resolution but as a way of theory formation. To bridge the gap between objective truth and subjective acceptability, Wohlrapp (1995) developed a concept of Gültigkeit [validity], a notion applying to theses rather than to reasoning patterns (Wohlrapp 1977, pp. 289–291).

In Der Begriff des Arguments [The concept of argument], Wohlrapp (2009) presents his ideas for a new philosophical foundation of argumentation theory, a basis which is in his view strongly lacking in most modern work in the field.54 Given the deficient status quo of modern argumentation theory, Wohlrapp claims that the field needs a philosophical foundation centered around the validity of argumentation. He promises a new concept of argumentation that is dialectic, pragmatic, and reflexive; captures innovation and differences in perspective; and provides the core of a concept of thetical reason (p. 45). In this connection Wohlrapp distinguishes between epistemical theories (theories that are reliably true) and thetical theories (theories that are useful for the time being but might be in need of revision).

In Wohlrapp’s view, validity can be of two kinds, depending on the type of theory: “epistemical,” i.e., providing an approved orientation, or “thetical,” i.e., providing a New Orientation (Wohlrapp’s capitalization). A thesis is gültig [valid] if, after examining the arguments for and against it in a dialogue, there is no objection left (p. 349). In other words, a thesis is valid if the proof is free from objections; otherwise it is invalid (p. 354). Wohlrapp maintains that this kind of validity is independent of audience assent (p. 344). Not every dissent or Streit [dispute] may give cause to argumentation; argumentation is to be reserved for situations in which a fundamental orientation is to be tested and improved (2009, p. 144).

According to Wohlrapp, in argumentation three Grundoperationen [basic operations] can be distinguished: (1) claiming or affirming, (2) justifying or proving, and (3) criticizing. Argumentation is, in his view, “that which is produced between the affirmation of a thesis and the judgment of the validity of a conclusion” (2009, p. 190) All substantial argumentative acts can be subsumed under claiming, proving, or criticizing. In addition to these basic operations, Wohlrapp describes Rahmenstrukturen [frames]. The concept of “frame” addresses some of the problems that arise from the subjectivity of the arguers. In Wohlrapp’s terminology, framing is not an elocutionary technique, but rather the idea of seeing “A as B,” “A in the light of B,” or “A for the purpose of B.” His example is the “car” that can be seen by different arguers as a mode of transportation, a location of privacy in the public sphere, or as an object of prestige (p. 239).

One of Wohlrapp’s students, Geert-Lüke Lüken (1991, 1992, 1995) proposed an argumentative solution to the incommensurability problem caused by the radical differences between theories, paradigms, and world views. He argues that the problem, though serious, does not present a threat to the rationality of scientific argumentation. Such a threat arises only if rationality is exclusively connected with a particular system of rules. Proponents of incommensurable theories can never reach consensus in a Begründungsspiel [rule-guided reasoning game]. Lüken (1991) therefore recommends an “anticipatory practice,” consisting in a type of “mutual field research.” The participants in the discussion should attempt to learn as much as possible about each other’s forms of life, mutually assuming the roles of teacher and student and taking note of even seemingly unimportant details, without imposing their own cognitive categories and standards on others (pp. 248–249).

Lüken (1992) intends to demonstrate that, in principle, it is possible to overcome conflicts between incommensurable positions with the help of rational argumentation. Firstly, following Feyerabend, he suggests a kind of “free exchange” (p. 294). This is a learning situation similar to anthropological field research. Secondly, taking up suggestions of the Erlangen school, Lüken suggests techniques of teaching a new language (1992, p. 315). Mutual comprehensibility cannot be presupposed in cases of incommensurable systems of orientation. Therefore, the participants have to teach each other how to use and interpret the expressions of their language.

Peter Mengel (1995), another doctoral student of Wohlrapp, tries to shed light on the interrelationship between analogy and argument: How can analogy argumentation claim validity? One of Mengel’s starting points is that there exists a tension between the practical relevance of the research of analogy argumentation, on the one hand, and the actual attention that argumentation theory pays to this phenomenon, on the other hand. He observes that analogy argumentation is indeed used quite often, not only in everyday argumentation but also, for instance, in philosophical discourse. Theoreticians, however, tend to approach this analogy argumentation with a certain degree of disdain. Mengel raises the question of whether this theoretical disdain is justified, in particular in view of the practical relevance of analogy argumentation. He opts for a perspective that he thinks can offer a proper account of analogy argumentation: a version of Wohlrapp’s argumentation theory. In this theory, “Geltungsrelevanz” [validity relevance] is directly related to (real or fictitious) objections of parties in a discussion. An analogy is valid if it can withstand these objections.

Another German philosopher who has developed a systematic perspective on argumentation is Christoph Lumer (see also Sect. 7.6 of this volume). In Lumer’s (1990; 1991, 2005) epistemological approach, the rationality of argumentation is not solely based on the norms applying to formal deductive reasoning, but also on the norms described in probability theory and decision-making theory.55 Lumer formulates validity conditions, soundness conditions, and adequacy conditions for the evaluation of different types of everyday argument. Among the argument types he discusses are generalizations and interpretative, epistemological, and practical arguments.

A tradition that has been of great influence in the German-speaking philosophical world is inspired by Habermas’s approach to communicative rationality (Habermas 1971, 1973, 1981, 1991). Habermas’s work belongs to a stream of philosophy often referred to as Diskurstheorie [theory of discourse]. It takes a stance against all kinds of relativism. The main sources of this stream, originating in the neo-Marxist “Frankfurter Schule,” are Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel.

In the normative model of argumentation represented by the “ideal speech situation” developed by Habermas, the conditions are specified which must be fulfilled for a discussion to result in a Begründeter Konsens [well-founded rational consensus]. Habermas distinguishes three levels of communicative rationality , each of them having its own critical standards. At the logical level, argumentation is evaluated as a “product” by applying logical and semantic rules: Speakers, for instance, may not contradict themselves and their use of linguistic expressions must be consistent. At the dialectical level, argumentation is evaluated as a “procedure.” Pragmatic rules then applied are, for instance, that speakers should be sincere and prepared to defend themselves against attacks. At the rhetorical level, argumentation is evaluated as a communicative “process.” The conditions that have to be fulfilled are, for example, that free participation in the discussion is not limited by external factors. In practice, the ideal speech situation will never be completely realized, but the basic assumptions of ideal communicative action and argumentation are implicitly anticipated. 56 According to Habermas, they can therefore serve as a critical standard for judging everyday argumentation.57

A prominent theoretical approach to argumentation in Germany that is influenced by Habermas is Josef Kopperschmidt’s rhetorical approach to argumentation. Kopperschmidt studied rhetoric in Tübingen and he is an advocate of the rehabilitation of classical rhetoric. Using insights from rhetoric, but also from speech act theory, text linguistics, and Habermas’s theory, he has developed a normative theory of argumentation (Kopperschmidt 1976a, 1978, 1980, 1987, 1989a).58 In his publications on argumentation, Kopperschmidt attempts to bridge the gap between abstract theory and argumentation analysis and practice. He views rhetoric as a sub-theory of the theory of communicative competence. An important aim of the study of rhetoric is, in his opinion, to develop rules for a felicitous and successful performance of persuasive speech acts that can be used to resolve controversies concerning practical matters and norms for action. An important task for argumentation theorists is, according to Kopperschmidt (1995), to supply means for meeting the need for consensus, especially in politics.

Central figures in German rhetoric are Gert Üding,59 and, when it comes to rhetoric and argumentation, Manfred Kraus. Üding and his former colleague Walter Jens developed at the University of Tübingen a famous and productive center for the study on rhetoric – in fact the only rhetoric department in Germany. In 1984 Jens started the comprehensive project Das Historische Wörterbuch der Rhetorik [Historical dictionary of rhetoric], which was finished by Üding (Üding and Jens 1992, 1994). Manfred Kraus (2006) contributed to argumentation theory by applying the Toulmin model (see Chap. 4 of this volume) to complement Cicero’s classical formal approach. Kraus (2007) argues that in Roman rhetoric, contrarium was considered either as a figure of speech or as an argument. Contrarium is a way of juxtaposing two opposing statements, using one statement to prove the other. According to Cicero, it is based on a third Stoic indemonstrable syllogism: ¬ (p ^ q); (p→¬q). The persuasiveness of this type of argument, however, vitally depends on the validity of the alleged “incompatibility” forming its major premise. This appears to be the argument’s weak point, as the “incompatibilities” never really hold. This is why in practice such arguments are most often phrased as rhetorical questions. The persuasive force of these rhetorical questions is enhanced by certain strategic maneuverings and fallacies.

Kraus (2012) uses the sophistic concept of “anti-logical reasoning,” as well as certain approaches of rhetoric and discourse analysis, to establish the logic and rhetoric of polemic arguments within the framework of critical discussion (in the pragma-dialectical sense). All argumentation starts from dissent, but needs common ground to build on, which is usually provided by cognitive or cultural environments shared by the arguers. In cases of radical cognitive or cultural diversity, there is little common ground, so that only polemic argument will be possible. Polemic argument characterizes in fact much of our present argument culture, because in present pluralistic societies various groups have divergent cultural backgrounds and different argument cultures.

Lars Leeten (2011) examines the central role of rhetoric in moral discourse. In practical matters it is not enough to justify practical beliefs as “true”: The motivational dimension cannot be ignored. Rhetorical methods are not designed to examine theoretical truths but are designed for the purpose of practical decision-making. This is why rhetoric and ethics have always been closely related. Leeten discusses how expressive speech can have a place in rational moral argumentation. The important question then is how such speech can be more than just emotional talk and be part of moral argumentation.

Using a rather broad concept of argumentation, Kati Hannken-Illjes analyzes argumentative discourse in criminal cases. In Hannken-Illjes (2006) she explores how, in the legal realm, different argumentation fields interact, the juridical field being just one of them. She lays out an approach of studying argumentation in the legal realm in the framework of an ethnographic methodology by identifying the topical rules the participants in criminal trials adhere to. Suggesting the notion of “field-dependence” as a starting point for the analysis of legal argumentation, she provides examples from different fields of argumentation interacting in criminal proceedings. The examination of what counts as a good reason and how arguments are employed, negotiated, and evaluated in criminal proceedings sheds light on the practice of constructing facts and arriving at decisions in court. Furthermore, this examination points at the constitution of legal rationality and how it is produced in criminal trials. Hannken-Illjes shows that in criminal proceedings rationality is interactively achieved by negotiating different standards of validity.

Hannken-Illjes (2007) wonders what the relation between narration and argumentation amounts to when it comes to the production of facts in criminal proceedings. In Hannken-Illjes (2011), Prior’s method of “ethnography of argumentation” is used to analyze instances of “argumentative blanks” in German criminal cases. By “argumentative blank” Hannken-Illjes means the situation in which an arguer does not provide reasons, in spite of the fact that the procedure allowed for them.

12.8 Argumentation Studies in Dutch-Speaking Areas

In the Netherlands, argumentation theory is a strongly developed field, and to a lesser extent this also goes for the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium. Several of the main approaches to argumentation are well represented at universities throughout the region: formal dialectics at the University of Groningen, pragma-dialectics and rhetoric at the University of Amsterdam and Leiden University, persuasion research at the Radboud University Nijmegen, and rhetoric at the Lessius University College in Antwerp.

Most argumentation scholars in the Dutch-speaking areas of the world have developed their specific approaches to the subject within the field of “speech communication,” but argumentation theory is also represented in philosophy. In other fields, such as legal studies, there are also scholars who make use of argumentation theory to find solutions for problems of their fields. In the research three main strands can be distinguished. The first and dominant one is the dialectical approach, represented most prominently by the pragma-dialectical approach and in philosophy also by formal dialectics. Since we already discussed pragma-dialectics in Chap. 10 and formal dialectics in Sects. 6.5 and 6.9 of this volume, we leave them out of consideration in this section.

A second type of approach to argumentation developed in Dutch speech communication is procedurism. This approach takes its inspiration, next to the logical and dialectical sources, from the modern rhetorical tradition and American debate theory. Below, we will discuss the work of Peter Jan Schellens, Gerard Verhoeven, and Paul van den Hoven, who are representatives of this approach.

The third type of approach is – again next to the logical and dialectical sources (in particular pragma-dialectics) – inspired in the first place by classical rhetoric. Below, we will discuss the work of Antoine Braet, who is the main representative of this approach.

Among the first Dutch scholars emphasizing the importance of argumentation in speech communication were Willem Drop and Jan de Vries, who introduced the Toulmin model and its use in the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse in their influential textbook Taalbeheersing [Speech communication] (Drop and de Vries 1974). Several of Drop’s former students at Utrecht University tried to develop procedures for teaching secondary school pupils how to analyze and evaluate argumentative texts. The most important of these “procedurists” are Peter Jan Schellens, Gerard Verhoeven, and Paul van den Hoven. Since they took their inspiration for the development of their procedures not only in the Toulmin model and the American debate tradition but also in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s new rhetoric, Braet (1999) characterizes their approach as “rhetorical procedurism” (p. 30). 60

The procedure for the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse that has been developed by the Dutch procedurists has never led to a fully fledged theory of argumentation. Van den Hoven (1984) concentrated in his doctoral dissertation on developing a procedure for the analytical reconstruction of argumentative discourse. Of a more recent date are his efforts to develop instruments for the analysis of visual argumentation (e.g., van den Hoven 2012). Schellens (1985) devoted his doctoral dissertation to developing – based on existing sources such as the new rhetoric and Hastings (1962) – a theory of argument schemes as part of a procedure for the evaluation of argumentative discourse. These preparatory efforts eventually led to the development of a practical course book by Schellens and Verhoeven (1988) with instructions for the analysis and critical evaluation of argumentative texts.

As a theoretical background of this approach, Schellens (1985) had presented a fourfold typology of argument schemes, covering many different types of argumentation, such as argumentation from example, argumentation from authority, and argumentation from analogy. In a later article, Schellens (1991) related his approach to argument schemes to the theory of fallacies by defining a fallacy as an argument scheme that has not been applied correctly. As is also described in other approaches, the critical reader of an argumentative text can uncover such a fallacy committed by the writer by checking whether the critical questions associated with the argument scheme at issue can be answered in a satisfactory way.

Much later, in collaboration with other researchers at the University of Nijmegen, Schellens concentrated more strongly on the related field of persuasion research (e.g., Schellens and de Jong 2004). Much of the research that is carried out within this field is empirical in nature and is to some extent based on theoretical concepts developed within argumentation theory (see Sects. 8.8 and 12.4 of this volume).61

At Leiden University, Antoine Braet developed an approach to argumentation that can be characterized as a combination of speech communication and classical rhetoric.62 Emphasizing the reasonableness of the classical rhetorical instructions regarding the effectiveness of argumentative discourse, Braet aimed to actualize and apply insights from classical rhetoric to develop a method for teaching secondary school pupils how to write argumentative texts (1979–1980, 1995) and how to conduct discussions or debates (Braet and Schouw 1998). According to Braet, the rhetorical approach to argumentation is ideally suited for this purpose, because (1) rhetoric does consist not only of a theory of persuasion but also of a critical theory of argument evaluation; (2) there is a large overlap between the rhetorical norms for the effectiveness of argumentation and the dialectical norms for the reasonableness of argumentation; and (3) rhetoric, again like dialectic, does in fact apply to the dialectical situation of two parties arguing their case in front of a judging audience (Braet 1999, pp. 34–35). In a later publication, Braet (2007) reiterates his views on the reasonableness of rhetorical instructions by analyzing three works that are central to the tradition of classical rhetoric: the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, Aristotle’s Rhetorica, and the rhetoric of Hermagoras of Temnos. In the analysis, Braet aims to reconstruct the classical concepts of “status theory,” “enthymemes,” “topics,” and “fallacies” as early contributions to the development of a normative theory of argumentation. Earlier versions of parts of the book are also published in English (e.g., Braet 1987, 1996, 2004).

In the Netherlands and the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium, several other scholars have been working in the field of argumentation theory. At Leiden University, for instance, Ton van Haaften conducts from a pragma-dialectical and rhetorical perspective research on the (persuasive) effects of language use in parliamentary debates. Henrike Jansen describes various types of arguments from a pragma-dialectical perspective that incorporates insights from classical and modern rhetoric and pragmatics. At Lessius University College in Antwerp, Hilde van Belle teaches and writes on argumentation and rhetoric. At the University of Ghent, Jan Willem Wieland examines infinite regress arguments in philosophy.

12.9 Argumentation Studies in French-Speaking Areas

In Chap. 9 of this volume, dealing with linguistic approaches to argumentation, a great deal of attention is paid to the important contributions made to this take on argumentation theory in the French-speaking world. In fact, argumentation theory in these areas is to a large extent dominated by approaches starting from a linguistic and descriptive perspective. Nevertheless, other approaches have been developed as well, although it must be acknowledged that they, too, are often strongly influenced by the linguistic perspective. This applies clearly, for instance, to several of the cognitive and rhetorical approaches that have been proposed. It is remarkable that the rhetorical perspective, after it had been held in low esteem for a long time, has gradually started to make a comeback, especially after Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s new rhetoric has become more influential. Since the 1970s, next to – and sometimes in combination with – linguistic and cognitive approaches, various authors have made interesting contributions to argumentation theory starting from a primarily rhetorical angle. 63

A linguistic approach we have discussed extensively in Sect. 9.3 is the semantic approach developed by Ducrot and Anscombre, in which argumentation is seen as an intrinsic component of the meaning of utterances. Working in this tradition is, for instance, the linguist Pierre-Yves Raccah, who developed a “semantics of point of view.”64 This semantic theory is aimed at explaining how language makes it possible to let the implicit points of view of actors (the underlying ideological representations) come to the surface (Raccah 2006, 2011).

A second linguistic approach to argumentation is cognitive in nature. Georges Vignaux, a logician and cognitive psychologist, has continued the work of J.-B. Grize and his colleagues in Neuchâtel (see Sect. 9.2) in France. Vignaux (1976, 1988, 1999, 2004) aims to identify the natural logic of argumentation and the logico-discursive operations involved in this logic.

Other present-day French (pragma)linguistic approaches to argumentation combine concepts from classical rhetoric and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s new rhetoric with insights from discourse analysis and conversation analysis. Important examples of such discourse-analytical approaches to argumentation are those of Christian Plantin and Marianne Doury (see Sect. 9.4). Another well-known discourse analyst who pays attention to argumentation is the linguist Dominique Maingueneau (1994, 1996). In addition, the important French discourse analyst Patrick Charaudeau has published on argumentative discourse (Charaudeau 1992, 2008). Based on her doctoral dissertation, Cristina Demaître-Lahaye (2011) published a monograph on the pragmatic strategies used in different communicative contexts to dissuade people from committing suicide.

At the University of Versailles St-Quentin-en-Yvelines, Marta Spranzi, specialist in the history and philosophy of science, has published a book on Aristotelian dialectics that connects with argumentation theory (Spranzi 2011). Other work by Spranzi is in the field of the history of science and focuses in particular on Galileo (Spranzi 2004a, b). At present, her research concentrates on the field of medical ethics and communication. Another French-speaking researcher who approaches argumentation from an interdisciplinary perspective is Eabrasu, who has written a defense of Hoppe’s argumentation ethics (Eabrasu 2009).65 Controversies and public debate are studied from a sociological perspective by Francis Chateauraynaud (Chateauraynaud 2011).66 Michel Dufour (Communication and Media Department of University Sorbonne Nouvelle) authored an informal logic textbook (Dufour 2008). In addition, he published papers on scientific and nonscientific explanations (Dufour 2010).

Although France has had an important rhetorical tradition,67 at the end of the nineteenth century rhetoric vanished from the state education curriculum, after severe criticisms of its nonscientific character. This development has greatly influenced the position of rhetoric in France up to the present day. Generally speaking, even now, only the history of rhetoric is considered to be a subject worthy of academic attention.

An important French rhetorical scholar of recent times was Olivier Reboul.68 In 1991, Reboul published an introduction to rhetoric that deals with the history of rhetoric, with rhetorical strategies and figures, as well as with the distinctions between various types of arguments (Reboul 1991). According to Reboul (1988), argumentation has a number of rhetorical properties that distinguish it from demonstrative proof: It is conducted in ordinary language and directed at an audience, its premises are at best plausible, and its inferences are not compelling. Dialectics is for Reboul (1990) the intellectual instrument of rhetoric, in distinction to the emotive means of persuasion.

Another well-known French rhetorician, specializing in the history of rhetoric, is Françoise Douay-Soublin, who has edited Dumarsais’s (1988) study of tropes from 1730. She also published on French rhetoric in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth century (Douay-Soublin 1990a, b, 1994a, b). At the University of Lyon 2, Joseph Dichy, together with Véronique Traverso, leads the group GRIAF (Group of Research on Interactions in Arab and French).69 Part of the research conducted by this group focuses on such subjects as medieval Arab rhetoric and argumentative text analysis (Dichy 2003).

Just as in France, in the French-speaking part of Switzerland, the research on argumentation is predominantly linguistic and cognitive in nature. Since the 1960s, the University of Neuchâtel has been a center of argumentation research. As is explained in Sect. 9.2, this is where Jean-Blaise Grize and his colleagues developed their theory of natural logic, which is both linguistic and epistemological in nature, as an alternative to formal logic.

At present, at the Institut des Sciences du Langage et de la Communication (Institute of Language and Communication Sciences) of the University of Neuchâtel, a number of researchers conduct research extending to the field of argumentation theory. The linguist Louis de Saussure, for one, specializes in the analysis of persuasive and manipulative discourse. He has published essays on argumentative indicators and on speaker commitment in argumentative discourse (de Saussure 2010; de Saussure and Oswald 2009). Thierry Herman, a rhetorician and discourse analyst, concentrates his research on rhetoric and argumentation, including critical thinking and the analysis of political and public discourse (Herman 2005, 2008a, 2011). In Herman (2008b), he analyzed Charles de Gaulle’s war rhetoric.

A young linguist whose research interests lie at the interface between cognitive pragmatics, linguistics, cognitive psychology, argumentation theory, and discourse analysis is Steve Oswald. Oswald has investigated, among other things, the compatibility of pragma-dialectics with cognitive theories such as relevance theory (Oswald 2007). Starting from a cognitive–pragmatic perspective, he has also conducted research on uncooperative and deceptive or manipulative communication (Oswald 2010). Part of this research has been undertaken together with Didier Maillat, professor of English linguistics at the University of Fribourg (Maillat and Oswald 2009, 2011). Oswald’s most recent work concentrates on fallacious argument and is aimed at integrating insights from cognitive psychological approaches with concepts from argumentation theory (Oswald 2011).

At the University of Geneva, a group of Francophone Swiss pragma-linguists developed in the 1980s the “Geneva model of discourse analysis,” a hierarchical and functional model of discourse structure. The model is intended to provide a systematic account of the structure of both monological and dialogical discourses. According to Filliettaz and Roulet (2002, p. 369), the research combines concepts from speech act theory with a unified theory of human behavior and a study of discourse relations and discourse markers inspired by Ducrot et al. (1980). The main contributions to the development of the model have been made by Antoine Auchlin (1981), Jacques Moeschler (1985), and Eddy Roulet (Roulet 1989; Roulet et al. 1985). In the 1990s, the Geneva model underwent a major revision to make it possible to do justice to both social and cognitive factors in the description of discourse (Roulet 1999; Roulet et al. 2001).

At the University of Lausanne, in the department of French linguistics, a number of scholars conduct research in the field of rhetoric, stylistics, discourse analysis, and argumentation. Among them is Jean-Michel Adam, professor of French linguistics, who developed a sequential model of argumentation within the framework of text linguistics (Adam 2004). Together with Marc Bonhomme, he also published a study on argumentation in advertising (Adam and Bonhomme 2003). Marcel Burger specializes in media discourse (Burger 2005). He has edited with Guylaine Martel a volume on argumentation and communication in the media (Burger et al. 2005). Raphaël Micheli is a discourse analyst and rhetorician who examines the function of argumentation in discourse genres such as political and media discourse (Micheli 2010). He also published a paper on the relationship between argumentation and persuasion (Micheli 2012). Another scholar from the University of Lausanne that is to be mentioned is Jérôme Jacquin, a specialist in the field of discourse and conversation analysis. Jacquin (2012) provides an argumentative analysis of the French President Georges Pompidou’s speeches in 1968. Together with Burger and Micheli, he has also edited a volume on political discourse and confrontation in the media (Burger et al. 2011).

At the University of Bern, finally, professor of French linguistics Marc Bonhomme, who we already mentioned, is a specialist in the field of stylistics. He has published several semantic and pragmatic analyses of rhetorical figures of speech (Bonhomme 1987, 1998, 2005, 2006).

In the French-speaking part of Canada, there are a number of scholars working in the field of argumentation theory. At the University Laval in Québec City, Professor Gilles Gauthier of the department of information and communication specializes in argumentation and communication in political discourse (Gauthier 2004). Together with Breton, Gauthier published a historical overview of the study of argumentation from antiquity to modern times (Breton and Gauthier 2011). In the same department, Guylaine Martel applies rhetorical and discourse-analytical instruments to argumentation in public debate (Martel 2008). Also at the University Laval, but in the department of languages, linguistics, and translation, Diane Vincent uses methods from discourse and conversation analysis in her characterization of public debate (Vincent 2009). At McGill University in Montreal, Marc Angenot, a Belgian-Canadian professor in the history of ideas and discourse analysis, published several books on rhetoric and argumentation (Angenot 1982, 2004).70

In the French-speaking part of Belgium, argumentation has been predominantly studied from a rhetorical perspective. Since the 1970s, two neo-rhetorical approaches have been developed. Both approaches have resulted in a series of characteristic publications.

The first rhetorical approach is that of the École de Bruxelles (School of Brussels), founded by Chaim Perelman (see Chap. 5 of this volume) at the Free University of Brussels. The approach to rhetoric of this school can be seen as a continuation of the Aristotelian tradition of viewing rhetoric as the study of all available means of persuasion, both argumentative and stylistic in nature. After Perelman’s death in 1984, Michel Meyer, his collaborator, succeeded him as professor of rhetoric and argumentation. Meyer also took over Perelman’s task as director of the Revue internationale de philosophie, an international journal of philosophy.71

Out of dissatisfaction with formal logic, Meyer developed in the early 1970s a philosophical approach to argumentation, the foundations of which are rhetorical: problematology (Meyer 1976, 1982a, b, 1986b, 1988). With his problematology, he aims to make a critical but constructive contribution to the traditional conception of science. In 1995, the English translation of his thesis Of problematology: Philosophy, Science and Language (first published in French in 1976) appeared. In 2000, Meyer published the treatise Questionnement et historicité [Questionability and historicity] in which he systematically expounds the philosophy of problematology. In 2008, Principia rhetorica: Une théorie générale de l’argumentation [Principia rhetorica: A general theory of argumentation] was published, in which Meyer presents a general theory of argumentation that takes a number of different major approaches to argumentation and rhetoric into account.

The basis for Meyer’s synthesis of theoretical approaches is the notion of “questioning,” or “problematizing.” According to Meyer’s problematological approach, every utterance can be used for two purposes: to express a question (or “problem”) and to provide an answer (or “solution”). A question is “an obstacle, a difficulty, an exigency of choice, and therefore an appeal for a decision” (Meyer 1986b, p. 118). Since all discourse, from phrase to text, can serve the double function of expressing problems and presenting solutions, any piece of discourse can mark the question as well as the solution. In Meyer’s view, argumentation pertains to the theory of questioning: “What is an argument but an opinion on a question? To raise a question […] is to argue” (Meyer 1982b, p. 99). The function of argumentative discourse is to provide an answer to a specific problem in a specific context. Final answers are not to be expected, because they can only be provided in the formal language of a formal logic in which there is no room for doubt or contradictory propositions.

The second rhetorical approach stemming from the French-speaking part of Belgium is developed by the interdisciplinary Groupe μ of the University of Liège.72 In opposition with Perelman’s views on rhetoric, this group focuses on the stylistic aspects of rhetoric and is mainly concerned with the literary (or poetic) function of language.73 Their first major publication appeared in 1970: Rhétorique générale [A general rhetoric] (the English translation was published in 1981). In this book an explanatory model of rhetorical figures of speech is presented, making use of a structuralist linguistic approach. The group also developed a theoretical approach to visual rhetoric and visual semiotics (Groupe μ 1992).

At the beginning of 2000, at the Free University of Brussels, the Groupe de recherche en Rhétorique et en Argumentation Linguistique (GRAL) [Research group on rhetoric and on linguistic argumentation] was founded. The research leader is Emmanuelle Danblon (Free University of Brussels), who is also secretary general of the Perelman Foundation. Among the other members of GRAL are Loïc Nicolas, Benoît Sans, Victor Ferry, Ingrid Mayeur, and Alice Toma. Members of GRAL study argumentation both from a rhetorical and from a linguistic perspective, thus uniting the two Belgian rhetorical traditions. The research program of GRAL is interdisciplinary: In their study of argumentation and rhetoric, these researchers make use of insights from the history of rhetoric, legal studies, political philosophy, psychology, (bio)ethics, anthropology, literature, and philosophy of mind. In 2011 the group started a systematic exploration of the Perelman archives.

GRAL member Emmanuelle Danblon aims to combine traditional rhetoric with insights from present-day linguistics. Her research topics are rhetoric, argumentation theory, discourse, epistemology, and rationality. She has written several books in the field of argumentation theory and rhetoric (Danblon 2002, 2004, 2005, 2013). In Danblon (2002), she discusses the relationship between rhetoric and rationality, opting for a cognitive perspective and drawing a parallel between forms of reasoning (induction, abduction, and deduction) and the development of reasoning skills. Danblon (2005) presents an overview of the origins of rhetoric, reviews the main contemporary argumentative approaches, and discusses the role of rhetoric in modern society. Finally, Danblon (2013) goes back to the roots of rhetoric, by analyzing rhetoric as a technique developed to enable every citizen to speak in public.

12.10 Argumentation Studies in Italian-Speaking Areas

Since the 1960s, there has been a steadily growing interest in argumentation in Italy.74 Influenced by the Italian translation of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New rhetoric, which appeared in 1966, researchers have been examining argumentation as a way of using language for influencing others.75 Until the 1990s, most of the research concentrated on rhetorical aspects of argumentative discourse, focusing in particular on stylistic characteristics. This interest in rhetorical figures and stylistics was stimulated by the Italian translation in 1969 of Lausberg’s Elements of rhetoric and the publication of Groupe μ’s (1970, 1981) Rhétorique générale [General rhetoric]. After 1990, philosophical and dialectical approaches to argumentation started to be developed. A distinctive feature of present-day argumentation studies in Italy is the focus on argumentation in specific institutional contexts – from the legal, the political, and the medical, to the commercial.

The rhetorical publications concentrated to a large extent on explaining the function of rhetorical devices. Renato Barilli (1969), Paolo Valesio (1980), and Cesare Segre (1985) testify to this particular interest. Until the late 1960s, rhetoric was viewed either as the art of linguistic cosmetics or as the art of (manipulative) persuasion. In Novantiqua, Valesio (1980) argues that these conceptions of rhetoric are not tenable. He defends the view that every statement is rhetorically marked. According to Valesio, rhetoric is “all of language, in its realization as discourse” (p. 7). In such a conception of rhetoric, there is no clear division possible between a rhetorical and a linguistic analysis of discourse.

In 1989, Mortara Garavelli published a comprehensive handbook of rhetoric, Manuale di retorica. Another important rhetorical contribution is Adelino Cattani’s (1990) study of modes of arguing. Cattani revaluates rhetoric as a theory of discourse and an instrument for describing argumentative practice. In 1995, Cattani treats the subject of fallacies from a rhetorical perspective. Whether an argument is fallacious or not depends in such a perspective on the specific situation in which the argument is put forward and the judgement of the addressee. In 2001, Cattani published a historical overview of the use of rhetorical techniques in debates (Cattani 2001).

Sorin Stati (1931–2008), a linguist of Rumanian origin, published in 2002 a monograph on the analysis of argumentation in which rhetorical, logical, and linguistic perspectives are combined (Stati 2002).76 Franca Piazza presented a few years later a study of rhetoric in the twentieth century (Piazza 2004) as well as a study of Aristotle’s rhetoric (Piazza 2008). Social psychologist Nicoletta Cavazza analyzed the mechanisms that are activated in the persuasive procedure and investigated the contexts and conditions which enable social actors in various situations to be persuaded (Cavazza 2006). In 2009, Cattani edited, together with Cantù, Testa, and Vidali, a volume on the developments in argumentation theory 50 years after Perelman and Toulmin (Cattani et al. 2009).

An important philosophical contribution to the Italian study of argumentation is Marcello Pera’s (1991) analysis of rhetoric, dialectic, and science in The Discourses of Science (English translation, 1994). Pera proposes to approach reasoning in science from a combined rhetorical and dialectical perspective. In his opinion, the logical ideal model of scientific method is untenable. According to Pera, not just nature and the inquiring mind are involved in the conduct of science but also a questioning community, which determines through a process of attack, defense, and dispute what science is. Rhetoric is, in Pera’s view, an essential element in the constitution of science as the practice of persuasive argumentation through which research results gain acceptance.

Pera (1994) makes a distinction between scientific rhetoric, that is, “those persuasive forms of reasoning or argumentation that aim at changing the belief system of an audience in scientific debates,” and scientific dialectics, “ the logic or canon of validation of those forms” (p. 58). To acquire a clearer picture of what scientific rhetoric amounts to in practice, he examines the uses of argumentation in Galileo’s Dialogue, Darwin’s Origin, and the “big-bang steady state controversy” in cosmology. From his analysis, Pera draws the conclusion that scientists resort primarily to rhetoric in the following scientific contexts: (1) when attempting to make the choice of a new methodological procedure acceptable, (2) when arguing for a specific interpretation of a methodological rule, (3) when attempting to overcome objections concerning the application of a rule to a concrete case, (4) when justifying a starting point, (5) when attributing a positive degree of plausibility to a hypothesis, (6) when criticizing or discrediting rival hypotheses, and (7) when rejecting objections against a hypothesis.

In formal logic arguments are examined by themselves to determine whether they are valid, but whether they are correct or incorrect should, according to Pera (1994), be established in a debate, that is, in a specific situation for a specific audience. In a debate, an argument is submitted to certain constraints or debating rules which determine which moves are permitted and prohibited. It is the task of scientific dialecticians to formulate such rules for scientific arguments. The rules of scientific dialectics are of two types: rules for conducting a debate, disciplining the type of exchange allowed between the interlocutors and rules for adjudicating a debate, determining the points bestowed on each side, and the awarding of victory (pp. 121–126). In many respects, Pera’s approach is similar to the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation discussed in Chap. 10 of this volume.

Sara Rubinelli, an Italian argumentation scholar working in Switzerland, discusses in Ars topica Aristotle’s and Cicero’s methods of topoi and their relationship (Rubinelli 2009). Her monograph gives an interpretation rooted philologically in the historical context of topoi and aims to lay the ground for evaluating the relevance of classical approaches to modern argumentation research. Another philosophical contribution to the study of argumentation in Italy is Andrea Gilardoni’s (2008) handbook on logic and argumentation, which contains a compilation of insights from logic, argumentation theory, and rhetoric.77 In addition, the epistemologist and political philosopher Franca d’Agostini published studies on reasonable and fallacious arguments in public debate (d’Agostini 2010) and on the argumentum ad ignorantiam (d’Agostini 2011).

An important dialectical contribution to the study of argumentation is Paola Cantù and Italo Testa’s (2006) introduction to dialogue logics. In their study, they discuss various approaches to argumentation, both descriptive and normative, with an emphasis on dialogical and dialectical approaches, such as Hintikka’s dialectical approach, van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectics, and Walton and Krabbe’s dialogue models.78

In Italian argumentation studies, a great deal of attention is paid to argumentation in different institutional contexts. In particular the legal domain is well-represented. Among the authors engaged in research on argumentation in this domain are Guglielmo Gulotta and Luisa Puddu (2004). They analyze the argumentative strategies and techniques the prosecutor or the counsel can use in a criminal trial. Davide Mazzi specializes in the linguistic analysis of judicial argumentation (Mazzi 2007a, b). In the legal department of the University of Trento, some scholars conduct research on legal argumentation. Maurizio Manzin, for one, has published several volumes on legal rhetoric (2012a; b).79 At the same university, Serena Tomasi (2011) analyzes the Italian criminal trial from a rhetorical perspective. At Bocconi University in Milan, Damiano Canale and Giovanni Tuzet conduct research in the field of legal interpretation and argumentation. Together they published a number of articles on the use of particular types of arguments in legal practice (Canale and Tuzet 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011). Sergio Novani (2011a, b) from the University of Genoa examines how thought experiments and testimonial argumentation in a legal context can be analyzed.

A young researcher focusing on the political domain is Laura Vincze. In her doctoral dissertation about the use of persuasive strategies by politicians (Vincze 2010), she pays attention to verbal strategies as well as gestures and posture that speakers use in persuading their audience. Vincze makes a comparison between the persuasive strategies the French presidential candidates Ségolène Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy employed in their election campaigns.

A researcher whose work concentrates on the commercial domain is Annalisa Cattani. Cattani (2003, 2007, 2009) analyzes the use of both verbal and visual argumentative techniques in advertising.

Sara Rubinelli, who we already mentioned, has focused since the early part of the twenty-first century on the use of argumentation in the domain of health care. With Peter Schulz she has analyzed the role argumentation can play in doctor–patient interaction (Schulz and Rubinelli 2008). Together with Schulz and Kent Nakamoto, Rubinelli has also evaluated the use of argumentation in direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs (Rubinelli et al. 2008). With Snoeck Henkemans, Rubinelli edited in 2012 a special issue on argumentation and health of the Journal of Argumentation in Context.80 Another Italian researcher engaged in the field of medical argumentation is Sarah Bigi, who concentrates on the use of authority argumentation and ethos in interactions between doctors and patients (Bigi 2011, 2012). Gianmarco Manfrida (2003) analyzes the use of narration and argumentation in relational psychotherapy. According to Manfrida, psychotherapists need to use persuasive strategies in their therapy to undermine the patients’ previously held opinions on a logical and emotional level and to open them up to a new point of view.

Finally, scholars of Italian origin play an important part in research in the context of argumentation and computation (see also Chap. 11 of this volume). Floriana Grasso of the University of Liverpool is one of the researchers active in this field. Part of her research focuses on ways of modelling speaker’s goals and persuasive strategies, drawing on classical argumentation theory and cognitive modelling. A major area of application for her research is health informatics: providing personalized and persuasive information or advice on healthier lifestyles (Grasso and Paris 2011). Another Italian researcher in the field of argument and computation is Fabio Paglieri. His research concentrates on decision-making for action and on belief dynamics, both in an individual sense (belief revision) and in a social sense (argumentation) (Castelfranchi and Paglieri 2011).

12.11 Argumentation Studies in Eastern Europe

In Poland, the interest in argumentation theory is remarkably vivid. It is in fact based on an old and strong Polish research tradition of theorizing about logic in relation to the use of reasoning in human communication. Tarski (1995), for one, expressed his firm belief that the diffusion of knowledge of logic may contribute positively to the normalization of human relationships:

For, on the one hand, by making the meaning of concepts precise and uniform in its own field, and by stressing the necessity of such a precision and uniformization in any other domain, logic leads to the possibility of better understanding between those who have the will to do so. And, on the other hand, by perfecting and sharpening the tools of thought, it makes man more critical – and thus makes less likely their being misled by all the pseudo-reasonings to which they are in various parts of the world incessantly exposed today. (p. xiii)

We will first pay attention to the historical background of the study of argumentation in Poland, distinguishing between various stages in its development. Then we will turn to the current situation and discuss the research trends that are – in line with the tradition – most prominent in present-day Polish argumentation theory.

Between 1930 and 1970, when the early studies in Polish argumentation theory were conducted, the Lvov–Warsaw School was dominant. Although the term argumentation theory was not yet used, in the philosophy of language and logic that was practiced by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Stanisław Jaśkowski, Stanisław Kamiński, Seweryna Łuszczewska-Romahnowa, and their collaborators, a great many topics were already examined that are nowadays central in pragma-dialectics and informal logic (see Koszowy 2011). Among them are, next to Ajdukiewicz’s (1974) program of pragmatic logic and pragmatic methodology, Łuszczewska-Romahnowa’s (1966) context-related pragmatic account of inference, Jaśkowski’s (1948) discursive paraconsistent discussion logic, and Kamiński’s (1962) analyses of the concept of a logical fallacy, language precision as a necessary condition of reasonable discussion, logical culture as an ideal for teaching critical thinking skills, and argumentation in the context of philosophy and methodology of science. Although the Lvov–Warsaw School tended to be in the first place formal, they were also keen on modelling and teaching real-life reasoning. This explains why studies were devoted to argument analysis and evaluation, and a Polish analytical tradition of studying language and reasoning came into being.81

From the 1980s onwards, argumentation theory and logic were examined in philosophical logic, mainly in departments of philosophy. The first attempts were made to familiarize Polish philosophy with contemporary studies in argumentation theory. This also involved a turn from formal and mathematical logic – dominant in Polish research and teaching, even on the undergraduate level – to the study of the real-life reasoning and critical thinking. Scholars such as Teresa Hołówka, Witold Marciszewski, Wojciech Suchoń, and Marek Tokarz developed, for instance, a logical approach to rhetoric and a formal pragmatic account of persuasion (Tokarz 1987, 1993), but they also examined logical fallacies and the logical foundations of the art of argument.82

In the 1990s, in Polish philology and linguistic departments, various scholars started to combine their interest in language studies with making use of insights from rhetoric. They applied classical and other rhetorical theories to the study of literary style. Among the topics tackled by Czesław Jaroszyński, Piotr Jaroszyński, Mirosław Korolko, Jakub Lichański, and Jerzy Ziomek are the history of rhetoric, rhetoric as an art of eloquent and effective speech, and the use of rhetorical–stylistic techniques (such as metaphor, anaphora, onomatopoeia, and irony) in literature from ancient to modern times.83

Finally, from 2000 onwards, the development is characterized by the building and establishment of the interdisciplinary Polish School of Argumentation. This School includes researchers from different departments, such as philosophy, philology, linguistics, computer science, psychology, and pedagogy. In their approach, the formal study of argument is central, but the starting point is the practice of real-life communication (see Budzynska et al. 2012). In cooperation with the international research community, and publishing primarily in English, they explore possibilities of linking theories of argumentation, dialogue, and persuasion together. United in research groups such as PERSEUS and ZeBraS,84 Katarzyna Budzynska, Kamila Dębowska-Kozłowska, Magdalena Kacprzak, Marcin Koszowy, Marcin Selinger, Krzysztof Szymanek, Krzysztof Wieczorek, Maria Załęska, and their students deal with research topics as varied as formal models of argument analysis and evaluation, argument schemes and fallacies, logics for reasoning about persuasion and dialogue, applied formal rhetoric, ethos and ethotic arguments, cognitive pragmatics in modelling argumentation and dialogue, and critical thinking.85

The activities of the Polish School of Argumentation are coordinated by means of ArgDiaP, a forum initiated by Budzynska and Kacprzak and organized under the auspices of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences.86 The main goal of the forum is to encourage interdisciplinary reflection and discussion on the processes of communication and argumentation, to establish a network of Polish argumentation researchers, and to further coherence in the work of the emerging Polish School of Argumentation. The research, which focuses on “formal rhetoric,” builds on the Polish logical and rhetorical tradition and aims to connect formal and practical aspects of argumentation and communication benefiting from the perspectives provided by all relevant disciplines.

The ArgDiaP initiative has led to the publication of several special issues on argumentation, edited by Koszowy, of the Polish journal Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric. In addition, a series of biannual one-day conferences has been organized, hosting next to speakers from all leading Polish universities invited speakers from other countries representing the most prominent approaches to argumentation theory.87 In a special issue dedicated to the Polish School of Argumentation of the journal Argumentation (2014, no. 2), the guest editors, Budzynska and Koszowy, have brought together a collection of extended versions of papers presented at the international editions of ArgDiaP. The introduction lays out the central themes and the main approaches of the Polish School. Among the contributors are Budzynska, Dębowska-Kozłowska, Kacprzak, Koszowy, and Selinger.

The range of topics examined by the Polish School of Argumentation is rather broad, sometimes extending the boundaries of argumentation theory proper. A first topic that is central in current research is evaluation. Koszowy (2004, 2013) takes a methodological approach based on the claim that some arguments in knowledge-gaining procedures can be successfully evaluated by applying tools stemming from the methodology of science. Dębowska (2010) extends the pragma-dialectical model for the evaluation of the effectiveness and reasonableness of argumentation by introducing an abductive procedure that makes it possible to take the pragmatic relevance of arguments and the global and local goals of the participants in a dialogue into account. Szymanek (2009) proposes a model for analyzing and evaluating argument by similarity for dealing with analogy argumentation, giving a new account of the structure and interpretation of reasoning by similarity with the help of the multiconstraint theory of analogy (Gentner 1983). A formal model of evaluation covering a broad class of arguments in natural contexts is developed by Selinger (2012) by providing a general numerical method for evaluating the strength of arguments.

Another trend consists in studying the rhetorical and persuasive aspects of argumentation. Tokarz (2006), Wieczorek (2007), and Budzynska (2011) examine the links between psychological models and logical models of argumentation. A theoretical framework for describing the structure of arguments against epistemic authority is offered by Załęska (2011), who interprets from the perspective of the interpersonal level two parameters of an expert’s good reputation, i.e., solidity and trustworthiness, as two different kinds of ad hominem. Budzynska (2012) shows that standard models allow for the reconstruction of circularity only if the circular utterances are interpreted as ethotic arguments. She makes clear that their alternative, assertive interpretation requires enriching the existing models with an ethotic component relating to the credibility of the performer of the speech acts concerned. Selinger (2005) and Załęska (2012a) study the nature of ethos in the context of political discourse. Skulska (2013) considers a hierarchy of argument schemes for rhetorical arguments.

A related but different concern is dialogue taxonomy and protocols. Budzynska and Dębowska (2010) propose a model of dialogues aimed at conflict resolution that is a modified and extended version of Walton’s model. Budzynska and Reed (2012) present a non-inferential model of ad hominem techniques used in a dialogue. Their approach is built on the following assumptions: (a) that ad hominem is not an inferential, but an undercutting structure; (b) that in some communicative contexts it can be a non-fallacious dialectical technique; and (c) that critical questions associated with Walton’s (1998a) ad hominem scheme can be used to determine defensive strategies against ad hominem attacks. An implementation of speech acts in a paraconsistent framework is discussed by Dunin-Kęplicz et al. (2012). They analyze speech acts as building blocks of interactions between agents in the context of communicative relations in situations that may require conflict resolution and belief revision. They include perceiving (a) inconsistent information, (b) previously inconsistent information, (c) previously unknown information, (d) unknown information, (e) compatible information, and (f) contradictory information.88 Yaskorska et al. (2012) develop a dialogue protocol allowing the representation and elimination of formal fallacies starting from the pragma-dialectical discussion rule that the antagonist may challenge both the propositional content of premises used by the protagonist and the justificatory force of the reasoning. They bring two traditions together to represent this rule formally: Lorenzen’s dialogue logic and Prakken’s specification of persuasion dialogue games. This results in a procedure in which agents can persuade each other not only about facts but also about the classical propositional validity of the arguments used in the dialogue.

Another strand of research concerns formal and computational models of argument. Budzynska and Kacprzak’s (2008) multimodal logic of actions and graded beliefs, AGn, provides a deductive system for reasoning about persuasion processes in distributed systems of agents in circumstances of uncertain and incomplete information. Dunin-Kęplicz and Verbrugge (2010) develop a logical theory, TeamLog, that models teamwork in dynamic environments of agents. Selinger (2010) proposes a set-theoretic model of argument structure, and Łoziński (2011, 2012) comes up with an algorithm for incremental argumentation analysis in Carneades.

Argumentation technologies are another focus of attention. In Perseus, Budzynska et al. (2009) provide a software tool that can be used for formal verification of multi-agent systems to examine such issues as what arguments individuals use to successfully convince others and what type of a persuader guarantees victory. In Araucaria-PL, Budzynska (2011) designs the only Polish tool for teaching argumentation theory, based on Araucaria by Reed and Rowe (2004) and extended with a module capturing persuasive aspects of argumentation. In ArgDB-pl, Budzynska (2011) uses the open AIF standard for argument representation for building the first Polish corpus of analyzed natural arguments.89

Last, but not least, serious attention is paid to meta-theoretical issues concerning the relationship between the tradition of Polish logical studies and current argumentation research in pragma-dialectics and informal logic (Koszowy 2004, 2011, 2013).90

In argumentation theory in Hungary, two schools have developed since the 1980s. First, there is the Budapest School, based in the philosophy program of Eötvös Loránd University Budapest (ELTE). This group of scholars, which includes Imre Ruzsa, László Pólos, András Máté, and László Szabó, studies argumentation and reasoning from classical and modern logical perspectives. After 2000 the Budapest School extended its scope through cooperation with the Technical University of Budapest and Corvinus University. New venues, such as argumentation in the history of science and in the philosophy of science, were explored by researchers such as Gábor Zemplén (2008) and Petra Aczél (2009, 2012). Several case studies were carried out. Gábor Kutrovátz (2010) examined more than 1,000 argumentative online exchanges from the public debate on the H1N1 vaccination. Informed by recent debates in the philosophy of testimony and contributions to argumentation theory such as the Woods–Walton approach, he developed a categorization of the most typical argument schemes. Zemplén (2011) studied historical case studies to investigate the extent to which methodological norms are argumentative tools in scientific controversies. Tihamér Margitay (2004) published the first comprehensive textbook on argumentation.

Second, there is the school originating in the early 1980s in the Janus Pannonius University in Pécs, which has become the University of Pécs. Today, in argumentation research there is active cooperation between the innovative Pécs School and scholars from the University of Debrecen and the University of Szeged. Since 2003 argumentation-related research projects have been carried out in the framework of an inter-university research cooperation funded by the National Science Foundation (OTKA) and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA).91 The research is linguistically oriented; it is led by László Komlósi (Pécs), András Kertész (Debrecen), and Enikő T. Németh (Szeged).

It is characteristic of the approach chosen by the Pécs group that argumentation is viewed as an interdisciplinary concept that brings together cognitive, cultural, linguistic, literary, and visual phenomena.92 The interrelations between the various angles are studied under the general umbrella of “social-interactive construction of meaning.” Next to Komlósi, other contributors are László Tarnay, Zsuzsanna Simonffy, Erzsébet Knipf, Tamás Pólya, Árpád Vígh, Monika Gyuró, and István Tarrósy.93 The theoretical tools they use combine insights from a great many sources: cognitive–discursive and dialogical approaches to argumentation, pragma-dialectics, inferential pragmatics, informal logic, the theory of topoi, semiotic traditions,94 and the French tradition of studying argumentation in language (Benveniste, Ducrot, and Raccah’s “point of view semantics”95), and Groupe μ and the visual rhetorical school of Liège, Belgium.

Komlósi studied general linguistics and modern languages and is now a professor of linguistics and communication at the University of Pécs. He devoted his doctoral dissertation to formal semantics: Montague grammar and its missing pragmatic parameters. His Habilitationsschrift was a study on inferential pragmatics. Komlósi’s cognitive interests have strongly influenced his research on discursive argumentation, argument structure, informal logic, reasoning strategies, and inferential pragmatics (e.g., Komlósi 1990, 1997, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2008). Tarnay is an associate professor at the same university. He applied the theory of dialogue games, elaborated in semantics and pragmatics, to the analysis of riddles and proverbs and was involved in literary research based on a model of argumentation which he opposed to the hermeneutic model of interpretation (e.g., Tarnay 1982, 1986, 1990, 1991, 2003). Simonffy, another associate professor at the University of Pécs, studied in France with Raccah and Ducrot. She is interested in applying their argumentative insights to specific linguistic problems, such as indefiniteness and vagueness in meaning and inferential structure (e.g., Simonffy 2010).

In the republics that constituted together the former Yugoslavia, the study of argumentation is not well developed. Nevertheless, some interesting developments have taken place. In the first place in Slovenia, largely due to the influence of Igor Ž. Žagar. It could be claimed that historically the local interest in argumentation theory started in the 1960s, when Fran Vatovec taught rhetoric at the University of Ljubljana. Vatovec, however, was not primarily interested in argumentation theory proper, but in journalism and public speaking. The same went for his successor, Boris Grabnar, whose work is eclectic and purely descriptive. In 1991, he published a textbook that provides a general introduction into rhetoric (Grabnar 1991), but this introduction is not free from conceptual mistakes and inconsistencies.

Most of the theoretical work on argumentation theory in Slovenia is carried out by Igor Ž. Žagar and Janja Žmavc at the Center for Discourse Studies of the Educational Research Institute in Ljubljana. At the University of Primorska, they teach a compulsory course in rhetoric and argumentation for students of Slovenian Studies and Media Studies and at the University of Maribor another rhetorically oriented course.96 Žagar was also instrumental in realizing a school reform introducing rhetoric in the primary school curriculum. In addition, rhetoric is also taught in commercial schools, albeit merely as ars recte loquendi: the art of speaking correctly, fluently, and if it can be also beautifully. In fact, in the teaching of rhetoric in Slovenia, argumentation remains neglected, and if argumentation is taught in connection with rhetoric, this happens always “on the side,” incorporated in other academic disciplines.

The interest in argumentation in Slovenia started when Žagar had been introduced to Ducrot’s theory of argumentation in the language system (see Sect. 9.3 of this volume) while studying in Paris.97 His study of philosophy and linguistics, especially of speech acts, led Žagar to the discovery of the “argumentative structures” and “argumentative orientations” which are, according to Ducrot, inherent to a language as a system. Žagar states his starting point as follows:

Argumentation always comes in blocks, consisting of an argument (at least one) and a conclusion, and we always have to consider them together, in relation to one another, not in isolation. […] [T]here is no absolute and independent orientation an argument can have: it is always limited, explained, and (re)interpreted by the conclusion. And one and the same argument can have (at least?) two different, even opposite, conclusions […]. Therefore, when assessing and evaluating an argument, we always have to do it in relation to the conclusion reached, within the framework of a given topic, never in isolation. (2008, pp. 162–163)

Žagar received his doctoral degree in sociology of culture from the University of Ljubljana. In 1997 he became head of the Center for Discourse Studies at the Educational Research Institute in Ljubljana. He is (co)author and (co)editor of a great many books and articles covering an intersection of argumentation, pragmatics, and discourse analysis. In his own view, his most important work is in the field of argumentation (argumentation in the language system) and discourse analysis, focusing on topics such as argumentative orientation, argumentative force, argumentative markers/connectives, argumentative scales, argumentative indicators, polyphony, topoi, and the discourse–historical approach to critical discourse analysis (e.g., Žagar 1991, 1995, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2008, 2010, 2011; Žagar and Schlamberger Brezar 2009; Žagar and Grgič 2011). It was his work on argumentation that led Žagar to rhetoric, in particular to classical topoi theory.

In 2005, Žagar started to collaborate with Žmavc, whose doctoral dissertation on ethos in pathos in the antique rhetorical tradition he co-supervised. Žmavc’s theoretical interests concentrate on the history of classical rhetoric, classical rhetorical concepts, rhetorical theory and practice, the use of ethos and pathos in argumentation, linguistic pragmatics, and the teaching of rhetoric. In her research, she investigates in the first place the connections between classical rhetorical concepts and contemporary models and their applicability to the analysis of argumentative discourse (e.g., Žmavc 2008a, b, 2012). In the contributions in which she deals with ethos she discusses different ancient conceptions of character presentation and proposes an interpretation which covers, in her view, the classical rhetorical concept of ethos. Žmavc also conducted the only empirical study so far on rhetorical and argumentative skills of Slovenian students.98

In Croatia, the interest in rhetoric reappeared in the 1990s, when the communist period in Yugoslavia had ended. This development, instigated by the late Ivo Škarić, started in the Department of Phonetics of the University of Zagreb in media education. Next to a rhetorical perspective on teaching argumentation, rhetorically oriented argumentation research also started to be published (e.g., Hasanbegović 1988; Visković 1997; Škarić 2011). Gabrijela Kišiček and Davor Stanković provided an analysis of fallacies in Croatian parliamentary debate (Kišiček and Stanković 2011). In addition, Davor Nikolić and Diana Tomić make clear how the Toulmin model can be used in rhetorical education (Nikolić and Tomić 2011).

In Bulgaria, the roots of argumentation theory are definitely rhetorical and date from the beginning of the twentieth century. The first textbook in which a great deal of attention was paid to argumentation was a guide of rhetoric and eloquence by Andrei Toshev, published in 1901. In 1924, Georgi Bakalov examined in a study devoted to public speaking for workers types of arguments that effectively influence mass consciousness.

A strong impetus to the development of modern argumentation theory in Bulgaria was the foundation, in 1976, of the department of rhetoric at Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski.99 From the very beginning, argumentation theory was in that department taught as a symbiosis of logical and psychological methods and techniques. 100 Other universities followed suit by offering rhetoric as a compulsory course or as an elective. 101 In the curricula of philosophers, lawyers, and linguists, too, argumentation theory came to play a significant role.

When it comes to theoretical approaches that have had an impact on the development of argumentation theory in Bulgaria, Aristotle’s dialectic comes first. It is usually studied in the context of Aristotelian philosophy, together with Aristotle’s analytics, rhetoric, and political theory. As Donka Alexandrova (1984, 1985, 2008), Jordan Vedar (2001), Gergana Apostolova (1994, 1999, 2012), and Ivanka Mavrodieva (2010) have shown, due to its holistic and open nature, Aristotle’s philosophy has the sustainability to remain pertinent throughout time.

Bulgarian scholarship which has influenced the theorizing includes Kiril Vassilev’s (1989) rhetorical study on eloquence, Красноречието: Аспекти на реториката [Eloquence: Rhetorical aspects]. In this study this distinguished historian of philosophy examines the relationship between philosophy, ideology, and rhetoric. Dobrin Spassov (1980) and Liuben Sivilov (1981, 1993) explore the relationship between rhetoric and nonformal dialectic logic. Vitan Stefanov (2001, 2003) concentrates on the relationship between formal–logical evidence and argumentation, focusing on logical errors.

In a study on metamorphoses of rhetoric in the twentieth century, Alexandrova (2006) presents the first systematic overview of argumentation theory in Bulgaria. By critically reviewing the most important ideas that have been advanced in the field, she makes clear that the interest in argumentation theory and rhetoric in the second half of the twentieth century is a product of postmodern society. Alexandrova discusses the rise and fall of the ideologies that have led to the collapse of socialism as the greatest social experiment in history, globalization, and the development of an anthropology related to it, but also intercultural dialogue and the role played by the media. In her monograph, the theories of persuasive communication are grouped into two categories: “argumentation theory” and “tropology.” First, four schools on argumentation theory belonging to the first category are discussed: Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s new rhetoric, the Toulmin approach, van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectics, and Brutian’s Yerevan School.102 Next, as part of the second category, rhetorical–stylistic aspects of persuasion are explored from a semiotic perspective.

Perelman’s return to Aristotelian complexity was an interesting replacement of the Marxist basic premise of the objectivity of truth (Alexandrova 1997, 1999, 2006, 2008).103 Brutian’s Yerevan School’s argumentation theory was still based on the objective truth concept that was the ideological starting point during the period of the Soviet regime, but argumentation, argumentative discourse, and the topoi were already viewed from a perspective different from logical demonstration.

Pragma-dialectics was brought closer to Bulgarian research practices by the publication of Bulgarian translations of several key monographs in the Library of Rhetoric, started and edited by Alexandrova.104 It is now a major influence on argumentation theory in Bulgaria.105 Mavrodieva (2010) uses Marcin Lewiński’s (2010a, b) pragma-dialectical study on the argumentative activity type of Internet political discussion forums as a theoretical and methodological basis for her research on virtual rhetoric.

Leading theorists in current Bulgarian argumentation theory are Alexandrova, Spassov, Vassilev, and Stefanov. In addition, important contributions have been made by some other scholars. Virginia Radeva (2000, 2006), for instance, examines the genesis of philosophical rhetoric. Her thesis is that rhetoric as a science of persuasion in communication has logical and axiological aspects. In her view, rhetorical proof is logical in essence and nature, but rhetorical in its function and application. Radeva makes clear that axiological aspects have their place in the field of rhetoric in so far as the orator’s moral and value orientation plays a part in the rhetorical evidence. In Culture and texts, Apostolova (2012) discusses specific applications of intercultural rhetoric to the field of English-language learning. She distinguishes between two phases in the learning process: first, argumentation and motivation and second, Systematic Integrated Approach to the Net (SIAN).

Other studies worth mentioning are a monograph by George Polya (1968), in which plausible reasoning is connected with the idea of negotiable premises in rhetorical reasoning, and Apostolova’s (2011) discussion of the nature of philosophical argument. Problems of argumentation theory are nowadays also frequently discussed in Bulgarian doctoral dissertations. A dissertation that stands out is Neli Stefanova’s (2012) study Реторическа аргументация в италианския политически дебат от края на ХХ век [Rhetorical argumentation in Italian political debate since the end of the twentieth century]. Stefanova discusses the rhetorical argumentation she is concerned with against the philosophical and political background of the transition from First to Second Italian Republic and the profound changes in sociopolitical communication and political discourse that went with it.

In Romania, argumentation theory has developed since the 1990s in two different environments: in departments of philosophy and, more prominently, in departments of foreign languages and linguistics.106 At the philosophy department of Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, Andrei Marga published several studies in which the philosophical and the linguistic perspectives on argumentation are combined (Marga 1992, 2009, 2010). In Marga (1992), for instance, he discusses the Toulmin model together with important flaws in philosophical argumentation, such as the use of the argumentum ad verecundiam in several of its variants (pp. 152–157). At the Al. I. Cuza University of Iaşi, Constantin Sălăvăstru (2003), a philosopher who is a very productive argumentation scholar, published the most detailed overview of argumentation studies that has so far appeared in Romanian. 107 Starting from antiquity, he sketches a historical panorama and provides an integrating perspective on argumentation theory.

An influential handbook stemming from foreign languages and linguistics departments is authored by Mariana Tuţescu (1986, 1998) of the University of Bucharest, who addresses a Francophone public. In Romania, argumentation studies in French often focus on linguistic devices such as argumentative indicators and connectors, and they are usually strongly influenced by Anscombre, Ducrot, Grize, and Moeschler (see Chap. 9 of this volume). Tuţescu offers in the first place an overview of linguistic insights relevant to argumentation theory. After a short historical presentation of the development of argumentation theory, she discusses insights from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Apostel, von Wright, Grize, Vignaux, Toulmin, Ducrot and Anscombre, and van Eemeren and Grootendorst. The argumentative strategies she pays attention to include the use of polemic negation, metaphor, and paradox. Tuţescu also discusses the discursive characteristics of linguistic devices such as the French mais [but], même [even], and d’ailleurs [in fact]. In line with Anscombre and Ducrot, she views “explaining” and “seducing” as guiding the way in which discourse builds itself around major objectives and words are given an argumentative role. Tuţescu’s approach has had a considerable impact on doctoral research in Romanian argumentation theory.

At the University of Bucharest, Liliana Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu and Rodica Ileana Zafiu approach language and discourse from a pragmatic perspective, integrating insights from stylistics, rhetoric, argumentation theory, and discourse analysis. While Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu promotes the study of political argumentation (2008, 2010),108 Zafiu applies insights from argumentation theory and rhetoric to various types of argumentative texts. In Zafiu (2003), she makes use of Houtlosser’s (1998) distinctions between opinions, attitudes, theses, conclusions, and standpoints in studying the relationship between argumentation and dialogue as it is reflected in dialogues extracted from the CORV, a corpus of spoken Romanian (put together by Dascălu Jinga 2002). According to Zafiu’s research, in everyday conversations Romanian speakers usually advance points of view that challenge common opinion. Instead of supporting their standpoints with arguments, they develop subthemes they find easier to discuss. Advancing standpoints and argumentation is often accompanied by hesitation, approximation, vagueness, and attenuation. Zafiu also pays attention to the development of argumentative roles in conversation and the use of linguistic devices for image building. 109

In 2006, at the same university, Isabela Ieţcu-Preoteasa (or Ieţcu), one of the founding members of the research group on discourse analysis of the Prosper Language Center of the Academy of Economic Studies, published several studies dealing with issues from argumentation theory (for her contributions as Isabela Fairclough, see Sect. 12.2 of this volume). The first is a revised version of the doctoral dissertation she defended in 2004 at the University of Lancaster (Ieţcu-Preoteasa 2006). She compares and connects critical discourse analysis and pragma-dialectics with each other: The former is less specific and “less analytical in its description of the normative framework for dialogue,” while more precise “in its specification of the various ways in which differences of opinion are approached.” Ieţcu-Preoteasa points out that “overcoming differences of opinion through dialogue is just one possible scenario” which the speakers may choose (2006, p. 132). She examines in her dissertation the discursive and argumentative strategies used by the Romanian author Horia-Roman Patapievici in a collection of essays to legitimize economic liberalism in Romania and delegitimize communism after 1989. By integrating insights from critical discourse analysis, pragma-dialectics, and informal logic, on the one hand, and from the theory of modal argument by Angelika Kratzer, on the other hand, she intends to create her own method of analysis. In a second study, Ieţcu (2006) includes the notions of modality, evidentiality, and metaphor in her method when she applies the pragma-dialectical concept of strategic maneuvering to the analysis of four different types of cases of argumentative discourse. Her approach, which combines various perspectives and takes a great amount of contextual information into account in the analysis, enabled her to draw conclusions that otherwise could not have been reached. She concludes, for instance, that the explicitly dialectical orientation (in the pragma-dialectical sense) of the Romanian intellectuals who became in 1989 the model of public dissent gained them a considerable degree of moral and political authority, but concealed the extent to which their arguments were in fact open to the charge of fallaciousness, and obscured the fact that “the dichotomies they constructed for argumentative purposes were often false dilemmas […], their analogies spurious and misleading […]” (p. 273).

For the research group of Argumentation, Rhetoric, and Communication of the Dunărea de Jos University in Galaţi, pragma-dialectics has become a major source of inspiration. 110 Since 2007, a research project has been carried out on strategic maneuvering with dissociation and with evidential markers.111 The argumentative technique of dissociation was examined in a series of articles by Anca Gâţă and Alina Ganea (e.g., Gâţă 2007; Ganea and Gâţă 2010). The role of evidential markers in argumentative discourse has been discussed in two monographs and a series of articles by Ganea, Gâţă, and Gabriela Scripnic (e.g., Ganea and Gâţă 2009; Gâţă 2010; Ganea 2011, 2012; Scripnic 2011, 2012a, b). The hypothesis of the researchers is that the rhetorical function of presenting the source of information in argumentative discourse is to draw the other party’s attention to its degree of reliability, thus supporting its dialectical function of ensuring that the argument is built on solid evidence. Making use of extended pragma-dialectics, Simona Mazilu and Daniela Muraru, who are both connected with the project, defended in 2010 at the University of Bucharest their doctoral dissertations devoted to strategic maneuvering in specific cases of argumentative discourse: the Romanian abortion debate and the peace negotiations at Camp David, respectively (Mazilu 2010; Muraru 2010).

Since the late 1990s, in Macedonia there has been a growing interest in argumentation theory – primarily in philosophy, logic, and artificial intelligence but also in law and communication studies and rhetoric. Not only has the role that argumentation theory can play in furthering the development of logic been recognized, but also are the conceptual tools of argumentation theory viewed as practical instruments for judging the quality of any kind of rational discourse. This has led to an expanding engagement of Macedonian scholars from various disciplines in the theoretical study of argumentative phenomena. In this endeavor, insights from various kinds of theoretical approaches to argumentation are brought to bear, including not only the Toulmin perspective, the new rhetoric, pragma-dialectics, and informal logic but also more formally oriented approaches, such as formal dialectic, and insights concerning defeasible reasoning from non-monotonic logic. In addition, critical thinking has become a topic of study both in interdisciplinary curriculums and in summer schools.112

Macedonian argumentation research from the logical–philosophical perspective responds to the challenge to create a theoretical framework for integrating the different paradigms that have been developed in argumentation theory. In the Institute of Philosophy of Ss Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, the study of argumentation theory was introduced by Violeta Panzova as a continuation of an earlier research project, “Logical analysis and formalization of the Macedonian standard language.” In the new research project, “Contemporary trends in argumentation theory,” the most important approaches to argumentation were scrutinized to develop a conception of logic that is broad enough to deal with the forms, principles, and mechanisms of analytical as well as dialectical reasoning. The historical part of the project concentrated in the first place on Aristotle’s “dialectical” treatises, Topics, Rhetoric, and Sophistical Refutations. Among the main sources for the systematic part of project were the publications of Perelman, Toulmin, Viehweg, Lorenz, Barth and Krabbe, Walton, and van Eemeren and Grootendorst.113 The focus was on sketching the fundamentals of an integral theory of argumentation.

The main result of the project most pertinent to argumentation theory is Ana Dimiškovska Trajanoska’s (2001) book publication in Macedonian, Прагматиката и теорgtуијата на аргументацијата [Pragmatics and argumentation theory]. The core idea of this study is that argumentation theory involves a pragmatically oriented approach to logic.114 It is an attempt to overcome a reductionist formalized approach to logic by developing an integral conception of logic as a theory of both analytical and non-analytical manifestations of rationality. According to Dimiškovska, starting from the intersubjectivity of communication and the dialogical structure of reasoning, through the analysis of the pragmatic aspects of language, a categorical apparatus can be developed that can be constructively applied in argumentation theory. She demonstrates the relevance of the theory of speech acts for argumentation theory by applying van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectical theory to the analysis of argumentative discourse and the identification of fallacies. In her conclusion, Dimiškovska emphasizes the need to elaborate the theorizing concerning non-analytical reasoning by replacing a purely descriptive theory by a theory that also includes the normative dimension.115

As is shown in Dimiškovska (2009), the (re)introduction of argumentation theory involves a radical return to the resources of natural language and the primacy of the dialectical perspective over the analytical perspective. Dimiškovska responds to the question of how in argumentative discourse the participants can prevent inadequate argumentative acting from being effective by reacting to subversive uses of argumentative techniques by the other party that go against “the canons of rationality.” She discusses four different “strategies” that can be used in different contexts, on different communicative levels, and with different effects. In this discussion she pays special attention to the relationship between normative and descriptive aspects of the strategies.

Other research activities related to argumentation theory at Ss Cyril and Methodius University are employed at the Institute of Classical Studies with regard to rhetoric and at the Institute of Pedagogy and the Institute of Psychology with regard to critical thinking.116 In the early twenty-first century, the South East European University in Tetovo has also become actively engaged in argumentation theory, due to the work of Vesel Memedi, who was a lecturer at this university and is presently a professor at the State University of Tetovo. Memedi is interested in the problem of resolving “deep disagreement.” In Memedi (2007), he argues with the help of a Macedonian case study that the concept of a “third party” can be of help in explaining at least some of the cases of deep disagreement.

Research in argumentation theory tends to concentrate on analyzing argumentative discourse between two parties, but in certain cases a third party is involved as well. Just as the parties in debate tournaments do not try to persuade each other but the judge or the referee, in a court of law the lawyers on both sides do not try to persuade each other but the judge or the jury. According to Memedi (2007), the same can be said about certain ethnic conflicts, where the parties cannot persuade each other but try to convince a third-party audience. By means of a pragma-dialectical analysis of the strategic maneuvering by Macedonian-language and Albanian-language newspapers regarding the armed conflict between these two ethnic groups in 2001, he tests his hypothesis that the two parties were in fact trying to persuade the international community to intervene. In Memedi (2011), he considers exploiting the recently introduced notion of an “attractor” “that can pull inside its gravity both sides” in dealing with intractable conflicts (p. 1264), so that a powerful attractor, such as intervention by the international community, can be used in analyzing and explaining the management of the Macedonian conflict.

12.12 Argumentation Studies in Russia and Other Parts of the Former USSR

The study of argumentation in Russia and other parts of the former USSR is not characterized by compliance with a unifying paradigm. There is a clear interest in argumentation theory, but the views about what the subject matter of the discipline should be differ, just as there is no unanimity regarding its main problems or prospective developments. Argumentation is approached from a variety of angles. The main theoretical traditions are philosophical, logical, cognitive, pragma-dialectical, rhetorical, or a combination of some of these. Different schools can be distinguished, but there is in fact a considerable amount of overlap between them. In sketching the state of the art, we shall first pay attention to the historical background of the study of argumentation in the Soviet Union and then discuss more recent developments. We will do so by giving an overview of the various kinds of approaches to argumentation theory in Russia and other countries that were part of the USSR.

Historically, Russian argumentation studies started as part of the logical research tradition. Some works, however, reached beyond the confines of this framework. The famous Russian logician Sergey Povarnin, for instance, discussed in his seminal work Iskusstvo spora: O teorii i praktike spora [The art of argument: On the theory and practice of arguing], next to logical aspects, also communicative and psychological aspects of arguing (Povarnin 1923). Povarnin developed a classification of disputes, examined arguing techniques of proponents and opponents, and classified fallacies. His work is still on the reading list of argumentation students looking for practical aids. A more articulated theoretical interest in argumentation theory however was not generated in the Soviet Union until the second part of the twentieth century, when some studies of prominent Western argumentation theorists, such as Walton, and van Eemeren and Grootendorst, had been translated into Russian.117

In the 1970s, the interest in the study of argumentation in the Soviet Union was first stimulated from Armenia by the philosopher Georg Brutian, who started then a center of argumentation research at the University of Yerevan.118 Brutian thus revived an old Armenian tradition, going back to David the Invincible in the fifth and sixth century. He offered a theoretical basis for the approach on which the new stream of argumentation research was to be built. His efforts have resulted in the creation of the Yerevan School of Argumentation. At present, this school has branched out to scholars in Russia, Belarus, and various other countries.

Brutian and his collaborators concentrated in the first place on philosophical argumentation, but they also published about specific problems in the theory of argumentation and about argumentation analysis. They view argumentation as aimed at transforming the opponent into a co-participant in the realization of the proponent’s goal. The main characteristic of their approach is that it is synthetic, combining insights from philosophy, logic, rhetoric, discourse analysis, and other disciplines. The Yerevan School of Argumentation has been very active in organizing international conferences and educating young researchers from all over the Soviet Union. After the first All-Union symposium on argumentation had taken place in Yerevan in 1984, such conferences have been held on a regular basis and their proceedings were always published.119 From 1997 to 2001, Brutian also published the journal Armenian Mind and from 2003 onwards News and Views.120

In his publications on argumentation theory (e.g., G. Brutian 1991, 1992, 1998), Professor Brutian has displayed a broad interest in a great many topics, varying from the history of the study of argumentation and the use of dialectic and rhetoric to the typology of argumentation and the specific characteristics of philosophical argumentation.121 Other members of the Yerevan School include Hasmik Hovhannisian, Robert Djidjian, and Lilit Brutian. Hovhannisian investigated the problems of argumentation that David the Invincible was dealing with and described the history and current concerns of the Yerevan School (Hovhannisian 2006). Djidjian concentrated on the role of argumentation in scientific discovery, in medical argumentation, and in other fields of knowledge, but he also discussed the interrelation of argumentation theory and “transformational logic” (Djidjian 1992). Lilit Brutian’s main focus is the linguistic dimension of argumentation. She published essays on the analysis of explicit and partially explicit types of argumentative discourse and suggested a typological classification of argumentative discourse (e.g., L. Brutian 1991, 2003, 2007, 2011).122

Currently, two philosophical traditions can be distinguished in Russia, the one located in Moscow, the other in St. Petersburg. In Moscow, the leading theorists are Andrey Alekseev, Irina Gerasimova, and Alexander Ivin of the Philosophy Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Yury Ivlev of the department of logic at Moscow State University. In St. Petersburg, the most prominent scholars are Anatoliy Migunov and Elena Lisanyuk of the department of logic of St. Petersburg State University.123 There is also a research group in argumentation at the department of philosophy of the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University in Kaliningrad, which was founded around 2000 by the late Vladimir Briushinkin. In addition, the activities of Viktor Tchouechov of the philosophy department of the Public Administration Academy in Minsk, Belarus, deserve to be mentioned.

The Moscow scholars concentrate on the ways of reasoning displayed in argumentation, which should, in their view, always be logically correct. Alexander Ivin’s (1997) textbook Osnovy teorii argumentatsii [The basics of argumentation theory], which is the first of its kind in Russia, takes as its starting point that the aim of argumentation is to get the audience to accept a thesis, but that this thesis need not necessarily be true. According to Ivin, argumentation theory has as its main goal to study the various discursive ways that enable speakers to influence their audience, even when they defend theses that are in fact false. Because of the different kinds of backing they require, Ivin not only distinguishes between descriptive and evaluative statements, but he also makes a distinction between universal ways of reasoning, which do not depend on the audience, and contextual ways of reasoning, in which the audience that is to be persuaded is taken into consideration.

In St. Petersburg, Anatoliy Migunov examines argumentative discourse from the perspective of logical pragmatics, making also use of the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (Migunov 2002, 2004, 2005, 2007a, b, 2009, 2011). Focusing on the interconnection between logic, argumentation theory, and rhetoric, he distinguishes between traditional logical inferences, argumentative inferences in interpersonal communication based on pragma-dialectical principles of argumentation, and rhetorical inferences involving dialogical thought generation and verbalization of ideas. Elena Lisanyuk (2013) pursues a logical–cognitive approach in which argumentation is understood, in a pragma-dialectical vein, as involving two conceptually distinct phases: the mental activity of designing argumentation in a logical and cognitive framework and the speech activity of externalizing the argumentation communicatively in a dialogue or monologue. To conceive a mental design, an arguer has to anticipate the cognitive presumptions of the prospective dialogue partner in relation to the type of argumentation to be advanced. These cognitive presumptions vary in accordance with the distinction between argumentation aimed at justification, aimed at conviction, and aimed at persuasion.124

In Kaliningrad, the late Vladimir Briushinkin suggested designing a systematic argumentation model by making use of logical, rhetorical, and cognitive approaches to argumentation (Briushinkin 2000, 2008, 2010). This systematic argumentation model has two distinctive features. The first is that it considers argumentation as a purely conceptual activity taking place inside the mind, whereas the externalization which takes places in verbalizing argumentation is a separate matter. Second, to determine which model of argumentation is to be chosen, research is to be carried out into the intended addressee. The workshops on argumentation started by Briushinkin in Svetlogorsk (formerly Rauschen) in 2000 under the title “Modelling reasoning” have gradually become an important tradition in the field of argumentation theory in the countries of the former USSR; they attract argumentation theorists from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.

The Belarusian argumentation theorist Viktor Tchouechov discussed in his dissertation philosophical argumentation in relation to Karl Marx’s concept of philosophy. He also conducted comparative studies of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s new rhetoric and van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectics, on the one hand, and Karl Marx’s dialectics, on the other hand. Tchouechov’s contributions to argumentation theory further include historical overviews of different kinds of rhetorics. In Teoretiko-istoricheskie osnovania argumentologii [Theoretical-historical foundations of argumentology], Tchouechov (1993) differentiates three methodological directions in historical philosophies of argumentation: argumentation from logos in ancient Greece, argumentation from authority in ancient India, and argumentation from ethos in ancient China. In considering paradigms of argumentology, he proposed to distinguish along the following four dimensions between the various approaches: formal/informal/nonformal logics; argumentative/expressive rhetorics; hermeneutics/para-hermeneutics; and monological/dialogical/dialectical (see also Tchouechov 2011).125

The studies of argumentation in Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union which start from a linguistic angle concentrate on specific aspects of argumentative discourse. These studies are conducted from rhetorical and pragma-dialectical perspectives. Again, a distinction can be made between a Moscow School and a St. Petersburg School, but there are also contributions from others. A prominent theorist from the Moscow School in linguistic argumentation studies is Anatoly Baranov. In his doctoral dissertation, Linguisticheskay teoriya argumentatsii (kognitivny podhod) [Linguistic theory of argumentation: A cognitive approach], Baranov views argumentation as “a complex of verbally performed cognitive procedures of knowledge processing” that lead to changes in the recipient’s world picture and influences the process of decision-making (1990, p. 41). Baranov distinguishes between four types of argumentation: logical, emotional, dialectical, and “generative” argumentation.

Prominent representatives of the St. Petersburg School in linguistic argumentation studies are the late Ludmila Chakhoyan, Tatyana Tretyakova, Vadim Golubev, Kira Goudkova, and Tatyana Ivanova. Initially, the group was led by Chakhoyan, whose views on argumentation were influenced by pragma-dialectics. She supervised the doctoral dissertations of Golubev and Goudkova. In their argumentation research, Tretyakova, Golubev, Goudkova, and Ivanova deal with a variety of language-related topics, including the argumentation structures and argument schemes used in media discourse,126 the types of argumentation and linguistic devices arguers use,127 and verbal manipulation by pseudo-argumentation.128 In some cases, they carry out joint projects (e.g., Goudkova and Tretyakova 2011).

Vadim Golubev (2001, 2002a, b) uses a logico-pragma-stylistic perspective in identifying and explaining fallacies. His analysis is based on the assumption that in argumentation in natural language there is a strong interdependence between the logical aspects examined in logic and the pragma-stylistic aspects examined in linguistics. Golubev identifies three major appeals that are made in a communicative strategy: to the mind of the recipients, to their emotions, and to their aesthetic feelings. The maximum persuasive effect can be achieved by using all three kinds of appeals, so that the rational appeal is reinforced by the emotional and the aesthetic appeals. Fallacies occur when reason is supplanted by emotional and aesthetic appeals.129 Later Golubev concentrated his research interests on political argumentation, in particular on the issue of terrorism in public debate in Russia. In Golubev (2007), he analyzed President Putin’s address to the nation in the wake of the Beslan terrorist attack, on 4 September 2004, to examine how the Russian leader used the problem of terrorism in furthering his political goals. In this way, the terrorism debate is viewed in the wider context of the democracy and governance debate between the Russian President and the liberal opposition.

Kira Goudkova (2009) examines in Kognitivno-pragmatichesky analiz argumentatsii v analiticheskoy gazetnoy statye [Cognitive-pragmatical analysis of argumentation of the analytical newspaper article] the use of argumentation in British newspapers. Her starting point is that the framework within which argumentation is built and structured cognitively is defined by binary oppositions. In agreement with the pragma-dialectical view, she recognizes that argumentation is both a process of putting forward arguments and a result of this process. In terms of the textual result, a distinction can be made between a type of argumentation composition that is progressive (first, the thesis and then the supporting arguments) and a type of argumentation composition that is regressive (first, the supporting arguments and then the thesis). In terms of the discourse process, oppositions apply such as thesis and antithesis, proponent and opponent, and argument and counterargument. Such oppositions determine, according to Goudkova, the argumentative vector of the arguer’s reasoning, especially in the case of conflicting systems of belief.

Elsewhere in Russia, Lev Vasilyev (also spelled Va(s)siliev) of Kaluga State University focuses on the convergence of logical and linguistic aspects of argumentation.130 In Vasiliev (1994), the founder of the Kaluga School of Linguistic Argumentology proposed a method for tactical argument analysis and enthymeme reconstruction which makes use of an Aristotle-based syllogistic logic (see also Vassiliev 2003).131 Vasilyev advocates a multi-level semio-argumentative approach to analyzing comprehension instruments of argumentative discourse in which the starting point is that the principal linguistic unit in which argumentation manifests itself, the Argumentative Move, has the nature of a sign (Vasilyev 2007). He supervised a series of doctoral dissertations on various types of written texts with the form of a monologue.132

In Belarus, Alena Vasilyeva of Minsk State Linguistic University concentrates on argumentation in the context of dispute mediation. Making use of insights from pragma-dialectics and the study of conversational argument by Jackson and Jacobs, she examines, for example, how participants in dispute mediation manage to shape the disagreement space and how they make use of the resources of the disagreement space to construct the process of deliberation (Vasilyeva 2011). In Vasilyeva (2012), she shows what is made arguable and how the strategies and resources that can be used in the argumentation are constrained by demands of the interaction process, such as face protection, and the institutional demands of the communicative activity type in which the argumentative exchange takes place. The mediator proves to play an active part in shaping a specific disagreement space and controls to some extent what can become arguable.

Besides these contributions to the study of argumentation from Russia and other parts of the former USSR,133 there is also an ongoing rhetorical tradition of argumentation research based on Aristotle and on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s new rhetoric. The most important theoreticians are Yury Rozhdestvensky and Evgeny Kluev. Prinzipy sovremennoy ritoriki [The principles of modern rhetoric] by Rozhdestvensky (2000) and Ritorika: Inventsiya, Dispozitsiya, Elocutsiya [Rhetoric: Invention, disposition, elocution] by Kluev (1999) are generally considered to be the main handbooks for specialists working in this tradition. Their focus is mainly on persuasive strategies in texts from the media and on the principles of constructing persuasive texts.

12.13 Argumentation Studies in Spanish-Speaking Areas

In the Spanish-speaking world, the interest in argumentation theory has increased considerably in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Various research groups concentrating on the study of argumentation have come into being, academic conferences have been organized, and the teaching programs of a number of universities have been enriched with courses devoted to argumentation. This development did not only take place in Spain but also – and even more strikingly – in Chile, Argentina, Colombia, and some other Latin American countries.134 The growing interest is for a large part motivated by the practical relevance of argumentation, which manifests itself in the academic activities in a strong emphasis on the study of argumentative competence and skills and the intricacies of the use of argumentation in the legal domain and other institutional contexts.

Unfortunately, the great rhetorical tradition going back to the Spanish Golden Age, which shares some important characteristics with the Renaissance traditions in Italy, England, and the Netherlands (Alburquerque 1995), was not systematically continued.135 Nevertheless, the relationship between rhetoric and argumentation and the relationship between argumentation and logic were already a topic of reflection, albeit by somewhat isolated scholars, before the field started to expand. Toulmin’s philosophical views were studied, just as Perelman’s approach to legal reasoning, and the importance of informal logic for teaching philosophy, linguistics, and communication136 was considered. The Uruguayan philosopher Carlos Vaz Ferreira (1872–1958), for one, showed in his early Lógica viva [Living logic] (Vaz Ferreira 1945), stemming from 1910, why it is necessary to examine the fallacies.

Although the recent invigoration of argumentation studies in Spanish-speaking countries has not yet led to a great many fundamental theoretical innovations, it is clear that the required background has been created for systematic theoretical reflection and fruitful mutual collaboration. The present academic infrastructure of the field includes regular conferences and seminars devoted to argumentation theory, book series which publish studies on argumentation by Hispanic scholars and translations of works written by other prominent scholars in the field, and even an Institute of Argumentation at the Faculty of Law of the University of Chile, led by Rodrigo Valenzuela, and a Centre for the Study of Argumentation and Reasoning (CEAR) at the University of Diego Portales in Santiago de Chile. The last institution has its own academic journal, Cogency, edited by Claudio Fuentes and Cristián Santibáñez. Against this background, compared with the situation in the past, communication and exchanges of views between argumentation scholars from different Hispanic countries are now much easier to realize.

In Spain, argumentation theory was strongly promoted by the philosopher Luis Vega Reñón, starting already in the 1990s (see Vega 2005). Approaching argumentation primarily from a logical perspective, Vega not only published on the topic but also stimulated his students at the Spanish Open University UNED (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia) to write theses and doctoral dissertations about problems in argumentation theory. From Madrid, he directed three comprehensive research projects, in which he also included scholars from other parts of Spain and from South America and Mexico.137 As a result, in 2011, under the supervision of Vega and Paula Olmos, the first Compendio de lógica, argumentación y retórica [Compendium of logic, argumentation and rhetoric] was published (Vega and Olmos 2011), which had a second edition already 1 year later.138 In 2010, Vega founded an online journal on argumentation, Revista Iberoamericana de Argumentación (RIA) [Ibero-American journal of argumentation].139 He was also instrumental in the publication of a monograph by María G. Navarro (2009) about argumentation and interpretation, Interpretar y Argumentar [Interpreting and arguing],140 and a monograph by M. Teresa López de la Vieja (2010) about moral argumentation, La pendiente resbaladiza [The slippery-slope fallacy].141

A Spanish argumentation scholar who has published a monograph in English, so that her views are accessible to the argumentation community at large, is Lilian Bermejo-Luque, who is currently affiliated with the University of Granada. In Giving Reasons, Bermejo-Luque (2011) presents a linguistic pragmatic approach to argumentation in which she aims to integrate the logical, dialectical, and rhetorical dimensions of argumentation.142 To achieve this purpose, she develops a model for treating the justificatory and persuasive force of argumentation that is based on speech act theory. In this endeavor, Bermejo-Luque makes use of several prominent approaches to argumentation: the Toulmin model, pragma-dialectics, the new rhetoric, the ARG model of informal logic, and the epistemic perspective on argumentation. Abandoning the “instrumentalist” conception of goodness of argumentation that is in her view behind these approaches, she offers an alternative by characterizing argumentation as a “second-order speech act complex.” This proposal has led to mixed reactions.143

Earlier, at the Basque University of San Sebastian (Donostia), Kepa Korta and his team had already incorporated the study of argumentation in their research program of logic. They included argumentation theory also explicitly in their conferences and colloquiums (see, e.g., Korta and Garmendia 2008). Another disciplinary angle of approach that was chosen at an early stage is linguistics, with a clear focus on Ducrot’s theorizing (see Sect. 9.3 of this volume).144 Contemporary rhetoric was in Spain also well represented, particularly in connection with Perelman’s views.145 María Lanzadera, together with Félix García, Sergio Montes, and José Valadés, published in 2007 a compilation of essays, Argumentación y razonar: Cómo enseñar y evaluar la capacidad de argumentar [Argumentation and reasoning: How to teach and evaluate the argumentative capacity], in which the state of the art in Spanish argumentation theory was described from the perspective of education. María Josep Cuenca (1995), too, examined argumentation and education. A generally recognized center for the study of legal argumentation in the Hispanic world is the University of Alicante, with Manuel Atienza and Juan Ruiz Manero as the leading scholars and Alexy’s views as the main source of inspiration.146 Juan García Amado, at the northern University of Léon, also examines legal argumentation, but his approach is primarily linked with the views of Viehweg and Luhmann. Other Spanish researchers addressed specific topics in argumentation theory. Tomás Miranda (1998, 2002), for example, discussed the argument schemes – a topic later also examined by Begoña Carrascal and Miguel Mori (2011). Visual argumentation in films was studied by Jesús Alcolea Banegas (2007).147

An important impetus to the study of argumentation in Argentina was given in 2002 by the conference on argumentation organized in Buenos Aires by the prominent discourse analysts María Marta García Negroni and Elvira Narvaja de Arnoux, where Ducrot presented a keynote speech. Negroni is editor of the journal Páginas de Guarda, which published, besides a great number of essays on style, also papers on argumentation. She is a disciple of Ducrot and has stimulated Argentinian argumentation theory to go into his direction. Narvaja, who shares Negroni’s interest in argumentation, leads the master’s program of discourse analysis in the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Buenos Aires. Argumentation theory is part of this program and students are encouraged to write their master’s theses on argumentation, which often means argumentation in political discourse.148 Although the way in which argumentation is studied in this curriculum is strongly influenced by the French School, there is also room for other approaches.149

The main protagonist of argumentation studies in Argentina, however, is Roberto Marafioti. He has not only been involved in argumentation theory as an editor of a textbook on semiotics that includes a substantial chapter on argumentation (Marafioti et al. 1997), as an author of a textbook entirely devoted to argumentation theory (Marafioti 2003), and as an author of some essays dealing particularly with political argumentation in parliament (Marafioti 2007; Marafioti et al. 2007) but also as coordinator of a remarkably consistent research group, which includes Bertha Zamudio, Jacqueline Giudice, Leticia Rolando, Nora Muñoz, María Bitonte, and Zelma Dumm.150

Another scholar doing argumentation research at the University of Buenos Aires is Cecilia Crespo, who examined the role of argumentation in science and more in particular in the ways in which children understand and produce mathematical reasoning (Crespo 2005; Crespo and Farfán 2005).151 The Argentinian philosopher Juan Comesaña is remarkable because he was one of the first South-Americans to engage in informal logic and the study of the fallacies (Comesaña 1998).152

More recently, Constanza Padilla has started at the Universidad Nacional de Tucumán in north Argentina, together with her team, to do research concerning argumentative competence in children (Padilla and López 2011) and to apply argumentation theory to Argentinian social and political discourse, using a combination of pragma-dialectics and Ducrot’s approach (Padilla 1997).153 Padilla is editor of the journal Revista del Instituto de Investigaciones Lingüísticas y Literarias Hispanoamericana [Journal of the Institute of Hispano-American Linguistic and Literary Investigations], which devoted several issues to argumentation theory. In the same vein, Susana Ortega de Hocevar (2003, 2008) at the National University of Cuyo, Mendoza, tried to achieve a better understanding of children’s argumentative competence.

Remarkably, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Chile has become a crucial center of activities in Latin American argumentation theory. In fact, Juan Rivano, Gerardo Álvarez, and Emilio Rivano had prepared the ground for this development in the 1980s and 1990s. Already in the 1980s, Juan Rivano, who was professor of philosophy at the University of Chile, discussed the Toulmin model explaining Toulmin’s notion of reasonableness (Rivano 1984). In the 1990s, at the University of Concepción, the linguist Emilio Rivano treated Toulmin’s approach in more detail but added some elements from Naess’s perspective (Rivano 1999). At the same department, Gerardo Álvarez approached argumentation from the angle of text linguistics (Álvarez 1996). An important step toward an expansion of the Chilean study of argumentation was made at the Catholic University of Chile in Santiago by the philosophers Ana María Vicuña and Celso López. They paved the way to the inclusion of more recent developments in argumentation theory by inviting van Eemeren several times to lecture in Chile and by presenting Spanish translations of the pragma-dialectical monographs Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992a), and A systematic theory of argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004) (2007 and 2011, respectively).. In addition, they applied the theoretical instruments of pragma-dialectics in their own work (e.g., López 2007; Vicuña 2007; López and Vicuña 2011).

The foundation of CEAR at the University of Diego Portales in 2007 created the appropriate context for the further expansion of Chilean argumentation theory. Next to having every 2 years an international argumentation conference and publishing the journal Cogency, CEAR supervises bachelor’s and master’s theses and offers argumentation seminars in Chile and elsewhere in South America, organizes debate tournaments that prepare secondary school teachers and their students for argumentation theory, and sees to the translation of important studies in the field.154 Several lines of research are being developed at CEAR. So far Santibáñez has published on a variety of topics, varying from a case study about argumentation and metaphor (2010c) to a review of Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory of reasoning (2012a) and an essay on argumentation theory as applied epistemology (2012c).155

In 2010, the lawyer Rodrigo Valenzuela started the Institute for Argumentation in the faculty of law of the University of Chile, which carries out two lines of work, one focused on rhetoric, led by Valenzuela (2009), and the other focused on pragma-dialectically oriented argumentation, led by Cristóbal Joannon and Constanza Ihnen. In her doctoral dissertation at the University of Amsterdam, Ihnen (2012b) examined the role of pragmatic argumentation in law-making debates in the British parliament. She uses the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation to develop instruments for the analysis and evaluation of pragmatic argumentation.156 Subsequently she contextualizes these instruments by taking into consideration the institutional constraints applying to the communicative activity type of parliamentary Second Reading debates in the British parliament. To illustrate their use, she examines pragmatic argumentation put forward by the Labour government in the Second Reading of the Terrorism Bill in 2005. At the University of La Serena, Cristian Noemi also carries out research into legal argumentation, making use of Aristotelian and Perelmanian insights (Noemi 2011). His research on argumentative complexity is partly based on pragma-dialectics.157

In the south of Chile, at the University of Concepción, Jorge Osorio links argumentation and cognition (Osorio 2006). In Valdivia, at the University of Austral, Cecilia Quintrileo applied pragma-dialectics in analyzing Chilean parliamentarian discourse (Quintrileo 2007). A group of Chilean researchers primarily stemming from the Catholic University of Valparaíso concentrates on researching from a linguistic point of view the argumentative competence of children in primary and secondary education. This research is strongly empirical and relates to tests for reading comprehension and debate skills (see N. Crespo 1995; Jelvez 2008; Marinkovich 2000, 2007; Meza 2009; Parodi 2000; Poblete 2003).

Other Spanish-speaking countries in which argumentation has become a topic of research are Colombia, Uruguay, and Mexico. In Colombia, at the University of Valle in Cali, since 2003, María Cristina Martínez Solis has been stimulating the interest in argumentation theory through the UNESCO Chair in Reading and Writing by organizing an international seminar.158 She invited European argumentation scholars, such as van Eemeren, Plantin, and Amossy, to give seminars in Cali but also South-American colleagues, such as Marafioti and Santibáñez. In her own research, she connects examining argumentation with a dialogical approach to discourse. In La construcción del proceso argumentativo en el discurso [The construction of the argumentative process in discourse] (Martinez 2005), she presents a model of Enunciative Dynamics that integrates from a dialogical perspective three prominent views on argumentation: the Toulmin approach, Perelman’s new rhetoric, and van Eemeren’s pragma-dialectics (see also Martínez 2006, 2007).

Starting from the model of Enunciative Dynamics, at the University of Valle, the research group GITECLE examines different types of discourses, especially political, administrative, and media discourse, by means of argumentation analysis. At the same university, Adolfo León Gómez had earlier been promoting the new rhetoric by translating Perelman’s (1977) L’empire rhétorique [The realm of rhetoric] into Spanish (1997). In 1993, Gómez published Argumentos y falacias [Arguments and fallacies] (see Gómez 2003). In Seis lecciones sobre la teoría de la argumentación [Six lessons on argumentation theory], Gómez (2006) presents an approach to Perelman’s thinking which also includes some objections to Perelman’s theory. In 2010, Pedro Posada published Argumentación, teoría y práctica [Argumentation, theory and practice]. From an educational perspective, Julián de Zubiria (2006) contributed to the field by describing argumentative competence in children.

In Uruguay, the philosophers Miguel Andreoli, Anibal Corti, José Seoane, and others explained their approaches to argumentation at the first international argumentation colloquium organized in 2011 by Carlos Vaz Ferreira at the University of the Republic in Montevideo. Starting from the thinking of Vaz Ferreira, Oscar Sarlo reflected on that occasion about legal argumentation. At the Catholic University of Uruguay, Lilian Bentancur examined argumentation from an educational perspective. Bentancur’s (2009) monograph El desarrollo de la competencia argumentativa [The development of argumentative competence] describes possible ways of analyzing argumentative competence.

Although a Mexican scholar recently observed that argumentation is in that country a forgotten topic of research (Monzón 2011), and Mexican argumentation research is indeed still thin on the ground, several names should most certainly be mentioned. An early pioneer of argumentation theory is Carlos Pereda of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), who started out in 1987 with a collection of essays. His most important contributions are two books published in 1992: Razón e incertidumbre [Reason and uncertainty] (Pereda 1992a) and Vértigos argumentales: Una ética de la disputa [Argumentative Vertigos: An ethics of dispute] (Pereda 1992b). Next there is Julieta Haidar, who discussed problems of argumentation and operative models (Haidar 2010). Pedro Reygadas of the Autonomous University of San Luis Potosi (UASLP) published, among other things, a book about the art of arguing (Reygadas 2005). Together with Josefina Guzmán, he presented at the 2006 ISSA conference a study of visual schematization in Mexican advertising (Reygadas and Guzman 2007).

At the 2010 ISSA Conference, Ana Laura Nettel discussed argumentation, persuasion, and the enthymeme (Nettel 2011), while Georges Roque concentrated on visual argumentation (Roque 2011b). In 2012, Roque served, together with Nettel, as guest editor of a special issue of the journal Argumentation (Vol. 26, no. 1) on persuasion and argumentation. Next to papers by other international argumentation scholars, this issue includes a contribution by the guest editors in which argumentation is contrasted with manipulation (Nettel and Roque 2012). In this special issue, again, attention is paid to visual argumentation,159 but there is also a linguistic contribution by Luisa Puig (2012), a scholar from the National Autonomous University of Mexico.

The dominant theme in argumentation studies in Mexico seems to be the development of argumentative skills by children. A lot of attention is paid, in particular in theses and doctoral dissertations, to argumentative competence and the changes that have to be made in the educational system to make this competence develop optimally (e.g., Amestoy 1995; Cárdenas 2005; Cardona 2008; Huerta 2009; Peón 2004; Pineda 2004; Prian 2007). At the same time there is, especially among philosophers, a growing interest in theoretical issues and connections are made with international argumentation scholarship in pragma-dialectics, (non-monotonic) logic, and informal logic. At the University of Guadalajara, in particular, but also in other universities, several scholars are actively engaged in this enterprise (e.g., Leal et al. 2010; Harada 2011).160

12.14 Argumentation Studies in Portuguese-Speaking Areas

In Portugal, the study of argumentation could only start to develop after 1974, when democracy replaced the repressive authoritarian regime that had ruled the country for over 40 years. In practice, it took until the early 1980s, when the country was about to join the European Community, before the new system had stabilized enough to allow academics to catch up with their colleagues in other Western and European countries. Instead of studying argumentation, however, the emphasis remained initially strongly on rhetoric as a historical, philosophical, and literary discipline. As a consequence, relatively scarce attention was paid to the analysis and evaluation of argumentation. After some scholars had prepared the ground in the 1990s, this situation changed in the beginning of the twenty-first century when argumentation started to become a topic of research in several disciplines, varying from linguistics to communication theory and law. This development culminated in researchers from Portugal joining the international scholarship in the multidisciplinary (and ideally even interdisciplinary) field of argumentation theory proper.

One of the main contributions to the establishment of argumentation studies in Portugal was made by the philosopher Manuel Maria Carrilho of the New University of Lisbon. At the end of the 1980s, he was the advocate of the reform of philosophy education in Portuguese secondary schools that introduced logic and argumentation in the curriculum. Carrilho approached argumentation from a philosophical and rhetorical perspective inspired by Perelman’s new rhetoric and introduced Michel Meyer’s “problematology” in Portugal.161 He published several books on rhetoric and argumentation in Portuguese, such as Verdade, suspeita e argumentação [Truth, suspicion and argumentation] (Carrilho 1990).162 In addition, he organized in Lisbon in 1992 an international colloquium about logic and argumentation (Carrilho 1994), coordinated a book series named Argumentos [Arguments], and supported Portuguese argumentation researchers who adopted the theoretical framework of the new rhetoric. One of them, Rui Alexandre Grácio, has become one of the most prolific Portuguese authors on rhetoric and argumentation (e.g., Grácio 1993, 1998).163

Carrilho’s views of rhetoric and argumentation were largely in line with the traditional view of rhetoric as a historical, philosophical, and literary discipline (that is, they do not provide an argument theory) and did not have a real impact on the development of argumentation theory in Portugal. The same applies to the views propounded by formal logicians and analytical philosophers related to them, in spite of their success in some important departments of philosophy.164 In fact, the main impetus to the development of argumentation theory probably came from teachers of argumentation in secondary education, who clearly perceived the relevance of this topic to their students. Together with the authors of textbooks, they urged through their professional organizations for the promotion of argumentation theory at the universities (see Ribeiro and Vicente 2010).

In Portugal, scientific research is organized, independently of teaching, in research units that are, as a rule, institutionally affiliated with one of the sixteen public universities. Because in the first decade of the twenty-first century the research units interested in argumentation research used to be more or less isolated from each other and received an input from different academic disciplines, the development of argumentation theory in Portugal can best be described by taking the disciplinary and institutional backgrounds of the researchers concerned as the point of departure. The coexistence of various disciplinary angles of approach is, in our view, characteristic of the way in which, just as in some other countries, the study of argumentation in Portugal has gradually moved away from the old historical, philosophical, and literary paradigm of rhetoric to a new conception of argumentation theory as a field which incorporates insights from a multiplicity of disciplines and has applications in a variety of areas.

The first disciplinary angle of approach to argumentation in which the paradigm shift manifested itself is linguistics. Here we can also see that the shift has not been completed yet and that the internationalization is largely limited to the inclusion of sources from the Francophone literature. With a few exceptions, it is still mainly studies by Ducrot, Anscombre, Amossy, Plantin, Doury, J.-M. Adams, and their associates that are seriously taken into account. It is nevertheless clear that in studying argumentation and rhetoric from a linguistic perspective, a considerable step forward has been made. This applies, for instance, to the argumentation research conducted at the Centre for Linguistics of the New University of Lisbon, the Centre for General and Applied Linguistics of the University of Coimbra, and the Centre for Humanistic Studies of the University of Minho in Braga.

At the Centre for Linguistics in Lisbon, two research groups in particular focus on problems of argumentation. The first, Grammar and Text, publishes its own Cadernos WGT (Workshops em Gramática e Texto) [Notebooks WGT (Workshops in Grammar and Text)] in an electronic version.165 Its December issue of 2009 was dedicated to argumentation. Starting basically from the Francophone theoretical framework we just mentioned, Rosalice Pinto – the most prominent researcher in Grammar and Text – developed her doctoral dissertation (Pinto 2006) into the monograph Como argumentar e persuadir? Prática política, jurídica, jornalistica [How to argue and persuade? Political, legal and journalistic practice] (Pinto 2010). Pinto’s study focuses on the analysis of texts relating to Portuguese politics at the time of the general elections of 2002. She examines the relationship between the degree of institutionalization of the text genre that is used and the organization, stylistics, and other presentational aspects of the texts in view of persuasiveness. In Pinto’s view, the role of persuasiveness compared to demonstration decreases the more a genre is institutionalized.

The second research group, Discursive Interaction, uses a range of theoretical models to examine the discursive structures and strategies in real-life situations, both in spontaneous exchanges and in more institutionalized contexts. Some publications of this group, particularly by Isabel Roboredo Seara, concern rhetoric and argumentation (Seara 2010a, b; Seara and Pinto 2011).

The unit conducting argumentation research at the Centre for General and Applied Linguistics of the University of Coimbra has only one research project, dedicated to synchrony, diachrony, and contact in Portuguese. In the context of this project, Carla Maria Cunha Marques completed in 2010 her doctoral dissertation A argumentação oral formal em contexto escolar [The formal oral argumentation in school context]. Again starting from the Francophone theoretical framework we referred to, Marques presents a theoretical and didactic reflection on oral argumentative texts produced in schools (Marques 2010). She also offers a set of guidelines for producing oral argumentative texts in a formal context.

At the Centre for Humanistic Studies in Braga, some researchers have made use of the theoretical insights advanced by Adam, Amossy, Anscombre, Ducrot, Plantin, and Doury in examining argumentation in discourse, particularly political discourse. Most pertinent are the studies by Maria Aldina Marques on argumentation in discourse (Marques 2011), argumentative strategies in narrative and political discourse (Marques 2007b), and argumentative strategies in dealing with disagreement in parliament (Marques 2007a).

Communication theory constitutes the second disciplinary angle of approach determining the development of argumentation theory in Portugal. The driving forces are the LabCom of the University of Beira Interior at Covilhã, the Communication and Society Research Centre of the University of Minho in Braga, the department of communication sciences of the New University of Lisbon, and the Centre for Linguistics and Literary Studies of the University of Algarve. Researchers connected with the last two research units, in Lisbon and the Algarve, have contributed by presenting rhetorical studies in which argumentation is taken into account and the old rhetorical paradigm is replaced by an approach from several disciplinary backgrounds (e.g., Cunha 2004; Carvalho and Carvalho 2006).

The LabCom at Covilhã, which is closely connected with the Portuguese Association of Communication Sciences, is the most important research unit in communication in the country. Its multidisciplinary conception of the field includes also research in rhetoric, carried out in particular by the research group Information and Persuasion. One of its research focuses, “rhetoric online,” concentrates on the way in which the means of persuasion described in classical rhetoric are adapted to the various forms of communication that are practiced on the Web (e.g., Serra 2009). The unit has its own electronic journal, Rhêtorikê. Some of the publications in the LabCom book series deal with the mediatization of rhetoric in society (e.g., Ferreira and Serra 2011).

Although the Communication and Society Research Centre in Braga has only one research project that focuses on argumentation, Language and Social Interaction, the Centre has been important to the development of the study of argumentation in Portugal. Its journal, Comunicação e sociedade [Communication and society], published in 2009 an issue on communication, argumentation, and rhetoric in which, among others, Plantin and Amossy participated. A prominent researcher connected to this group is the already mentioned argumentation theorist Rui Grácio, whose views are close to those of Plantin. In 2011, he completed his doctoral dissertation, Para uma teoria geral da argumentação: Questões teóricas e aplicações didácticas [Towards a general argumentation theory: Theoretical questions and didactic applications], in which he discusses various theoretical models of argumentation as well as a conceptual framework for the didactics of teaching argumentation (Grácio 2011).166

The third disciplinary angle via which argumentation theory has been stimulated in Portugal is the study of law. Some relevant studies have been made by lawyers (Gaspar 1998; Silva 2004). In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Centre for Judicial Studies, which is responsible for the training of all Portuguese lawyers who want to become judges or public prosecutors, has focused on argumentation. So far, however, this focus is not generally shared by the Faculties of Law, although occasionally some university teachers have made important contributions to the literature (e.g., Cunha and Malato 2007; Calheiros 2008). As far as research of legal argumentation is concerned, a notable exception is the New University of Lisbon. Both its ArgLab at the Institute for the Philosophy of Language and its Media and Journalism Research Centre have started to make a real contribution to the theorizing. Among the publications of Hermenegildo Ferreira Borges, who is at the Centre as the coordinator of the postgraduate program Communication, Media and Justice, are the monograph Vida, razão e justice: Racionalidade argumentativa na motivação judiciária [Life, reason and justice: Argumentative rationality in judicial motivation] (Borges 2005) and the book chapter “Nova retórica e democratização da justiça” [New rhetoric and democratization of justice] (Borges 2009).

The step from these divergent disciplinary beginnings to a full participation in the multidisciplinary international scholarship in argumentation theory was at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century made by philosophers from the University of Coimbra and the New University of Lisbon. The Language, Interpretation and Philosophy section of the University of Coimbra created in 2008 a research unit devoted to the teaching of logic and argumentation theory that is coordinated by Henrique Jales Ribeiro. This unit organized within a few years several important international colloquiums to promote the study of argumentation in Portugal: in 2008, “Rhetoric and argumentation in the beginning of the XXIst century” (Ribeiro 2009); in 2011, “Inside arguments: Logic and the study of argumentation” (Ribeiro and Vicente 2010; Ribeiro 2012); in 2012, “Aristotle and contemporary argumentation theory” (Ribeiro 2013); and in 2013, “The role of analogy in argumentative discourse.” In all four colloquiums the most prominent international scholars were invited to participate. In addition, specific seminars were organized. More specifically, all these meetings were aimed at examining the relationship between logic and argumentation theory and determining the role that philosophy can play in argumentation theory as a multidisciplinary (or interdisciplinary) field.167

At the New University of Lisbon, a spectacular development has taken place. The Institute for the Philosophy of Language started at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century a research group on argumentation theory, ArgLab, to carry out the research project Argumentation, Communication, and Context. The creation of this research group has made Lisbon one of the international centers of argumentation studies. For the first time, contemporary theories of argumentation were systematically introduced into the Portuguese academia and, at the same time, researchers were attracted who possess the expertise that is required for using these theories to tackle problems in argumentation theory. The theoretical frameworks that are adopted are pragma-dialectics and Walton’s dialectical theory. The problems that are tackled pertain primarily to communicative practices in the argumentative contexts of political discussion and legal argumentation.168

The international group of researchers taking part in the activities of ArgLab includes Fabricio Macagno, Marcin Lewiński, Dima Mohammed, and Giovanni Damele. They carry out research projects that are sponsored by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology. The main project aims at comparing the pragma-dialectical theory and Walton’s dialectical argumentation theory by using these two approaches in analyzing and evaluating public argumentative discourse in three different contexts: political and social debates in the virtual public sphere (e.g., Lewiński 2010a, b), legislative debates in the European Parliament (e.g., Mohammed 2013), and legal argumentation in (Portuguese, other European and North American) courts of law (e.g., Damele and Savelka 2011). Special attention is paid to rationality in political argumentation (Lewiński and Mohammed 2013), argumentation in multi-party discussions (e.g., Lewiński 2010a, 2013; Mohammed 2011), the semantics of argument schemes (e.g., Macagno and Walton 2010), and the forms of argument used in legal contexts (e.g., Damele et al. 2011; Damele 2012; Macagno and Walton 2010).

In Brazil, the study of argumentation has been practiced independently from its development in Portugal. Argumentation research in this country has been conducted for some time, but the state of the art in the field is rather diverse. Recently, a remarkable increase has taken place in the number of argumentation studies, particularly among linguists specializing in discourse analysis and legal scholars. There is also a clear interest in applying argumentation theory in education. Basic influences on Brazilian argumentation studies are Toulmin’s model of argumentation and, much more strongly, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s new rhetoric, but some influence from the French linguistic approaches is also noticeable.169 The following achievements and developments can be reported.

One of the forerunners of argumentation studies in Brazil is Ingedore G. V. Koch of the Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem (IEL) [Institute of language studies] at the State University of Campinas – Unicamp. In Argumentação e linguagem [Argumentation and language], a pioneering study of argumentation in Portuguese, which has already reached its 13th edition, Koch (1984) approaches argumentation from a linguistic point of view. Using the concept of argumentative semantics, she discusses in her study Ducrot’s conception of argumentativity. Under the influence of Perelman’s new rhetoric, Koch takes the view that the study of argumentation and rhetoric can be seen “almost as synonymous.”170

Currently all major Brazilian universities have research groups in linguistics that study discourse analysis, and some of them include also argumentation in their research. The main center for argumentation studies in Brazil is probably the IEL. Besides Koch, it is home to several other argumentation researchers. One of them is Eni Orlandi, the first scholar practicing discourse analysis in Brazil, who published in 2000 Análise do discurso, princípios e procedimentos [Discourse analysis, principles and procedures]. With Suzy Lagazzi-Rodrigues, also at IEL, she has organized several conferences and together they published the book Discurso e Textualidade [Discourse and textuality] (Orlandi and Lagazzi-Rodrigues 2006).

At the University of São Paulo (USP), discourse analysis has been an important topic of research at the Faculty of Philosophy, Letters and Human Sciences. Eduardo Guimarães (1987), for one, uses in Texto e argumentação, semântica do acontecimento e história da semântica [Text and argumentation, semantic of the event and history of semantic] insights from Ducrot to approach argumentation from a semantic angle. At the same university, Lineide Mosca, who coordinates since 2009 the research program “Retórica e argumentação: Exame de procedimentos discursivos” [Rhetoric and argumentation: Analysis of discursive processes], studies argumentation from a rhetorical and discourse-analytical perspective. In 2006, she edited the volume Discurso, argumentação e produção de sentido [Discourse, argumentation and making sense], which contains articles written by her graduate students (Mosca 2006). Also at the USP, Norma Discini de Campos (Discini 2008) conducts text and discourse analysis in the perspective of French semiotics, concentrating on discursive stylistics. Diana de Barros (2011) examines the procedures used in intolerant discourse. In 2005, Ademar Ferreira organized at USP an international seminar about the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, presented by van Eemeren and Garssen.

At the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), several research projects on discourse analysis that are closely related to argumentation theory are carried out in the Núcleo de Análise do Discurso [Nucleus for discourse analysis], coordinated by Ida Lucia Machado. Among them are “O ethos ético: O discurso e a ética” [The ethical ethos: Ethics and discourse] of Junia Focas (2010), “Análise do discurso: Emoções, ethos e argumentação” [Discourse analysis: Emotions, ethos and argumentation] of Wander de Souza and Machado (2008), “Discurso jurídico no tribunal do júri” [Forensic discourse in jury court] of Helcira de Lima (2011), and “Discursos sobre trabalhadores” [Discourses on workers] of Antonio de Faria (2001). At the Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC), Ana Dias runs a research group on discourse in the written press.171 She published in 2008 O discurso da violência – As marcas da oralidade no jornalismo popular [The discourse of violence – The tokens of violence in popular journalism] (Dias 2008). Also at the PUC, Luiz Ferreira uses pragmatics, aesthetics, and ethics to describe ways of creating cohesion and distance (Ferreira 2010; 2012).

Cláudia Gomes Paiva of the University of Brasília is a researcher who examines the relationship between rhetoric and argumentation (e.g., Paiva 2004). Judith Hoffnagel works at EFPE, the Federal University of Pernambuco on discourse analysis (DA) and textual-discursive studies in social practices (Hoffnagel 2010). Siane Cavalcanti Rodrigues studies discourse analysis and analysis of language practices in teaching (Rodrigues 2010). An entirely different research program has been developed in the department of psychology of this university by Selma Leitão, who develops her own approach to realizing what she considers to be the epistemic benefits of the use of argumentation in educating children. In this endeavor she exploits insights from argumentation theory, cognitive psychology, and the psychology of reasoning (Leitão 2000). The development of argumentative skills is also the topic of research of Clara Maria M. Santos and her colleagues from the Federal University of Rio Grande Do Norte in Natal (e.g., Santos et al. 2003).

Another distinctly prominent research tradition in Brazil concerns legal argumentation. On the one hand, analyses are made of “neo-classical” authors, such as Perelman and Viehweg.172 On the other hand, original theoretical models are developed to analyze legal decisions or legal discourse in general. At the University of São Paulo, one of the main centers of legal argumentation studies in Brazil, authors such as Tércio Sampaio Ferraz Jr. and Virgílio Afonso da Silva have developed models of discursive rationality aimed at analyzing legal argumentation. The approach of Ferraz Jr. (1997a, b) is based on classical rhetoric and the work of Viehweg. Ferraz adopts a criterion of rationality based on intersubjective justification. Da Silva (2007, 2009, 2011), influenced by Alexy, analyzes the use of legal principles in legal decisions and legal dogmatic. He compares the decisions of the Brazilian supreme federal court with those of the German constitutional court.

A rhetorical approach to legal argumentation from an Aristotelian point of view has been developed by João Maurício Adeodato (2009) at the Universidade Federal de Pernambuco. Adeodato’s work focuses on the role of rhetorical syllogisms (enthymemes) in legal argumentation. Margarida Lacombe Camargo (2010a, b) of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro carries out argumentative analyses of “hard cases” of the Brazilian supreme federal court and, more recently, of “public audience” in the same tribunal. Thomas da Rosa Bustamante (2012) of the Federal University of Minas Gerais analyzes, starting from the standard theory of legal argumentation (Alexy, MacCormick), the role of jurisprudence, or “precedents,” in legal discourse. Claudia Roesler coordinates a research group at the University of Brasilia which investigates, using Toulmin’s and MacCormick’s models, legal decisions of supreme and high courts in Brazil (Roesler and Senra 2012; Roesler and Tavares da Silva 2012). This work is part of the international project “Observatório Doxa de Argumentação Jurídica para o Mundo Latino” [Doxa – Observatory of legal argumentation for the Latin world], which is coordinated by Manuel Atienza of the University of Alicante in Spain.

Several Brazilian scholars are engaged in argumentation research as members of the International Association for the Study of Controversies, led by Marcelo Dascal (see Sect. 12.3 of this volume).173 Among them are Ademar Ferreira, Anna Carolina Regner, and Oswaldo Melo Souza Filho. They study controversies not only, and even not primarily, from the perspective of argumentation theory, but also make use of insights from pragmatics, philosophy, more in particular philosophy of science, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of mind. Of major influence on these projects are the ideas of Dascal, who is both Brazilian and Israeli (e.g., Dascal 1993, 1994, 2005, 2009). The University of the Sinos River Valley (UNISINOS) hosts a research group, Rationality and Controversies, which is coordinated by Regner and is inspired by Dascal’s ideas.

The philosopher Regner (2011) uses Dascal’s (2009) typology of kinds of debates to understand scientific argumentation.174 She observes that in the scientific debates she examined, presuppositions and the attitude to the opponent’s ideas play an important role in the acceptance of these ideas. In her view, “soft rationality” allows us to understand the argumentation used in these debates, which are neither pure demonstrations nor irrational enterprises. According to Regner, in the argumentation advanced in these debates, both logos and pathos play a role. Oswaldo Melo Souza Filho (2011) of the Brazilian Air Force Academy at Pirassununga also studies polemical debates, again with the help of Dascal’s typology. His main purpose is to find a way of overcoming deadlocks that do not leave open any prospect to a solution. His proposal is to move from a contentious and confrontational attitude to a dialogical attitude. In proposing this solution, he uses Pyrrhonean skepticism and Buber’s philosophy of dialogue as the two matrices between which we have to maneuver. At the University of São Paulo, Ademar Ferreira has been using pragmatics, rhetoric, and dialectic in examining argumentation and controversies (e.g., Ferreira 2009).

12.15 Argumentation Studies in Israel

Besides Dascal and his colleagues working on controversies (see Sect. 12.3 of this volume), and Amossy and her colleagues working on linguistic issues (see Sect. 9.4 of this volume), various other scholars in Israel are interested in examining argumentation. They operate individually. Most of them do not focus on theoretical issues, 175 but on characteristics of argumentation in specific fields, in particular in politics and the media.

Galia Yanoshevsky (2011), for one, explores trust building in scam letters in which the readers are persuaded to transfer money to foreign bank accounts. Yanoshevsky analyzes how the way in which the sender’s ethos is constructed may lead to the desired action. She claims that the success of scam letters is made possible not only thanks to the creation of a reliable image of the sender of these letters but also by constructing a favorable image of the receiver. The letters are written in such a way that “the reader of the letter may feel pride of being sensitive and benevolent” (p. 2021).

Valeria Pery-Borissov and Yanoshevsky (2011) provide an analysis of meta-discourse in interviews with literary authors. These authors are generally reluctant to participate in interviews. The analysis shows in what way the authors justify their participation in the interviews. Application of interaction analysis to the literary interview for the purpose of exposing the argumentative dimension of the discourse shows that, despite their explicit hostility to the interview as a genre, the authors use the interview to implicitly justify their participation. Using different strategies, they manage to turn the interaction into something that corresponds with their aims or points of view.

Moshe Azar (1995) analyzes argumentative texts in newspapers. Referring to the rhetorical structure theory of Mann and Thompson (1988), he distinguishes five types of argumentative relations: “evidence,” “justification,” “motivation,” “antithesis,” and “concession.” The evidence relation is the principal and the most powerful argumentative relation found in texts dealing with public issues and debates. Azar claims that the evidence relation frequently interacts with at least one of the less powerful concession and antithesis relations.

Azar (1999) focuses on a specific type of argumentative contrast used in academic argumentative discourse: the refutation of counterarguments, defined as arguments in favor of the standpoint that is the opposite of the writer’s own standpoint (p. 19). For his analysis he makes a distinction between “denial” and “concession.” Next, two subtypes of denial are discerned: (1) when the denied proposition is replaced by another proposition which serves as a pro-argument or is argumentatively neutral and (2) when the denied proposition is not replaced by another proposition. The first subtype Azar calls antithesis (the proposition that has been denied is the “thesis,” the one replacing it the “antithesis”), the second he calls objection. “Concession” is also classified into two subtypes: (1) when the rejection of the opposite standpoint is directly made and in plain words (direct-rejection concession) and (2) when the rejection is only implied (indirect-rejection concession). Azar concludes that counterargument refutation is necessary in establishing differences between proposed and opposed claims in research articles as well as in debating political and social controversies.

Rivka Ribak (1995) recorded the conversations of 50 Jewish and 15 Palestinian families during and following the evening news program on Israeli television viewed daily by most Jews and Palestinians. In analyzing the political discourse of members of these families, she focuses on three distinct – but interrelated – rhetorical moves based on the argument from dilemma: “dilemmatization accepted,” “dilemmatization delegitimated,” and “dilemmatization failed.”

Zohar Livnat (2014), a scholar active in the field of rhetoric of scientific discourse, provides a rhetorical–linguistic analysis of academic “conflict articles” that are part of an actual academic controversy in the field of archaeology. She focuses on the concept of scientific ethos. In contexts of conflict, the act of establishing one’s ethos and attacking the rival’s ethos can become a central issue. Scientific ethos is a discursive construction which is reciprocally established and negotiated through various linguistic practices. First-person pronouns, citations, rhetorical questions, irony, and positive and negative evaluations are all resources available to the authors in this endeavor, as well as labeling, the use of quotation marks and punctuation. Scientific norms of disinterestedness and skepticism as well as the values of consistency, simplicity, and fruitfulness are all realized in this argumentative context. Due to the ideological, political, and religious implications of the subject that is treated, emotional neutrality as a scientific value is especially significant.

Menashe Schwed (2003, 2005) investigates the possibility of a theory of visual argumentation. His ideas about visual argumentation are based on Frege’s theory of sense and reference and Goodman’s (1976) theory of art as a symbolic language. He argues that the distinction between the way in which an argument is actually made or communicated and the abstract object of argument is theoretically important for the possibility of visual argument. Schwed starts from the thesis that some images function as arguments intended to persuade the viewers. These images can be constructed in the same way as utterances in a language. They express meaning similar to the way meaning is expressed in other symbolic systems (2005, p. 403).

Schwed discusses the common objection to the notion of visual objects being rather like languages that this idea is based on a particular view of meaning in language: the view that meaning in language is exhausted by reference of denotation. According to Schwed, sense can exist without reference:

An image is not the expression that is performed as a speech act by its creator, but is the vehicle of what the creator expresses; it only imposes indirectly what it expresses. The expressive function is an ulterior function that is assigned to images, but where image, qua images, do not actually exhibit such a function. Their being utterances or vehicles of acts of expression in terms of implications of initial acts of expression. (2005, pp. 406–407)

Schwed concludes that the thesis that, in view of understanding them, images can be assimilated to symbolic systems depends on accepting the conclusion that reference or denotation does not play an important role. The assimilation rests on the concepts of sense in the following way: The specification of the sense of an image is dependent on the bearer of sense, which makes sense a useful notion in interpreting the meaning of images and consequently enables their verbal explication.

12.16 Argumentation Studies in the Arab World

In the Arab world, argumentation theory (Arabic: الحِجَاج, al-ḥijāj) connects strongly with classical Arabic traditions of logic, rhetoric, and scholastics based on works dating back to the period from the eighth to the eleventh century. As in a great many other parts of the world, the study of argumentation used to be part of the research conducted in other fields, such as philosophy and logic, linguistics and rhetoric, and discourse analysis. As a rule, problems relating to argumentation became a topic of attention because of their relevance to the pursuit of the aims of the disciplines concerned, but occasionally argumentation was also studied for its own sake.176 In the 1980s, the situation started to change, especially through the impetus given to the study of argumentation by some scholars from Morocco. After the turn of the century, argumentation theory even gradually tends to become a discipline in its own right.

The Moroccan philosophers and linguists who instigated the development of argumentation theory started from the classical Arabic tradition and they aimed at connecting this tradition with the modern revival of the study of argumentation that was taking place in the Western world. Because of the predominantly Francophone orientation of Moroccan academics, the incorporation of the newly developed Western views was in the first place influenced by scholarship in French, with Ducrot’s and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s insights taking pride of place. The two pioneers in the 1980s who set the stage for further developments in Arabic argumentation theory are Mohammed el Omari and Taha Abderrahmane, both from the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the Mohammed V University in Agdal, Rabat. Their research and teaching stimulated systematic reflection among Arab scholars upon the possible links between traditional Arabic insights and modern Western insights.

Mohamed el Omari is a professor emeritus of rhetoric and literary criticism at the Mohammed V University, who worked earlier at the King Saud University in Saudi Arabia and the Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University in Fez, Morocco. In his books on literary criticism he combined the old Arabic tradition with modern linguistics. In addition, he published also on Arabic argumentative discourse, connecting the Arabic rhetorical tradition with insights from Aristotle and modern European approaches to the study of argumentation, in particular from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s new rhetoric. Omari’s work is widely quoted by Arab argumentation scholars, in particular in North Africa. His most significant monograph was published in 1986; it was a theoretical and applied study of Arabic oratory. This study of the rhetoric of argumentative discourse focused in particular on oratory in the first Hijra century.177

The philosopher Taha Abderrahmane, whose name also appears as Abdurrahman and Abdulrahman, was the second Moroccan protagonist of argumentation theory in the 1980s. His expertise is particularly in logic, philosophy of language, and philosophy of morality. In 1985 he defended at the Sorbonne in Paris a doctoral dissertation in French on argumentation in which he discusses models of argumentation making use of natural deduction. Based on his studies of old Arabic traditions in philosophy, logic, and linguistics, he wrote an important monograph entitled Fī Uṣūl al-Ḥiwār wa Tajdīd ‘Ilm al-Kalām [On the basics of dialogue and the renovation of Islamic scholastics] in which he makes a proposal for a model of human discursive behavior. The model is based on a critical reading of the old Islamic scholastic theology (‘ilm al-kalām) in view of modern theories of dialogue and discussion (Abderrahmane 1985, 1987). In his later work, however, he concentrated on questions relating to Islam and modernity. The general goal of his project can be described as creating a concept of humanistic ethical modernism on the basis of the values of Islam.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the insights of the two pioneers of argumentation theory had become so well known among students and other readers that their influence started to expand outside Morocco. At the same time, the interest in Francophone argumentation theory was extended with the inclusion of insights from Walton, van Eemeren, and informal logic. Although the scholars engaged in the study of argumentation still remain located in departments of linguistics and philosophy, argumentation theory now becomes a specific field of study. In Morocco, but also in Tunisia international workshops and colloquiums were organized dealing specifically with argumentation theory. Meanwhile the research that was carried out continued to concentrate on exploring the links between the Arabic classics and the classical and modern Western tradition and applying the newly acquired insights to modern Arabic discourse.

The most outstanding publication of the first decade of the twenty-first century is the five-part volume Al-Ḥijāj: Mafhūmuhu wa Majālātuhu [Argumentation: The concept and the fields]. This comprehensive study, published in 2010, is edited by Hafid Ismaili Alaoui, a young scholar in the department of Arabic of the Ibn Zohr University in Agadir, Morocco. The five volumes include I. Argumentation: definitions and boundaries, II. Argumentation: schools and scholars, III. Argumentation and the dialogue of specializations, IV. Argumentation and practice, and V. Translated texts.178 Contributions to the study have been made by 58 researchers, stemming from a whole list of Arab countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates.179

There are still no academic Arabic journals specializing in argumentation, but a second landmark in the development of argumentation theory in the Arab world is certainly the publication in 2011 of a special issue of the Kuwait-based scientific journal ʻAlam al-Fikr devoted to the study of argumentation. Usually, Arabic researchers writing on argumentation publish their essays in faculty journals and pan-Arab academic journals. A striking characteristic of the current state of the art is that the contributions to argumentation theory made by Arab researchers remain for the most part local, i.e., limited to the Arabic-speaking world and are inaccessible to the rest of the world because they are published in Arabic.

Among the scholars engaged in argumentation theory are various prolific authors. One of them is Abu Bakr Azzawi (also referred to as Boubker Azzaoui Ihda) of the Cadi Ayyad University in Marrakesh, Morocco. He is a former student of Ducrot, who wrote a doctoral dissertation on pragmatic connectors in Arabic literature (Azzawi 1990). In his research, Azzawi applies Ducrot’s theory to the Arabic language and to discourse in Arabic. He also makes use of insights from Grize and from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. His later books include Al-lugha wa al-Ḥijāj [Language and argumentation] (Azzawi 2006) and Al-Khitāb wa al-Ḥijāj [Discourse and argumentation] (Azzawi 2010). Azzawi’s work is very influential: Particularly in North Africa, serious scholarly studies on argumentation in which it is not quoted are hard to be found.180

Several other Moroccan scholars are actively engaged in argumentation research. A prominent theorist is Hammou Naqqari of the Mohammed V University in Agdal, Rabat. Naqqari is a former student of Omari. He has a background in logic and connects in his work the old Arabic tradition with ancient and modern Western traditions. He edited in 2006 a volume of collected papers on argumentation presented at a conference that he organized: Al-Taḥājuj. Ṭabīʻatuh wa Majālātuh wa Waẓāʼifuh [Argumentation. Its nature, contexts and functions].

Another Moroccan argumentation theorist is Hafid Ismaili Alaoui, professor in the department of Arabic at Ibn Zohr University in Agadir. He specializes in linguistics and translation and is the coordinator of the research group in Language Communication and Argumentation (E.R.L.C.A). He is editor of the five-volume work on argumentation we already mentioned (Alaoui 2010).

Rachid al Radi, professor of philosophy at the Settat’s private institute of higher education, is a Moroccan scholar who published in 2010 a study about argumentation and the fallacies: Al-Ḥijāj wa Almughālatah; min al-Ḥiwār fī al-ʻAkl ilā al-ʻAkl fī al-Ḥiwār [From dialogue to reason to reason in dialogue]. In this study he discusses a variety of perspectives, from Aristotle to Hamblin, Walton, van Eemeren and Grootendorst, and recent contributions from within the Arab world. Radi contributed in 2011 also to the special issue on argumentation published by the Kuwait-based journal of ʻAlam al-Fikr.

Two very active Tunisian argumentation scholars are Hatem Obeid of the University of Kairouan and Hammadi Sammoud of Manouba University. Obeid contributed in 2011 an essay on the subject of the role of emotions in argumentation to the special issue on argumentation of ʻAlam al-Fikr in which he demonstrated a profound knowledge of the argumentation literature published in English. Sammoud is the coordinator of the research unit on discourse analysis at the Manouba University. He edited in 1999 Ahamm Nathariyyāt al-Ḥijāj fī Attaqālīd al-Gharbiyya min Aristu ilā al-Yawm [The main theories of argumentation in the western tradition from Aristotle until today]. This volume on argumentation includes studies by members of a research team on rhetoric and argumentation that Sammoud established at the Faculty of Letters of the Manouba University.181

In conclusion of our description of the study of argumentation in the Arab world, we mention some studies by Arab scholars that have been written in English. First, there are two significant essays by Basil Hatim, professor of Arabic Studies at the American University of Sharjah. Hatim is an expert on English-Arabic translation who wrote on argumentation earlier in his career. In Hatim (1990) he presents a model of argumentation in Arabic rhetoric and in Hatim (1991) he discusses the pragmatics of argumentation in Arabic. Although Hatim approaches argumentation from the perspective of a translation scholar, his approach provides interesting insights in the study of argumentation in classical Arabic works of the eighteenth to fifteenth century. Hatim’s view of the difference between argumentative practice in Arabic and in English has been influential. He argues that, as a result of the sociopolitical context of discussion in the Arab world, argumentative practice in Arabic is characterized by the use of what he calls “through-argumentation,” i.e., texts in which there is no reference to any opposite view, as opposed to argumentative practices characterized by the use of counter-argumentation.

Second, there is Arabic Rhetoric: A Pragmatic Analysis published in 2006 by Hussein Abdul Raof, a senior lecturer in the department of Arabic and Middle Eastern Studies of the University of Leeds in the United Kingdom. The study provides an excellent exposé of the classical Arabic tradition of rhetorical studies that sheds some light on the study of argumentation in the classical Arabic works.

12.17 Argumentation Studies in Japan

Although the study of argumentation in Japan has not led to any major theoretical innovations, there is certainly a strong and still growing interest in argumentative practices. This interest concentrates in the first place on improving people’s argumentative skills in business communication and other professional activities. As a consequence, the study of argumentation in Japan is primarily connected with the training of public speaking and debate, and very much rhetorically oriented. Because the emphasis is on argumentation in contacts with Westerners, this training is usually part of English-language learning. In colleges, it is, outside the official curriculum, organized by the so-called English Speaking Societies (ESSs).

In spite of Morrison’s (1972) blunt characterization of Japan as a “rhetorical vacuum,”182 traditionally rhetorical argumentation has been a major concern of a great many Japanese thinkers, who are not necessarily scholars of argumentation, but politicians, philosophers, and Buddhist monks.183 Particularly famous among these thinkers is Kitaro Nishida, who started the Nishida School of Philosophy at Kyoto University. His project “Overcoming Modernity” (Kindai no chokoku) is said to have provided a theoretical justification for Japan’s wartime imperial ideology.

According to Roichi Okabe (2002), European Christian missionaries – Jesuits from Spain and Portugal – made in the late sixteenth century a failed effort to introduce Western disputation in Japan as an educational practice in religious teaching. Western rhetorical tradition of argument and debate was still more emphatically propagated during the enlightenment of the Meiji era (1868–1912),184 when serious attempts were made to modernize Japan in Western ways and the constitution was developed that remained the legal basis of Japanese government until 1945.185 The Meiji constitution granted significant civil rights to citizens and led to the establishment of the Nation Diet, with a popularly elected parliament.

As Okabe explains in “Japan’s attempted enactments of Western debate practice in the 16th and the 19th centuries,” in particular Yukichi Fukuzawa, the founder of Keio University in Tokyo, undertook strenuous efforts “to enact the practices of Western rhetoric in general and of speech and debate in particular on the rhetorically barren stage of a feudalistic Japan” (p. 281).186 In 1873, Fukuzawa’s organization Mita Enzetsukai (Mita Oratory Association) provided “the first training program in Japanese-language debate and public speaking based on Western rhetorical principles and rules of parliamentary procedure” (Suzuki 1989, p. 17). In Japanese rhetoric the same key components (invention, disposition, style, delivery) and speech genres (forensic, deliberative, epideictic) are distinguished as in Western rhetoric, with basically the same substance. Distinctive features are that the speaker’s ethos is generally considered the fundamental constituent of oratory187 and that the interest concentrates particularly on style.188 Meiji rhetoricians tended to pay special attention to the difference between genbun itchi (integration of spoken and written language) and genbun betto (separation of spoken and written language), which can be explained by the fundamental distinction that exists in Japanese between spoken and written language.

According to Okabe, the serious attempts made in the Meiji era to introduce Western principles and practices of speech-making and debating to young Japanese intellectuals resulted eventually in failure (2002, pp. 287–288). One reason was Japan’s political turn toward militarism early in the twentieth century, with the imperialistic government enforcing a stiff control over freedom of speech. Other reasons Okabe mentions are that, psychologically, the foreign rhetorical ideas had not been properly “predigested,” so that the Japanese were not ready to accept them and that, ideologically, Western speech and debate were found to be antithetical to Japanese nemawashi (prior consultation of all parties involved) and sasshi (catching on intuitively to the other’s feelings).189 Other potential reasons, mentioned by Carl Becker (1983) of Kyoto University, are that neither law nor business had recognized the importance of argument and that the Japanese language “favored vague rather than blunt denials, and tended to become highly fettered with honorifics” (p. 144).190 As Takeshi Suzuki (2008) comments, “it is not so much the nature of the Japanese language as it is the socio-cultural atmosphere that emphasizes the hierarchical social structure that had hindered Japanese people from debating in public” (p. 51).

A clear example of the influence tradition can have on public communication in Japan is provided by Suzuki (2012) when he discusses kotodama. Of old, it was believed that the use of words can exert a special influence on people, the gods, and the course of events. This belief that a sacred power or spirit dwells in the words of the traditional Japanese language is called kotodama. Where kotodama rules, there is no freedom to choose words, because using a word is realizing at the same time what it means (kotoage), so that extreme care needs to be taken. Only good kotoage is to be permitted. This helps explaining why, after the Three Mile Island accident in the United States in 1979 and the Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union in 1986, Japanese nuclear power authorities maintained that their power plants were safe: Even mentioning the word “risk” was a taboo. Suzuki (2012) critically concludes: “Not only does the influence of kotodama still run deep in Japanese society, but Japanese politicians also depend on it as an excuse to postpone critical decision-making or to make inconsistent and provisional decisions” (p. 180).

The wish to overcome the considerable gap between Japanese and Western culture, and to enable Japanese businesspeople and other professionals to communicate effectively in international settings, has been a driving force in the Japanese engagement in argumentation theory, culminating in a pronounced interest in English-language debate. Debate is then viewed as a means of coming to terms with Western thought, language, and behavior. According to Morrison (1972, p. 101), in opposition with the predominantly intuitive and emotional tendencies in the Japanese language, Western rhetoric has as its main strength the compelling quality of logical exposition.191 Okabe (1989) states more precisely that “American logic and rhetoric value step-by-step, chainlike organization,” whereas, by contrast, “Japanese logic and rhetoric emphasize the importance of a dotted, point-like method of structuring a discourse” (pp. 553–554). Connecting the study of logic and rhetoric with debate, Mitsugu Iwashita and Yo Konno point out that it is “the paramount goal” of academic debate “to train the student in the tools of argumentation, to train him how to construct logical arguments and to detect weakness or lapses from logical standards in the argumentation of others” (Iwashita and Konno as quoted in Matlon 1978, p. 26; cf. Iwashita 1973).

The pronounced interest in English-language debate has led to a strong American influence on the development of the study of argumentation in Japan, almost exclusively from the field of speech communication.192 Although already in 1928 the first debate team from the United States – coming from the University of Hawaii – visited Japan, English-language debating did not begin to take off until the early 1950s. In 1950, the first Intercollegiate English-language Debating Contest was held in Tokyo. After that the number of English-language debating tournaments has been steadily increasing.193 As part of the Japan–US Exchange Tour, since 1976 American debate teams have been visiting Japan almost every 2 years (Suzuki and Matsumoto 2002, p. 52). In the 1970s, Donald Klopf (1973) could even come to the remarkable conclusion that “next to the United States of America, Japan has the largest amount of debating in the world – and almost all of it is in the English language” (p. 1). Apart from a strong dip in the late 1980s, due to “Americanization” and the adoption of broad topic debate (Suzuki and Matsumoto 2002, p. 58), the English-debate tradition in Japan has been maintained.

Debating tournaments have played an important role in providing oral English communication training for Japanese undergraduates. Because there is no room for this kind of learning activities in the official curriculum, starting in the 1990s, educational debate for college students in Japan has largely been organized by English Speaking Societies (ESSs). These Societies were founded by students who wanted to learn English communicative skills. Most of them have four “sections”: Debate, Discussion, Drama, and Speech. The main reason for students to join the ESS debates is obviously improving their English-speaking capabilities. As Carl Becker observed, additional advantages are that debate is conducted in a living language, has deep subject matter, combines all the important language skills, teaches confidence and assertiveness, and is coached and judged for quality of ideas and effectiveness of communication (Matlon 1978, pp. 26–27). Unfortunately, ESS debaters generally have little faculty supervision, having debate coaches being the exception rather than the rule. As a result, the students are instructed and judged by students from older classes, who have limited experience, or by alumni ESS members. Some former ESS members went on to study communication in the United States and later became university instructors in Japan.

Many Western scholars kept wondering why Japanese people do not debate in their native language. However, as Suzuki and Matsumoto (2002) explain, “English debate offers an invaluable context for Japanese people to set themselves free from their cultural constraints” (p. 66) and become acquainted with an adversarial communicative style of decision-making and negotiation (saying “no”) (p. 64). In their view, debate theories are also useful tools to help businesspeople to improve their business communication and management competence. But to conduct successful debate seminars for Japanese businesspeople, certain debate concepts need to be reformulated. First, the concept of “affirmative and negative” is to be replaced by that of “initiator and examiner,” “since the purpose of debate, in business contexts, does not appear to be whether to adopt or negate a specific resolution but to choose the best possible option/plan in a given situation” (Suzuki and Matsumoto 2002, p. 59). Since the 1980s Japanese-language debate has indeed started to develop, Sony, Toyota, and other companies have not only adopted debate as an essential part of the business communication training for those dealing with customers and co-workers at overseas affiliates, but some companies even provide debate lessons to their new employees in Japan. In the 1990s, some enthusiastic teachers also started using debate in Japanese as a means to energize classroom situations in high school, supported to some extent by the Ministry of Education and by mass media.194

The Japan Debate Association (JDA) – which sponsored the Tokyo Conference on Argumentation in 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012195 – is the largest organization for argumentation research in Japan. Some of its most prominent members (e.g., Shigeru Matsumoto) studied communication and rhetoric in the United States196; other prominent members (e.g., Narahiko Inoue, Yoshiro Yano, and Masako Suzuki) studied communication, argumentation and debate in Japan. The influence of the American communication scholars who were directly or indirectly their teachers on Japanese argumentation scholarship is evident.197 Their influence also shows clearly in the research interests of the Japanese scholars who studied in the United States. Those who studied at the University of Iowa, for instance, tend to be interested in ideological criticism and critical rhetoric (Aonuma, Kakita), and those who studied at Northwestern University, in historical and public argumentation studies (Nakazawa, Takeshi Suzuki, Yamamaki-Ogasawara, Okuda). It is striking that all American argumentation theorists who were teaching them are former debate coaches and that most of the Japanese students concerned were already college debaters in Japan.

Let us highlight three important Japanese argumentation scholars in particular, starting with Roichi Okabe, whose work we already mentioned. Okabe, professor emeritus at Nanzan University, has been the most productive scholar in the area of rhetorical argumentation. He has studied Western oratorical traditions and analyzed their influence on Japanese scholarship. In that way he aimed to explain how Western rhetoric has become part of the Japanese tradition (e.g., Okabe 1989, 1990, 2002).

Shigeru Matsumoto of Rikkyo University has been the leading Japanese theorist in the field of argumentation pedagogy since the late 1970s. Having been a champion debater in English college debate tournaments, he went on to study communication at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, in the United States. After his return to Japan, he became one of the founders and the first president of the Japan Debate Association. For more than 30 years, Matsumoto has promoted intercollegiate and high school debating, both in English and in Japanese, in every possible way.

Takeshi Suzuki of Meiji University has been very active in promoting the case of argumentation theory in Japan in more recent years.198 He has been the driving force behind the Tokyo Conferences, and in inviting in the first decade of the twenty-first century international argumentation scholars to lecture on government grants basis in Japan.199 Suzuki has also been a productive scholar, whose research concentrates on discovering universals and discrepancies in cross-cultural argumentation (Suzuki 2001, 2012). With Frans van Eemeren, he examined the strategic maneuvering in the speeches made by Queen Beatrix and Emperor Akihito on the occasion of the Emperor’s first state visit to the Netherlands in 2000. In “This painful chapter,” a title consisting of a quote from Beatrix, they analyze how the two heads of state utilized their speeches to maneuver strategically to repair the relationship between their countries, which had been badly damaged by Japanese aggression during the Second World War (Suzuki and van Eemeren 2004).

In the American vein of rhetorical analysis, various Japanese scholars have conducted case studies of specific pieces of argumentative discourse. Hiroko Okuda, for instance, concentrated on Prime Minister Mori’s controversial “Divine Nation” remarks (Okuda 2007), and later on Obama’s rhetorical strategy in “A world without nuclear weapons” (Okuda 2011). Takeshi Suzuki analyzed Prime Minister Koizumi’s slogan “Structural reform without sacred cows” (Suzuki 2007) and later, with Takayuki Kato, a television debate between Hatoyama and Okada on the leadership of the Democratic Party of Japan (Suzuki and Kato 2011). Tomohiro Kanke discussed Emperor Hirohito’s “Declaration of Humanity” (Kanke 2007). In a historical analysis, Kanke offers, together with Junya Morooka, an alternative account of debate practices in Japan during the Meiji and Taisho eras (1868–1926) (Kanke and Morooka 2011).

12.18 Argumentation Studies in China

Since the early 1990s, China is experiencing a remarkable social and cultural change that calls for educational reforms, stressing more liberal attitudes and good citizenship. As a result, in education more emphasis is nowadays placed on teaching critical thinking. Since the study of argumentation provides the teaching of critical thinking with the required academic background, the interest in argumentation theory in China has grown remarkably. It is against this background that recent developments in the study of argumentation in China should be appreciated.

Although ancient China had a strong argumentative tradition, this tradition was not really continued in later times. Current Chinese argumentation studies seem to be influenced in the first place by Western research traditions. Most publications on argumentation are introductory, providing a review of some particular issue in contemporary argumentation theory or giving an exposition of a specific theory. As far as advanced theorizing is concerned, the study of argumentation in China is still at an early stage. Recently, however, some interesting developments have taken place and some research groups have come into being that have started research programs that open up promising prospects for the near future.

Classic Chinese philosophy was, from its beginnings in the spring and autumn period (770–476 B.C.), characterized by a focus on social, moral issues rather than abstract topics. Ancient thinkers had to grapple with a plurality of viewpoints. They engaged critically with each other, trying to defend their own doctrines convincingly while criticizing others, especially in the period of the “Hundred Schools” during the Warring States periods (479–221 B.C.). Their argumentative practices urged them to study argumentation, paying special attention to issues pertaining to the relation between names and reality (Ming/Shi) and between language and meaning, and to the nature, typology, and rules of argumentation and debate.

The need for reflection on prevailing argumentative practices initiated a strong tradition of argumentation studies in ancient China.200 Mohists, in particular, combined a strong faith in argumentation with a keen interest in its study. They valued argumentation (bian) as an activity by which we “clarify divisions between right and wrong; examine the guidelines of order and disorder; clarify points of sameness and difference; discern the patterns of names and reality; settle benefit and harm; and resolve uncertainty and doubt” (Xiao Qu). In the Mohist Canons, they presented systematic studies on the forms, procedures, and methods of philosophical argumentation.

Following the decline of the Mohist School, later in history this tradition gradually faded away. When Confucianism became the dominant orthodoxy, the study of argumentation lost its popularity completely. Not until the beginning of the twentieth century, when scholars were searching for a counterpart of Western logic in ancient China, was this tradition rediscovered. This examination of the classic tradition is the subject matter of what is nowadays known as “Chinese Logic.” Its main bodies of research concerning ancient argumentation studies are characterized as “Studies of Names” (Mingxue) and “Studies of Debate” (Bianxue).

A separate tradition that deserves to be mentioned here is the long-lasting scholarship of Buddhist argumentation in China. Buddhism in China has two branches: Tibetan and Chinese. The former has a widespread following in the Tibetan and Mongolian areas, while the latter, also known as Zen, can be found in middle China. Buddhist philosophy includes a system of logic, called Buddhist logic or Hetuvidya. Viewed from a modern perspective, Hetuvidya is actually a kind of argumentation theory. According to Stcherbatsky (2011a, p. 1), it involves a doctrine on the forms of syllogism (parārtha-anumāna), consisting of a major and a minor premise and a conclusion.201 This connects Hetuvidya directly with the notion of an argument scheme in modern argumentation theory. The parārtha-anumāna – with its five-membered extension, including thesis, reason, example, application, and conclusion – is the core argument scheme in Hetuvidya (Stcherbatsky 2011a, p. 279).

Argumentation has a more prominent place in Tibetan Buddhism than in Chinese Buddhism. According to Rogers (2009, p.13), the Buddhist order of Ge-Luk-pa created a system of education and a curriculum designed to enable students to follow a “path of reasoning,” resulting in a consciousness that has been trained in reasoned analysis to get through to the meaning of religious texts and, eventually, to the true nature of reality. According to Perdue (1992, p. 4), the central aims of Tibetan monastic debate are to defeat misconceptions, to establish correct views, and to meet objections to these views. To reach these ends, the monks make a great effort to engage in debate, diligently trying to learn the words and fully understand the meaning of the Buddhist teaching.

Around the middle of the twentieth century, following the import and enthusiastic reception of modern logic, argumentation studies in China were strongly shaped by the discipline of formal logic. It was not until the 1990s that contemporary Western argumentation theories such as pragma-dialectics and informal logic were introduced in China and argumentation theory gained a broader scope. At present, the study of argumentation is becoming more and more popular in China and attracts scholars from various disciplines (philosophy, logic, linguistics, computer science, psychology, etc.).202 There is no noticeable influence of the ancient Chinese argumentation tradition on modern Chinese argumentation studies.

The leading institution in modern Chinese argumentation studies is the Institute of Logic and Cognition at Sun Yat-sen University. This Institute, which houses researchers with a background in philosophy, logic, psychology, and computer science, has a strong tradition of studying argumentation from the perspectives of modern formal logic, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. Recently, however, it has broadened its interest to informal and pragmatic approaches. In 2010, a rather big research program on argumentation has started that concentrates on studying argumentative practices from the perspectives of anthropology and sociology.

At the Institute of Logic and Cognition of Sun Yat-sen University, a research group, led by Shier Ju, studies argumentative practices in different cultures from anthropological and sociological perspectives.203 Their research program, based on general theoretical views concerning argumentation developed by Shier Ju, has attracted several younger researchers, some of whom already completed their doctoral dissertations.204 Another research group, led by Qingyin Liang and Minghui Xiong, focuses on the study of legal argumentation. They connect with the theoretical frameworks and tools provided by contemporary Western argumentation theories, such as pragma-dialectics and informal logic, and also make use of insights from rhetoric. An independent, but very productive Chinese argumentation scholar is Hongzhi Wu (Yan’an University), who contributed already in the 1980s to the study of the fallacies.

Both informal logic and pragma-dialectics have had a considerable impact on recent argumentation studies in China.205 The first series of papers introducing the basic issues and methods of informal logic, written by Song Ruan, appeared in 1991 (Ruan 1991–1992a, b, c, d, e). Around 2004, Hongzhi Wu started to give more elaborate introductions of the main theoretical developments in informal logic in a series of papers, resulting eventually in the publication of An Introduction to Informal Logic (Wu 2009). Wu provides a comprehensive overview of informal logic, dealing with virtually all the main sub-areas recognized in informal logic and discussing the major topics that are treated. As far as pragma-dialectics is concerned, so far four studies have been published in Chinese: Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992a, translated by Xu-Shi (1991b)); Critical Discussion (an earlier version of van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, A Systematic Theory of Argumentation, translated by Shuxue Zhang (2002)); Fundamentals of Legal Argumentation (Feteris 1999, translated by Qi Yuhan (2005)); and Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation and Presentation (van Eemeren et al. 2002a, translated by Minghui Xiong and Yi Zhao (2006b)).

The impact of these Western theories of argumentation manifests itself very clearly in current argumentation research in China. In Litigational argumentation: A Logical Perspective on Litigation Games, a recent monograph on legal reasoning by Minghui Xiong (2010), for example, a new framework for the analysis and evaluation of litigational argumentation is presented based on a variety of theoretical resources from contemporary argumentation studies, including theories of formal and informal logic, pragma-dialectics, and formal dialectic. With the help of this integrated framework, Minghui Xiong intends to analyze the litigation games of the suitor, the respondent, and the trier. Another contemporary leading Chinese argumentation theorist, collaborating with Minghui Xiong, is Qingyin Liang. Together the two of them have initiated and extended an argumentative approach to legal logic that is well received and has become very influential in China.206 Rongdong Jin and Yun Xie are two younger Chinese scholars with a keen interest in argumentation studies who have recently joined the international argumentation community. Rongdong Jin is primarily interested in investigating the philosophical foundations of informal logic, while Yun Xie is out to explore the critical dimension of argumentation theory and the dialectical approach to argumentation.

Starting from the need to take pragmatic elements such as context into account in evaluating real arguments, Minghui Xiong and Yi Zhao (2007) take in “A defeasible pragma-dialectical model of argumentation” the view that in argumentation theory another logical model is needed than the classical model of logic. The pragma-dialectical model puts argumentation always in a context of dialogue, but in their view this model can only deal with the defeasibility of real arguments if the basic inference rule of Modus Ponens, or Strict Modus Ponens, is replaced by Defeasible Modus Ponens, so that a Defeasible Pragma-Dialectical Model is constructed. In “Whose Toulmin, and which logic,” Minghui Xiong discusses, together with Yun Xie, Johan van Benthem’s (2009) reservations with regard to Toulmin’s (2003) diagnosis and abandonment of formal logic by discussing “two main misunderstandings of Toulmin’s ideas in van Benthem’s discussions” (Xie and Xiong 2011, p. 2).

In order to clarify an important difference between two prominent approaches to argumentation, Yun Xie (2008) analyzes in “Dialectic within pragma-dialectics and informal logic” the conflicting views of dialectic underlying Johnson’s “dialectical tier” and van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s view of dialectic. Whereas in Johnson’s view dialectic represents a particular property of a particular component of his approach, to the pragma-dialecticians dialectic is equivalent with the use of the critical method. Although these two views are theoretically interrelated, they diverge when they are, as happens in the two approaches, incorporated in different pragmatic perspectives, each of them involving a distinct conceptualization of rationality and reasonableness. In the “product-driven” context of the “solo argument construction” of Johnson’s dialectical tier, the dialectical function of critical scrutiny unfolds differently than in the “process-driven” dialogical context of the “duet cooperative discussion” between two parties of pragma-dialectics (Yun Xie 2008, pp. 283–285). In “How critical is the dialectical tier?” Yun Xie tackles the same problem again, this time together with Qingyin Liang and focusing exclusively on Johnson’s view (Liang and Xie 2011). Based on an examination of the similarities and discrepancies between Johnson’s view of the dialectical tier and the critical view of argument, the authors insist that Johnson’s theory and the critical view should be bridged, so that the dialectical tier becomes critical in nature (p. 240).


  1. 1.

    A critical evaluation of critical discourse analysis is given by Widdowson (1998). In his view, there is no coherent theory behind the claimed relationships between linguistic phenomena and ideology, the assumptions concerning ideological reproduction are based on a naïve and untenable version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, and the ideological interpretation of (selective) linguistic phenomena that is provided has no basis since it cannot be known what the neutral representation of a state of affairs or the author’s real intention is.

  2. 2.

    Ihnen and Richardson point at a “subtle” difference in the relation between analysis and evaluation or critique: in pragma-dialectics analysis and evaluation are worked out independently, whereas in critical discourse analysis, the results of analysis and critique are often presented simultaneously (2011, p. 237).

  3. 3.

    According to Ihnen and Richardson, by providing a theoretical and systematic grounding to interpretive claims, pragma-dialectics can prevent charges against critical discourse analysis of interpretive bias (2011, p. 238).

  4. 4.

    Another difference is that in critical discourse analysis, the notion of argument scheme (often referred to as topos) usually has a more specific scope than the highly general argument schemes in argumentation theories such as pragma-dialectics.

  5. 5.

    In pragma-dialectics, reasonableness and acceptability judgments pertain exclusively to the role that discursive elements play in resolving a difference of opinion on the merits, whereas in critical discourse analysis, they ultimately pertain to their role in the (re-)creation of relations of inequality and disempowerment.

  6. 6.

    This ideological starting point, essentially based in critical theory (Habermas), makes some authors fear that in the end the combination of the discourse-historical approach to critical discourse analysis with pragma-dialectical critical rationalism will lead to an incommensurable “epistemological conflict” (Forchtner and Tominc 2012).

  7. 7.

    Fairclough’s questions illustrate clearly how in “critical linguistics” critical discourse analysts deal with texts (see also Fowler and Kress 1979; Simpson 1993).

  8. 8.

    For the use of historical models in the analysis of controversies, see Dascal (2007).

  9. 9.

    The conception of controversy developed by Dascal is to a large extent in line with the view of Crawshay-Williams (1957), discussed in Sect. 3.7, that controversy arises when there is disagreement between the defender of a statement and an attacker of this statement concerning the criteria according to which the statement is to be tested.

  10. 10.

    Marras and Euli (2008) discuss the role of refutation and dissuasion in managing conflicts over political and social issues and opt for a replacement of the traditional dissuasion model by a nonviolent model. Their model allows for a taxonomy of six conflict “scenarios,” which resemble different articulations of deliberative communicative activity types from the political domain.

  11. 11.

    Ferreira (2008) aims to develop a model of scientific dialogical activity that incorporates the concept of controversy and does justice to the language aspects. In his view, the activities of scientists have always been “immersed in controversies” (p. 125). The variety in their cognitive aims and background assumptions “brings what should be a ‘rational discussion’ down to (or up to!) a controversy” (p. 126).

  12. 12.

    Zemplén, who would like to go even deeper into the rhetorical dimension, comes close to a fully fledged analysis of strategic maneuvering in the pragma-dialectical sense. By revealing the strategic maneuvering that takes place in the Newton–Lucas debate, he shows that such an analysis “can yield novel insights into and better understanding of the historical controversy” (p. 259).

  13. 13.

    This research can be seen as an altered replication of research conducted earlier by Baesler and Burgoon (1994).

  14. 14.

    See also Hornikx (2005) and Hornikx and de Best (2011).

  15. 15.

    See Šorm, Timmers, and Schellens (2007) for a similar study.

  16. 16.

    Van Eemeren et al. (1984) conducted empirical research to establish to what extent the recognition of argumentative moves is in argumentative reality facilitated or hampered by factors in the presentation (see Sect. 10.12 of this volume).

  17. 17.

    In a different area of psychology, a research tradition has already been established concentrating on the relationship between argumentation and education. See, for instance, Schwarz et al. (2000); Schwarz et al. (2003); Andriessen et al. (2003); Andriessen and Schwarz (2009); and Baker (2009).

  18. 18.

    See our explanation of Aristotle’s dialectic in Sect. 2.3.

  19. 19.

    For a response of argumentation scholars to Mercier and Sperber’s views of the relationship between the argumentative theory and argumentation theory, see Santibáñez Yañez (2012a) and the various contributions in Palczewski, Fritch, and Parrish (2012).

  20. 20.

    Finnish scholars took not so much part in this development because, unlike the various Scandinavian languages, the Finnish language is not understandable to Danes, Swedes, and Norwegians.

  21. 21.

    See also Jørgensen (1995, 2011); Jørgensen, Kock, and Rørbach (1998); and Jørgensen and Kock (1999).

  22. 22.

    For reasonable nonagreement, see also Pedersen (2011).

  23. 23.

    Sine Just (2003) of the Copenhagen Business School approached the ongoing debate on the future of the European Union from a rhetorical perspective. Other publications of the same research group are Bengtsson (2011), Gabrielsen (2003), and Gabrielsen, Just, and Bengtsson (2011).

  24. 24.

    There are also introductions to critical thinking and argumentation, such as Hultén, Pernilla, Hultman, and Eriksson (2009) and Björnsson, Kihlbom and Ullholm (2009).

  25. 25.

    See also Tomic (2007b) and Jovičič (2003a, b), contributions which Tomic published under a different name.

  26. 26.

    Sweden has an important critical thinking tradition. Classics among the textbooks are P.-A. Walton (1970) and Andersson and Furberg (1974). Later introductions to argumentation and critical thinking are Hultén, Hultman and Eriksson (2009) and Björnsson, Kihlbom and Ullholm (2009).

  27. 27.

    An earlier study in Swedish dealing specifically with the analysis of legal argumentation is Evers (1970).

  28. 28.

    Later Anders Sigrell became professor of rhetoric in Lund and Mats Rosengren at Södertörn.

  29. 29.

    Another publication about visual rhetoric is Engdahl, Gelang, and O’Brien (2011).

  30. 30.

    Sigrell (1995) concentrates his research on implicitness in argumentative discourse.

  31. 31.

    A Norwegian study of legal argumentation from a rhetorical perspective is Graver (2010).

  32. 32.

    A noteworthy Norwegian study of argumentation strategies in science that is part of the research of “sakprosa” is Breivega (2003).

  33. 33.

    See Kjeldsen and Grue (2011). See, for an example of such research, Sandvik (2007) on the rhetoric of emotions in political argumentation.

  34. 34.

    See also Kjeldsen (1999a).

  35. 35.

    See also Kjeldsen (2011a) and Gelang and Kjeldsen (2011). With Johanson, Kjeldsen published also a history of Norwegian political speech-making between 1814 and 2005 (Johanson and Kjeldsen 2005).

  36. 36.

    See also Skouen (2009).

  37. 37.

    Other monographs showing the influence of historical philosophers on current Finnish argumentation theory are Tuominen (2001) with regard to antiquity and Yrjönsuuri (1995, 2001) with regard to medieval logic and dialogue games.

  38. 38.

    See also Paavola (2006) on abductive argumentation.

  39. 39.

    Another well-recognized textbook is Siitonen and Halonen (1997). Critical thinking is approached from the perspective of debate in Kurki and Tomperi (2011).

  40. 40.

    From Jyvaskyla, Pajunen (2011) contributed to the study of epistemic concepts, such as “acceptance,” in argumentation theory.

  41. 41.

    For a Finnish study on juridical argumentation, see also Sajama (2012), who prepares a textbook on legal argumentation.

  42. 42.

    A case study of a historical political debate is reported in Rudanko (2009).

  43. 43.

    Another Finnish theologian that deserves to be mentioned is Lauri Thurén, currently professor at the University of Joensuu, who published in 1995 the first fully fledged application of Toulmin’s model to a book of the Bible (Thurén 1995). Another Nordic application of Toulmin’s model in theology is Hietanen (2002).

  44. 44.

    See also Hietanen (2003, 2010, 2011a). In Hietanen (2007c) the gospel of Matthew is analyzed as an argument. See also Hietanen (2011b).

  45. 45.

    At the University of Tampere, within social sciences, Kari Palonen has specialized in parliamentary debate and, within speech communication, Pekka Isotalus in political debate in the media (see Wilkins and Isotalus 2009).

  46. 46.

    Occasionally, Prologi, the journal published by the Finnish National Association for Speech Communication (Prologos), includes articles relating to argumentation.

  47. 47.

    Öhlschläger (1979) discusses “to argue,” Strecker (1976) “to prove,” and Klein (1987) a group of speech acts including “to confirm,” “to explain,” “to infer,” and “to justify.” Apeltauer (1978) provides a survey of sequences of speech acts, moves, and strategies in debate and discussions (see also Zillig 1982).

  48. 48.

    See also Schank and Schwitalla (1987), Gruber (1996), and Deppermann and Hartung (2003). See Lüttich (2007) for an analysis of argumentation in televised debates.

  49. 49.

    There are only few studies dealing with the overall structure of argumentative texts. In these studies, the structure of the text is made visible with the help of complex diagrams which show the interrelation of the arguments. See Deimer (1975), Grewendorf (1975, 1980), Frixen (1987), and Kopperschmidt (1989a).

  50. 50.

    The distinction between “schlussregeletablierende” and “schlussregelbenützende” argument schemes corresponds with the Toulminian distinction between “warrant-using” and “warrant-establishing” arguments (see Chap. 4 of this volume). There is also a correspondence between this distinction and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s distinction between argumentation based on the structure of reality and argumentation establishing the structure of reality (see Chap. 5 of this volume).

  51. 51.

    See also Kienpointner (1993) and (1996).

  52. 52.

    See Wohlrapp (1987, 1990, 1991), Lüken (1991, 1992, 1995), Mengel (1991, 1995), and Volquardsen (1995).

  53. 53.

    See Wohlrapp (1987, 1991, 2009).

  54. 54.

    For a review of Wohlrapp’s Der Begriff des Arguments, see Hoppmann (2012).

  55. 55.

    Lumer (2011) aims at developing general criteria of argumentative validity and adequacy for probabilistic arguments on the basis of, and from the viewpoint of, an epistemological approach to argumentation. These general criteria should provide the theoretical basis for, and a generalization of, the epistemological criteria for several special types of probabilistic arguments. The most obvious theoretical starting point of this epistemological approach to argumentation is Bayesian epistemology. However, since Bayesian epistemology in its present form is found to be defective in several respects (unresolved problem of priors, unfeasibly excessive coherence and conditionalization requirements, few exact degrees of belief, poor practical justification of Bayesianism, etc.), practical solutions need to be developed which are apt for argumentative use.

  56. 56.

    Apel (1988) regards the argumentative situation as the “transcendental-pragmatic condition” of all rational speech activity.

  57. 57.

    Further elaborations of Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality, the dialogue theory of the Erlangen School, and their practical implications are given in Berk (1979) and Gerhardus, Kledzig, and Reitzig (1975).

  58. 58.

    Kopperschmidt also published a substantial number of articles on the history of rhetoric and the analysis and evaluation of political speeches (1975, 1976b, 1977, 1989b, 1990). He edited books on rhetoric as a theory of the production of texts and the influences of rhetoric in other disciplines (1990, 1991) and edited a volume on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s new rhetoric (Kopperschmidt 2006).

  59. 59.

    Together with Jens, Üding edited Rhetorik, ein internationals Jahrbuch [International rhetorical yearbook]”). Jens made a series of contributions to the study of political rhetoric and the history of rhetoric from antiquity to the twentieth century. For the history of rhetoric in Germany from the sixteenth to the twentieth century, see Schanze (1974).

  60. 60.

    See Sect. 8.2 of this volume for a discussion of the American debate tradition and Chap. 5 for a discussion of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s new rhetoric.

  61. 61.

    The researchers involved in this type of research include Burgers, van Enschot, Hoeken, Hornikx, Hustinx, de Jong, van Mulken, and Šorm.

  62. 62.

    Braet (2007, p. 302) emphasizes that pragma-dialectics is the most important modern source of inspiration for his approach.

  63. 63.

    As an exception to the predominantly descriptive approaches to argumentation in the French-speaking areas, Philippe Breton, an important French argumentation scholar and communication theorist, proposed a normative approach (Breton 1996). In 1996, a French translation was published of van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s (1992a), which explains their normative views concerning argumentative discourse and the fallacies. French translations have been published of van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s (1992a) and Woods and Walton’s normative approaches (1996 and 1992, respectively).

  64. 64.

    Raccah is a member of the Laboratoire Ligérien de Linguistique at the University of Orleans.

  65. 65.

    Eabrasu is assistant professor of Economy and Law, group ESC-Troyes.

  66. 66.

    Chateauraynaud is director of studies at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris and founder of the GSPR (group of pragmatic and reflexive sociology).

  67. 67.

    Two important books on the classical rhetorical figures which appeared in the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century are Dumarsais’s (1988) study of tropes, first published in 1730, and Fontanier’s (1968) study of figures of speech, first published in 1821 and 1827.

  68. 68.

    During the later part of his career, Reboul was professor of philosophy at the University of Strasbourg. He died in 1992.

  69. 69.

    Dichy is professor of Arab linguistics. Traverso is a specialist in conversational analysis, pragmatics, and intercultural communication. She is director of research at the CNRS, Lyon 2 University. Some of her work is in the field of argumentation (Doury and Traverso 2000; Doury et al. 2000).

  70. 70.

    Angenot also holds a chair of rhetoric at the Free University of Brussels.

  71. 71.

    On the occasion of Perelman’s 100th birthday in 2012, Meyer co-edited a volume on Perelman’s work together with Benoît Frydman (Frydman and Meyer 2012).

  72. 72.

    Among the members of Groupe μ are Francis Édeline, Jean-Marie Klinkenberg, Jacques Dubois, Francis Pire, Hadelin Trinon, and Philippe Minguet.

  73. 73.

    The opposition to Perelman’s rhetoric was inspired by Roland Barthes’s (1970) view that rhetoric is an outdated discipline and cannot be considered as a serious object of study by theorists of language.

  74. 74.

    The semantic–pragmatic approach to argumentation of the Luganese scholars with an Italian background is discussed in Sect. 9.5 of this volume.

  75. 75.

    The Italian translation of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) in 1966 was introduced by the philosopher Bobbio. Its publication led to philosophical, sociological, and semantic reflection on argumentation. In the words of Eco (1987): “I remember the impact that […] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s book had upon us: the field of argumentation, including that bound to philosophy, is that of the plausible and the probable” (p. 14).

  76. 76.

    For the most part of his career, Stati was a professor of linguistics at the University of Bologna.

  77. 77.

    Gilardoni also translated van Eemeren (2010) (with S. Bigi), van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004), and van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2002a) into Italian (2014, 2008, and 2011), respectively.

  78. 78.

    In Cantu and Testa (2011), the relationship between developments in argumentation theory and artificial intelligence is discussed.

  79. 79.

    With Gianfranco Ferarri, Manzin edited a volume on the role of rhetoric in the legal profession (Ferrari and Manzin 2004) and with Puppo a volume on the cross-examination (Manzin and Puppo 2008).

  80. 80.

    Since 2010, Rubinelli is engaged in creating a research program on argumentation at the University of Lucerne, with a focus on rational persuasion in decision-making and argumentation skills in consumers and health professionals’ education (Zanini and Rubinelli 2012; Rubinelli and Zanini 2012).

  81. 81.

    See Ziembiński (1955) and Ajdukiewicz (1965).

  82. 82.

    For textbooks written by prominent scholars, see Hołówka (2005), Marciszewski (1969), Tokarz (2006), and Suchoń (2005).

  83. 83.

    See Korolko (1990), Lichański (1992), and Ziomek (1990).

  84. 84.

    PERSEUS, founded in 2006, stands for PERsuasiveness (Studies on the Effective Use of argumentS); ZeBraS, founded in 2012, is a research group on applied formal rhetoric.

  85. 85.

    See also Załęska (2012b), Szymanek (2001), and Szymanek, Wieczorek, and Wójcik (2004).

  86. 86.

    Doctoral dissertations were defended at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw by Katarzyna Budzynska in 2002 on notions of argumentation and proof viewed from a pragmatic perspective, at the University of Wrocław by Tomasz Zarębski in 2003 on the reconstruction and analysis of the conception of rationality in the philosophy of Toulmin, at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin by Marcin Koszowy in 2008 on contemporary conceptions of a logical fallacy, at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań by Kamila Dębowska in 2008 on extending the pragma-dialectal model of argumentation, and at the Warsaw University of Technology by Paweł Łoziński in 2012 on context-dependent reasoning in argumentative logics.

  87. 87.

    Other international conferences held in Poland include a conference in 2005 by the Polish Rhetorical Society devoted to rhetoric and argumentation, a conference in 2009 on argumentation and rational change of beliefs at the University of Silesia in Katowice, Ustroń, and the conference Pragmatics-2012 on interdisciplinary approaches to pragmatics, rhetoric and argumentation at the University of Łódź.

  88. 88.

    In Dunin-Kęplicz et al.’s (2012) approach, the choice of a rule-based, DATALOG-like query language 4QL as a four-valued implementation framework ensures that, unlike in standard two-valued approaches, tractability of the model is maintained.

  89. 89.

    For the standard language for argument representation AIF, see Chesnevar, McGinnis, Modgil, Rahwan, Reed, Simari, South, Vreeswijk, and Willmot (2006).

  90. 90.

    The educational ideal of critical thinking is also a matter of academic reflection. It is discussed by Wasilewska-Kamińska (2013) and promoted by means of various textbooks (Hołówka 2005; Szymanek et al. 2004; Tokarz 2006).

  91. 91.

    The graduate school for linguistics of the University of Debrecen publishes an online journal, Argumentum. See Kertész and Rákosi (2009) for a research publication on argumentation stemming from this university.

  92. 92.

    The University of Pécs has organized several international conferences on various aspects of argumentation. A doctoral dissertation on discourse coherence and arguments in health-related interviews, in which argumentation theory is applied to the clinical interview, was defended in 2007 by Monika Gyuró.

  93. 93.

    Among their joint studies are, for instance, Komlósi and Knipf (1987) and Komlósi and Tarrósy (2010).

  94. 94.

    Like in Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe, in Hungary semiotics (including formal and cognitive linguistics) was one of the dominant research paradigms between the mid-1970s and the 1990s. In particular narratology, discourse analysis, and informal logic were dominant, which is clearly manifested in the work of the Pécs School.

  95. 95.

    A specific feature of the Pécs group is an ongoing project of comparative analysis of languages, inspired by Raccah.

  96. 96.

    See Zadar et al. (2006).

  97. 97.

    Žagar considers himself a follower of Ducrot and mainly works within Ducrot’s “standard theory.” However, he often problematizes some of its concepts and definitions and generalizes others, trying to apply them to different fields.

  98. 98.

    Other Slovenian argumentation researchers are Bregant and Vezjak (2007), who have a descriptive interest in fallacies.

  99. 99.

    In the department of rhetoric scores of doctoral dissertations on argumentation theory have been defended.

  100. 100.

    Since 1995, the Bulgarian Association of Rhetoric is another center in developing scientific and educational projects.

  101. 101.

    The interest in argumentation theory in Bulgaria was further stimulated by the international conference on argumentation theory in Amsterdam in 1986 which led to the establishment of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA).

  102. 102.

    Visits to the department of rhetoric in Sofia of the intellectual leaders of three of these schools (Perelman, van Eemeren, and Brutian) have reinforced the impact of their ideas on Bulgarian scholarship.

  103. 103.

    This replacement, stimulated by Perelman’s studies (in particular, Perelman 1968, 1969, 1974, 1979b), also reflected a remarkable change in attitude towards rhetorical practice. Totalitarian management of rhetorical practice had relied on special volumes of instructions for leaders, including party and komsomol secretaries, and the ideology departments of the party committees; a series of monthly magazines served the lower-level secretaries and political instructors.

  104. 104.

    Bulgarian translations of van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992a, 2004) were published (2009, 2006, respectively).

  105. 105.

    The first two volumes of the Library of Rhetoric are translations of A Systematic Theory of Argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004), translated by M. Pencheva (published in 2006), and Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992a), translated by Donka Alexandrova (published in 2009). A translation of Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse (van Eemeren 2010) is to be published.

  106. 106.

    Argumentation theory is taught in faculties of philosophy, letters, and communication in Bucharest, Iaşi, Cluj, Craiova, Galaţi, and Ploieşti. There are two Romanian journals devoted to argumentation theory: Argumentum (published by Al. I. Cuza University of Iaşi since 2002) and Communication and Argumentation in the Public Sphere (published by Dunărea de Jos University of Galaţi since 2007).

  107. 107.

    Another important step in the study of argumentation in Romania is the publication in 2012 of a Romanian translation by A. Stoica of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958).

  108. 108.

    See also Constantinescu, Stoica, and Uţă Bărbulescu (2012).

  109. 109.

    Zafiu (2010) contains an analysis of religious texts represented by orthodox sermons, which belong to “the most stable types of texts throughout which the tradition of rhetoric has preserved itself and continued in European culture” (p. 27). In orthodox sermons, reasoning has a different role than, for instance, in scientific texts, and in argumentation it is in a specific way complemented by ethos and an “accepted presence of pathos” (p. 27).

  110. 110.

    This research group is part of the Centre of Discourse Theory and Practice of the Department of French in the Faculty of Letters. The Centre published a Romanian translation of van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992a) by A. Gâţă in collaboration with C. Andone of the University of Amsterdam (2010).

  111. 111.

    Evidential markers, or “evidentials,” are words or phrases indicating the source of information the statement relies on (visual or auditory perception, inference, reported speech, etc.).

  112. 112.

    In 2011, for example, a big interdisciplinary Summer University was organized in Ohrid: “Argumentation: Droit, politique, sciences” [Argumentation: Law, politics, science].

  113. 113.

    In Macedonia an Albanian translation was published of van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2002a) (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2006a).

  114. 114.

    See also Dimiškovska Trajanoska (2006).

  115. 115.

    The research just discussed is continued in the field of legal reasoning. See Dimiškovska Trajanoska (2010) and Dimiškovska (2011).

  116. 116.

    See Miovska-Spaseva and Ačkovska-Leškovska (2010) for an effort to develop innovative techniques of critical thinking that can be applied at all educational levels.

  117. 117.

    Walton’s study of ad hominem arguments (1998a) was translated into Russian (2002a). Russian translations of van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992a) and van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2002a) were also published (1994c, 1992b, 2002b, respectively).

  118. 118.

    As his Russian colleague Alekseev (1991) states, “The development of the investigation of argumentation in the Soviet Union is connected first of all with Brutian’s name” (p. 4).

  119. 119.

    The proceedings of the first symposium, Problems of philosophical argumentation, were published by G. Brutian and Narsky (1986). They see “argumentology” as a special branch of philosophical study.

  120. 120.

    In 2004 an Armenian translation was published of van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2002a).

  121. 121.

    For his views on the language of argumentation, see Brutian and Markarian (1991).

  122. 122.

    Other members of the Yerevan School are Edvard Atayan, Igor Zaslavsky, Hrachik Shakarian, Hamlet Gevorkian, Alexander Manassian, Edvard B. Markarian, Edvard S. Markarian, Henri Grigorian, Suren Hovhannisian, Hovhannes Hovhannisian, Mkrtich Avagian, Arthur Avanesian, and Anna Amirkhanian.

  123. 123.

    Between 1999 and 2002 the department of logic of St. Petersburg State University and the department of speech communication, argumentation theory and rhetoric of the University of Amsterdam published a joint online journal, Argumentation. Interpretation. Rhetoric, co-edited by Migunov and van Eemeren.

  124. 124.

    Other contributions to argumentation theory by the same author are Lisanyuk (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011).

  125. 125.

    Other argumentation studies from Belarus are Yaskevich (1993, 1999, 2003, 2007). These studies deal, among other things, with argumentation in the context of science. See also Tchouechov (1999).

  126. 126.

    See Maslennikova and Tretyakova (2003). For a study of text genre and argumentation structure by a scholar formerly from St. Petersburg, see Dolinina (1992). Dolinina (2007) concentrates on linguistic aspects of argumentative refusals to comply with directives and imperatives.

  127. 127.

    See, for instance, Smirnova (2007) on reported speech in newspaper discourse.

  128. 128.

    See Sentenberg and Karasic (1993).

  129. 129.

    See also Golubev (1999).

  130. 130.

    At Udmurt State University, Kiseliova defended in 2006 a doctoral dissertation on variability of verbal reactions in argumentative discourse (Kiseliova 2006).

  131. 131.

    See also Vassiliev (1999).

  132. 132.

    The doctoral dissertations supervised by Vasiliev deal with strategies and tactics in argumentative discourse (Oshchepkova 2004), mocking (Volkova 2005), refutation (Puckova 2006), presidential address (Guseva 2006), advertisement (Kalashnikova 2007), deliberation (Vasilyanova 2007), informative speech (Kasyanova 2008), conflict at school (Ruchkina 2009), appeals and complaints (Cherkasskaya 2009), political public address (Sukhareva 2010), allegorical phrasal units (Saltykova 2011), cognitive aspects (Besedina 2011), and bureaucratic runaround (Puchkova 2011).

  133. 133.

    At the Eurasian National University in Kazakhstan, too, a start has been made with argumentation research from a linguistic perspective. In collaboration with argumentation theorists of the University of Lugano, Serikkul Satenova supervised the doctoral dissertations of Lyazzat Kimanova and Diana Akizhanova.

  134. 134.

    As far as we are aware, no argumentation research is going on in Bolivia, Paraguay, and Peru, and only a very limited amount of work is done in Venezuela and Ecuador. In Venezuela, at the Experimental Pedagogical University Libertador in Caracas, the linguist Thays Adrian (2011) relates argumentation theory to political discourse. Like a great many of their Latin American colleagues, Natalie Álvarez and Iraida Sánchez (2001) focus on measuring argumentative skills of secondary school students.

  135. 135.

    The rhetoricians who gave shape to this tradition are Antonio de Nebrija, Miguel de Salinas, Alfonso García Matamoros, Cipriano Suárez, Martín de Segura, and Juan de Guzmán. The Valencian rhetorician Juan Luis Vives (1492–1540) also deserves to be mentioned. Baltasar Gracián (1601–1658) provided a rhetorical synthesis of the renaissance spirit (Kennedy 1999).

  136. 136.

    A Spanish translation of Feteris (1999), Fundamentals of legal argumentation, was published in 2007.

  137. 137.

    Among the participants in the meetings Vega set up to strengthen argumentation theory in the Hispanic academic community were Spanish scholars such as Jose Miguel Saguillo, Huberto Marraud, Cristina Corredor, Jesús Alcolea, José Francisco Álvarez, and Roberto Feltrero but also Latin American scholars such as Gabriela Guevara, Roberto Marafioti, Carlos Pereda, and Cristián Santibáñez.

  138. 138.

    For other joint studies by these two authors, see Vega and Olmos (2007) and Olmos and Vega (2011). Another scholar who has promoted the study of argumentation in Spain is Hubert Marraud of the Autonomous University of Madrid (see Marraud 2013).

  139. 139.
  140. 140.

    See also Navarro (2011).

  141. 141.

    In addition, Vega promoted the publication of a Spanish translation (2013b) of van Eemeren’s (2010) pragma-dialectical monograph Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse.

  142. 142.

    For her justification of the normative nature of argumentation see Bermejo-Luque (2007).

  143. 143.

    See, e.g., Andone (2012), Biro and Siegel (2011), Freeman (2011b), Hitchcock (2011a), Pinto (2011), and Xie (2012).

  144. 144.

    In addition, in the 1990s, Portolés and Tordesillas were in Barcelona, members of the Groupe μ, which also published on argumentation.

  145. 145.

    Sevilla translated Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s (1958) monograph on the new rhetoric into Spanish (1989). Other names that deserve to be mentioned here are Albadalejo, García Barrientos, García Berríos, and López Eire.

  146. 146.

    Atienza and Espejo translated Alexy’s (1978) Theorie der juristischen Argumentation [A theory of legal argumentation] into Spanish (1989).

  147. 147.

    Other Spanish contributions to argumentation theory are made, for instance, by Francisco Álvarez (2007) and Urbieta and Carrascal (2007).

  148. 148.

    Earlier, as editor of Signo and Seña, Narvaja already included some papers on argumentation in her journal.

  149. 149.

    Prominent foreign argumentation theorists are even regularly invited to present their views in guest lectures.

  150. 150.

    In addition, Marafioti translated van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Snoeck Henkemans’s (2002a) textbook Argumentation into Spanish (2006c) and enabled Ana María Vicuña and Celso López to publish their Spanish translation of van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s (2004) monograph A Systematic Theory of Argumentation (2011).

  151. 151.

    Other argumentation scholars at the University of Buenos Aires are Alicia Carrizo, Alfredo Lescano, Alejandra Reale, and Alejandra Vitale.

  152. 152.

    Other active Argentinian argumentation scholars are Gustavo Arroyo and Teresita Matienzo of the National University of General Sarmiento; Gustavo Bodanza of the National University del Sur; Bahía Blanca, Mónica Musci, and Andrea Pac of the University of Patagonia Austral; Nidia Piñeiro and Nilda Corral of the National University del Nordeste; and Carlos Oller of the National University La Plata.

  153. 153.

    Among her doctoral students were Esther López and María Belén Romano.

  154. 154.

    Under the supervision of CEAR, a Spanish translation of a compilation of papers by Henry Prakken was prepared (Prakken 2013) and also of Walton and Krabbe’s (1995) monograph Commitment in Dialogue. Commitment in Dialogue (2013), and van Eemeren and Grootendorst's (1984) monograph Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (2013)

  155. 155.

    Among his other papers are Santibáñez (2010a, b, 2012b). See also Fuentes and Kalawski (2007).

  156. 156.

    See also Ihnen (2012a) and Ihnen and Richardson (2011).

  157. 157.

    At the University Alberto Hurtado, Flavia Carbonell also examines legal argumentation (Carbonell 2011), just as Jorge Osorio at the University of Concepción (Osorio 2006).

  158. 158.

    See for a clear token of the connection between European and Latin American scholarship Ducrot (1986).

  159. 159.

    See also Roque (2008, 2010, 2011a).

  160. 160.

    Among them are Natalia Luna and Federico Marulanda. Luna and Leal have also played an important role in stimulating argumentation theory in Mexico by organizing conferences and inviting international argumentation scholars for guest lectures.

  161. 161.

    Portugese translations of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) en Perelman (1977) were published in 1996 and 1992, respectively.

  162. 162.

    See also Carrilho (1992, 1995) and Carrilho, Meyer, and Timmermans (1999).

  163. 163.

    Grácio (with F. Trindade) also translated Perelman’s book L’empire rhétorique [The realm of rhetoric] into Portuguese (Perelman 1977).

  164. 164.

    A philosopher worth mentioning is Gil, who influenced, together with his former student Coelho, scholars interested in dealing with argumentation from the perspective of polemics in science. See Gil (1999) and Coelho (1989).

  165. 165.

    The journal of the Centre for Linguistics, Estudos linguísticos [Linguistics studies], addresses also occasionally the topic of argumentation.

  166. 166.

    For another of his recent publications, see Grácio (2010).

  167. 167.

    A doctoral dissertation about the relationship between philosophy, rhetoric, and education was defended at the Faculty of Letters of the University of Coimbra by Vicente (2009). Polónio prepares a doctoral dissertation devoted to Aristotle’s theory of fallacies and its impact on contemporary argumentation theory.

  168. 168.

    ArgLab organized several international colloquiums involving international argumentation scholars, such as Aakhus, van Eemeren, Garssen, Hansen, and Walton: “Argumentation in political deliberation” (2011, see Lewiński and Mohammed 2013); “Meaning and arguments in context” (2012); and “Legal argumentation” (2012).

  169. 169.

    A Portuguese translation of Toulmin’s (1958) monograph appeared in 2001 (Toulmin 2001a), and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s (1958) study about the new rhetoric was translated in 1996. In 2008, a Portuguese version of Plantin’s (2005) introductory textbook was published.

  170. 170.

    In 2010, in Ouro Preto, the first Brazilian conference on rhetoric was held and the Brazilian Society of Rhetoric was founded.

  171. 171.

    Among the Ph.D. students engaged in argumentation research at this university is Regina Braz da Silva Santos Rocha, who concentrates on developing from a dialogical perspective methods for teaching argumentative writing skills.

  172. 172.

    See Monteiro (2006) on Perelman and Roesler (2004) on Viehweg.

  173. 173.

    The electronic journal Controvérsias of the department of philosophy of the University of the Sinos River Valley (UNISINOS) focuses exclusively on the study of controversies.

  174. 174.

    See also Regner (2007, 2009).

  175. 175.

    An exception is Inbar (1999), who outlines a conceptual framework for the critical assessment of argumentation which – according to Inbar – differs in some of its core characteristics from conventional approaches: It is resolutely semantic rather than formal; it centers on obligations rather than on beliefs; and its analytical focus is on the contingent necessity of conclusions rather than on persuasiveness or formal validity.

  176. 176.

    In Medieval Muslim scholarship, argumentation was very closely connected to theology. It was known in Arabic as ‘ilm al-kalaam, i.e., the science of speech, or more idiomatically “scholastic theology.” This took the form of scholarly debate and argumentation regarding the proper interpretation of Qur’anic verses relating to God’s names, attributes, and actions and how these were different from man’s names, attributes, and actions. The focus was on how to interpret verses that describe, for example, God speaking to Prophet Moses. The arguments centered around these questions: Does God speak? How can we envisage God’s speech? How can we interpret man’s freedom to act in light of God’s omnibus knowledge and God being the source of all that is and can be done in this world? Baghdad and other Muslim cities witnessed a lot of debates on these issues. A great deal of theological learning involved training on argumentation responding to such questions.

  177. 177.

    The Hijra calendar begins in 622 A.D., when the Prophet Muhammed emigrated from Mecca to Medina.

  178. 178.

    Other useful books which appeared around the same time are Amina Al-Dahri’s (2011) Al-Ḥijāj wa Binā’ al-Khitāb [Argumentation and the structure of discourse], published in Casa Blanca, and Al-Ḥijāj bayna al-Minwāl wa al-Mithāl [Argumentation between theory and practice] by the young Tunisian Ali Al-Shaba’an (2008).

  179. 179.

    Two recent book publications of a young Egyptian researcher, Imad Abdullatif (2012a, b) are Istratijiyyāt al-Iqnā’ wa al-Ta’thīr fi al-Khitāb al-Siyāsi: Khutab al-Ra’iīs al-Sadāt Namuthajan [Persuasion strategies in political discourse: President Sadat’s speeches as a model] and Al-Balāgha wa Ttawāsul ‘Abr al-Thaqāfāt [Rhetoric and cross-cultural communication].

  180. 180.

    In March 2010, a one-day conference was devoted exclusively to Azzawi’s work. The conference took place in the King Abdul-Aziz Al Saoud Foundation for Islamic Studies and Human Science in Casablanca, Morocco.

  181. 181.

    Hammadi Sammoud translated together with Abdelkader Mhiri also several French studies on linguistics and discourse analysis into Arabic.

  182. 182.

    According to Morrison, indigenous rhetorical theory is lacking in Japan. See also Becker (1983).

  183. 183.

    Among these thinkers are Shotoku Taishi (574–622), Kukai (774–835), Genshin (942–1017), Honen (1133–1212), Jien (1155–1225), Myoe (1173–1232), Shinran (1173–1263), Dogen (1200–1253), Nichiren (1222–1282), Ippen (1239–1289), Kitabatake Chikafusa (1293–1354), Fujiwara Seika (1561–1619), Suzuki Shosan (1579–1655), Hayashi Razan (1583–1657), Nakae Toju (1608–1648), Yamazaki Ansai (1618–1682), Yamaga Sokō (1622–1685), Ito Jinsai (1627–1705), Kaibara Ekken (1630–1713), Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728), Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801), Hirata Atsutane (1776–1843), Nishida Kitaro (1870–1945), Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962), Uehara Senroku (1899–1975), and Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990). See Ishii (1992) and Itaba (1995).

  184. 184.

    Okabe (1986–1988) identified 145 Japanese books on rhetorical theory, practice, and criticism published during the Meiji era which are to a large extent based on Western rhetoric. He selected eight representative studies written along the lines of classical rhetoric for a more detailed analysis.

  185. 185.

    According to Okabe (1990, p. 376), “the influence of Western rhetoric in Japan was at its height during the second and third decades of Meiji. The second saw many Japanese translations of Western rhetorical sources, and the third brought a gradual increase in works based on classical rhetoric written by Japanese theorists and practitioners of oratory” (p. 376).

  186. 186.

    The only difference between speech and debate consisted in the number of participants. Debate was classified into two types: parliamentary debate (as in the National Diet) and oratorical debate (as in the courtroom).

  187. 187.

    See, e.g., Palczewski (1989) and Suzuki and van Eemeren (2004). According to Okabe (1989), Japanese tend to count seniority, sex, and family background among the constituents of ethos, whereas Americans go for intelligence, competence, and character (p. 555).

  188. 188.

    According to Okabe (1989, p. 557), Japanese style is characterized by implicitness and ambiguity, exemplified by a preference for understatement and hesitation.

  189. 189.

    More generally, it is often observed that Japanese Buddhist culture, influenced by Taoism and Confucian ethics, worked against the development of oratory. In this connection, the hierarchical and static structure of Japanese society, starting already in the family, are also mentioned, together with the preference for cohesion and harmony, supported by ceremony, conformity, and obedience.

  190. 190.

    Morrison (1972), who is prejudiced against the Japanese language, sees as one of the major stumbling blocks in developing a rhetorical tradition that “a language so deficient makes any kind of argumentation extremely difficult” (pp. 100–101).

  191. 191.

    As Hazen (1982) explained: “The desire to learn English and its linkage with Western forms of logical thinking is coupled with a belief that the Japanese language is ‘emotional’ and does not express classical forms of Western logic well” (p. 11).

  192. 192.

    For an exceptional choice for an informal logical perspective, see Takuzo Konishi (2007).

  193. 193.

    See also Masako Suzuki et al. (2011).

  194. 194.

    Debeito kousien, for example, one of the largest Japanese-language high school debate tournaments, started in 1996 supported by the newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun.

  195. 195.

    The establishment of the Tokyo Conference on Argumentation in 2000 is the most striking development in Japanese argumentation theory in recent years. As is testified by its proceedings, this Conference brings together (as keynote speakers and otherwise) argumentation scholars from the East and the West.

  196. 196.

    Among the Japanese scholars who completed doctoral dissertations in rhetorical/critical analysis in the United States are Miyori Nakazawa (Northwestern University, 1989), Takeshi Suzuki (Northwestern University, 1996), Mitsuhiro Fujimaki (University of Iowa, 2004), Satoru Aonuma (Wayne State University, 2005), and Junya Morooka (University of Pittsburgh, 2006).

  197. 197.

    George Ziegelmueller taught Naoto Usui and Satoru Aonuma; Thomas Goodnight and David Zarefsky taught Miyori Nakazawa, Takeshi Suzuki, Haruno Yamamaki-Ogasawara, and Hiroko Okuda; Donn Parson and Robert Rowland taught Takeshi Suzuki and Noriko Hasegawa; Bruce Gronbeck and Michael McGee taught Satoru Aonuma and Hideki Kakita; Michael Hazen, who coached a successful American debate team visiting Japan in the 1970s, taught Mitsuhiro Fujimaki, Tomohiro Kanke, and Junya Morooka; more recently, Gordon Mitchell taught Takuzo Konishi and Junya Morooka.

  198. 198.

    For one thing, by introducing pragma-dialectics by means of translations to a Japanese readership

  199. 199.

    Gordon Mitchell in 2003, Frans van Eemeren in 2004 and 2011, Thomas Hollihan in 2007 and 2012, Thomas Goodnight in 2008, and David Zarefsky in 2009

  200. 200.

    Classic argumentation theory in ancient China is characterized by extensive studies of analogical arguments.

  201. 201.

    A famous example of a parārtha-anumāna quoted by Stcherbatsky (2011b, p. 110A) is: “Wherever there is no fire, there isn’t smoke either (major premise), But there is smoke here (minor premise), Hence there is fire here (conclusion).”

  202. 202.

    Early Chinese contributions to modern argumentation theory from a linguistic perspective were made by Shi Xu (1995) and Zhuanglin Hu (1995). Shi Xu and Kienpointner (2001) analyzed argumentative strategies in Chinese and Western newspapers concerning the handover of Hong Kong in 1997.

  203. 203.

    Currently they are concentrating on argumentative practices of Chinese minorities in Tibet, Mongolia, and Sinkiang.

  204. 204.

    Based on reports of ethnographic fieldwork and on research concerning ancient Chinese logic, Ju (2010) argues for the cultural relativity of logic and proposes a concept of argumentation that introduces cultural aspects into argumentation studies.

  205. 205.

    It is worth mentioning that also a great many critical thinking textbooks written by American scholars have been translated into Chinese (e.g., Browne and Keeley (2004), published in 2006; Moore and Parker (2009), published in 2007; and Paul and Elder (2002), published in 2010). In spite of some popularity in pedagogy however, they have had very little impact on argumentation studies.

  206. 206.

    Next to being used in studies of legal logic, informal logic is currently also adopted as a tool for re-interpreting classic Chinese argumentation studies.


  1. Aarnio, A. (1987). The rational as reasonable. A treatise on legal justification. Dordrecht: Reidel.Google Scholar
  2. Abderrahmane, T. (1985). Essai sur les logiques des raisonnements argumentatifs et naturels [A treatise on deductive and natural argumentation and its models] (4 Vols). Doctoral dissertation, Sorbonne University Paris, Paris.Google Scholar
  3. Abderrahmane, T. (1987). Fī Uṣūl al-Ḥiwār wa Tajdīd ‘Ilm al-Kalām [On the basics of dialogue and the renovation of Islamic scholastics]. Beirut: Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-ʿArabī. (3rd ed., 2007).Google Scholar
  4. Abdullatif, I. (2012a). Istratijiyyāt al-Iqnā’ wa al-Ta’thīr fi al-Khitāb al-Siyāsi: Khutab a-Ra’iīs al-Sadāt Namūthajan [Persuasion strategies in political discourse. President Sadat’s speeches as a model]. Cairo: al-Hay’a al-Misriyya al-‘Āmma lil-Kitāb.Google Scholar
  5. Abdullatif, I. (2012b). Albalāgha wa Ttawāsul ‘Abr al-Thaqāfāt [Rhetoric and cross-cultural communication]. Cairo: al-Hay’a al-‘Āmma li Quṣūr al-Thaqāfa.Google Scholar
  6. AbdulRaof, H. (2006). Arabic rhetoric. A pragmatic analysis. London/New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  7. Aczél, P. (2009). Új retorika [New rhetoric]. Bratislava: Kalligram Könyvkiadó.Google Scholar
  8. Aczél, P. (2012). Médiaretorika [Media rhetoric]. Budapest: Magyar Mercuris.Google Scholar
  9. Adam, J.-M. (2004). Une approche textuelle de l’argumentation. “Schema”, sequence et phrase périodique [A textual approach to argumentation. “Scheme”, sequence, and periodic sentence]. In M. Doury & S. Moirand (Eds.), L’argumentation aujourd’hui. Positions théoriques en confrontation [Argumentation today. Theoretical positions in confrontation] (pp. 77–102). Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle.Google Scholar
  10. Adam, J.-M., & Bonhomme, M. (2003). L’argumentation publicitaire. Rhétorique de l’éloge et de la persuasion. L’analyse du divers aspects du discours publicitaire [Argumentation in advertising. Rhetoric of eulogy and persuasion. The analysis of different aspects of advertising discourse]. Paris: Nathan. (1st ed., 1997).Google Scholar
  11. Adelswärd, V. (1987). The argumentation of self in job interviews. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation. Analysis and practices. Proceedings of the conference on argumentation 1986 (pp. 327–336). Dordrecht/Providence: Foris.Google Scholar
  12. Adelswärd, V. (1988). Styles of success. On impression management as collaborative action in job interviews. Linköping: University of Linköping: Linköping Studies in Arts and Science.Google Scholar
  13. Adelswärd, V. (1991). The use of formulations in the production of arguments. A study of interviews with conscientious objectors. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the second international conference on argumentation organized by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation at the University of Amsterdam, June 19–22, 1990 (pp. 591–603). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  14. Adelswärd, V., Aronsson, K., & Linell, P. (1988). Discourse of blame. Courtroom construction of social identity from the perspective of the defendant. Semiotica, 71, 261–284.Google Scholar
  15. Adeodato, J. M. (2009). A retórica constitucional (sobre tolerância, direitos humanos e outros fundamentos éticos do direito positivo) [Constitutional rhetoric (about tolerance, human rights and other ethical foundations of positive law)]. São Paulo: Saraiva.Google Scholar
  16. Adrian, T. (2011). El uso de la metáfora en Rómulo Betancourt y Hugo Chávez [The use of metaphor in Rómulo Betancourt and Hugo Chávez]. Madrid: EAE Editorial Academia Española.Google Scholar
  17. Ajdukiewicz, K. (1965). The problem of foundation. In K. Ajdukiewicz (Ed.), The foundation of statements and decisions. Proceedings of the international colloquium on methodology of sciences held in Warsaw, 18–23 September 1961 (pp. 1–11). Warszawa: PWN – Polish Scientific Publishers.Google Scholar
  18. Ajdukiewicz, K. (1974). Pragmatic logic (trans: Reidel, D.). Dordrecht: PWN – Polish Scientific Publishers. [trans.: Wojtasiewicz, O of K. Ajdukiewicz (1974), Logika pragmatyczna, Warsaw: PWN – Polish Scientific Publishers].Google Scholar
  19. Alaoui, H. F. (Ed.). (2010). al-Ḥijāj. Mafhūmuhu wa Majālātuhu [Argumentation. The concept and the fields]. Irbid: ʿAlam al-Kutub al-ḥadith.Google Scholar
  20. Alburquerque, L. (1995). El arte de hablar en público. Seis retóricas famosas [The art of public speaking. Six famous rhetorics]. Madrid: Visor Libros.Google Scholar
  21. Alcolea Banegas, J. (2007). Visual arguments in film. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 35–41). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  22. Al-Dahri, A. (2011). Al-Ḥijāj wa Binā’ al-Khitāb [Argumentation and the structure of discourse]. Casa Blanca: Manshūrāt al-Madāris.Google Scholar
  23. Alekseyev, A. P. (1991). Argumentacia, pzonaniye, obsheniye [Argumentation, cognition, communication]. Moscow: Moscow University Press.Google Scholar
  24. Alexandrova, D. (1984). Античните извори на реториката [Antique sources of rhetorics]. Sofia: Sofia University Press.Google Scholar
  25. Alexandrova, D. (1985). Проблеми на реториката [Problems of rhetoric]. Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo.Google Scholar
  26. Alexandrova, D. (1997). Реторическата аргументация – същност на продуктивния диалог в обучението [The rhetorical argumentation – A basis of productive dialogue in teaching]. Pedagogika, 5, 37–45.Google Scholar
  27. Alexandrova, D. (1999). Хаим Перелман и неговата “Нова реторика” или Трактат по аргументация [Chaim Perelman and his “New Rhetoric” or Treatise on argumentation]. Filosofski Alternativi, 3–4, 29–46.Google Scholar
  28. Alexandrova, D. (2006). Метаморфози на реториката през ХХ век [Metamorphoses of rhetoric in the twentieth century]. Sofia: Sofia University Press.Google Scholar
  29. Alexandrova, D. (2008). Основи на реториката [Fundaments of rhetoric]. Sofia: Sofia University Press.Google Scholar
  30. Alexy, R. (1978). Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Die Theorie des rationale Diskurses as Theorie der juristischen Begründung [A theory of legal argumentation]. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. (Spanish transl. by M. Atienza and I. Espejo as Teoría de la argumentación jurídica. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1989).Google Scholar
  31. Al-Shaba’an, A. (2008). Al-Ḥijāj bayna al-Minwāl wa al-Mithāl [Argumentation between theory and practice]. Tunis: Maskilyāni Publishers.Google Scholar
  32. Álvarez, G. (1996). Textos y discursos. Introducción a la lingüística del texto [Texts and discourses. Introduction to textual linguistics]. Concepción: Universidad de Concepción.Google Scholar
  33. Álvarez, J. F. (2007). The risk of arguing: From persuasion to dissuasion. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 65–71). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  34. Álvarez, N., & Sánchez, I. (2001). El discurso argumentativo de los escolares venezolanos [Venezuelan students’ argumentative discourse]. Letras, 62, 81–96.Google Scholar
  35. Amestoy, M. (1995). Procesos básicos del pensamiento [Basic processes of thinking]. Mexico: Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México.Google Scholar
  36. Andersson, J., & Furberg, M. (1974). Språk och påverkan. Om argumentationens semantik [Language and practice. The semantics of argumentation] (1st ed. 1966). Stockholm: Aldus/Bonnier.Google Scholar
  37. Andone, C. (2012). Review of Lilian Bermejo-Luque (2009) Giving reasons. A linguistic-pragmatic approach to argumentation theory. Argumentation, 26, 291–296.Google Scholar
  38. Andriessen, J. E. B., Baker, M. J., & Suthers, D. (2003). Argumentation, computer-support, and the educational con tekst of confronting cognitions. In J. Andriessen, M. J. Baker, & D. Suthers (Eds.), Arguing to learn. Confronting cognitions in computer-supported collaborative learning environments (pp. 1–25). Dordrecht: Kluwer.Google Scholar
  39. Andriessen, J. E. B., & Schwarz, B. B. (2009). Argumentative design. In N. W. Muller Mirza & A.-N. Perret-Clermont (Eds.), Argumentation and education. The foundation and practices (pp. 145–164). Berlin: Springer.Google Scholar
  40. Angenot, M. (1982). La parole pamphlétaire. Contribution à la typologie des discours modernes [Contribution to the typology of modern discourses]. Paris: Payot.Google Scholar
  41. Angenot, M. (2004). Rhétorique de l’anti-socialisme [Rhetoric of anti-socialism]. Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval.Google Scholar
  42. Apel, K. O. (1988). Diskurs und Verantwortung [Discourse and responsibility]. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.Google Scholar
  43. Apeltauer, E. (1978). Elemente und Verlaufsformen von Streitgesprächen [Elements and proceedings of disputations]. Doctoral dissertation, Münster University, Münster.Google Scholar
  44. Apostolova, G. (1994). Моделиране на диалога [Modelling the dialogue]. Philosophski Alternativi, 3, 112–122.Google Scholar
  45. Apostolova, G. (1999). Убеждаващата комуникация. културната традиция и прагматичните императиви [Persuasive discourse. Cultural tradition and pragmatic imperatives]. Sofia: Nauka i Izkustvo.Google Scholar
  46. Apostolova, G. (2011). Английският философски текст. интерпретация и превод [The texts of English philosophy. Interpretation and translation]. Blagoevgrad: BON.Google Scholar
  47. Apostolova, G. (2012). Култури и текстове. Интернет, интертекст, интеркултура [Cultures and texts. Internet, intertext, interculture]. Blagoevgrad: SWU Publishing House.Google Scholar
  48. Atkin, A., & Richardson, J. E. (2007). Arguing about Muslims. (Un)reasonable argumentation in letters to the editor. Text and Talk, 27(1), 1–25.Google Scholar
  49. Auchlin, A. (1981). Réflexions sur les marqueurs de structuration de la conversation [Reflections on markers of conversational structure]. Études de Linguistique Appliquee, 44, 88–103.Google Scholar
  50. Azar, M. (1995). Argumentative texts in newspapers. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Reconstruction and application. Proceedings of the third ISSA conference on argumentation (University of Amsterdam, June 21–24, 1994), III (pp. 493–500). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  51. Azar, M. (1999). Refuting counter-arguments in written essays. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the fourth international conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 19–21). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  52. Azzawi, A. B. (1990). Quelques connecteurs pragmatiques en Arabe littéraire. Approche argumentaire et polyphonique [Some pragmatic connectors in literary Arabic. An argumentative and polyphonic approach]. Lille: A.N.R.T. Doctoral dissertation, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales.Google Scholar
  53. Azzawi, A. B. (2006). Al-Lugha wa al-Ḥijāj [Language and argumentation] (2nd ed. 2009). Casablanca: al-Aḥmadiyya. Beirut: Muʼassast al-Riḥāb al-Ḥadīthah.Google Scholar
  54. Azzawi, A. B. (2010). Al-Khitāb wa al-Ḥijāj [Discourse and argumentation] (2nd ed.). Casablanca: Al-Aḥmadiyya. Beirut: Muʼassasat al-Riḥāb al-Ḥadīthah (1st ed. 2007).Google Scholar
  55. Baesler, J. E., & Burgoon, J. K. (1994). The temporal effects of story and statistical evidence on belief change. Communication Research, 21, 582–602.Google Scholar
  56. Bakalov, G. (1924). Ораторско изкуство за работници [Public speaking for workers]. София: Edison. Library Nov Pat 8.Google Scholar
  57. Baker, M. J. (2009). Argumentative interactions and the social construction of knowledge. In N. W. Muller Mirza & A.-N. Perret-Clermont (Eds.), Argumentation and education. The foundation and practices (pp. 127–144). Berlin: Springer.Google Scholar
  58. Baranov, A. N. (1990). Linguisticheskaya teoriya argumentatsii (kognitivny podhod) [Linguistic theory of argumentation. A cognitive approach]. Doctoral dissertation, University of Moscow, Moscow.Google Scholar
  59. Barilli, R. (1969). Poetica e retorica [Poetics and rhetoric]. Milan: Mursia.Google Scholar
  60. Barros, D. L. P. de (2011). Preconceito e intolerância. Reflexões linguístico-discursivas. [Prejudice and intolerance: Linguistic-discursive reflections]. São Paulo: Editora Mackenzie.Google Scholar
  61. Barthes, R. (1970). L’ancienne rhétorique. Aide mémoire [The old rhetoric. A compendium]. Communications, 16, 172–223.Google Scholar
  62. Becker, C. (1983). The Japanese way of debate. National Forensic Journal, 1, 141–147.Google Scholar
  63. Bengtsson, M. (2011). Defining functions of Danish political commentary. In F. Zenker (Ed.), Argumentation. Cognition and community. Proceedings of the 9th international conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA) (pp. 1–11). Windsor, ON. CD rom.Google Scholar
  64. Bentancur, L. (2009). El desarrollo de la competencia argumentativa [The development of argumentative competence]. Montevideo: Quehacer Educativo.Google Scholar
  65. van Benthem, J. (2009). One logician’s perspective on argumentation. Cogency, 1(2), 13–26.Google Scholar
  66. Berk, U. (1979). Konstruktive Argumentationstheorie [A constructive theory of argumentation]. Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.Google Scholar
  67. Bermejo-Luque, L. (2007). The justification of the normative nature of argumentation theory. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 113–118). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  68. Bermejo-Luque, L. (2011). Giving reasons. A linguistic-pragmatic approach to argumentation theory. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  69. Besedina, Y. V. (2011). Argumentativnyj diskurs kognitivno-slozhnyh i kognitivno-prostyh lichnostej [Argumentative discourse of cognitively-complex and cognitively-simple individuals]. Doctoral dissertation, Kaluga State University, Kaluga.Google Scholar
  70. Bigi, S. (2011). The persuasive role of ethos in doctor-patient interactions. Communication and Medicine, 8(1), 67–76.Google Scholar
  71. Bigi, S. (2012). Evaluating argumentative moves in medical consultations. Journal of Argumentation in Context, 1(1), 51–65.Google Scholar
  72. Biro, J., & Siegel, H. (2011). Argumentation, arguing, and arguments. Comments on Giving reasons. Theoria, 72, 279–287.Google Scholar
  73. Björnsson, G., Kihlbom, U., & Ullholm, A. (2009). Argumentationsanalys. Färdigheter för kritiskt tänkande [Argumentation analysis. Dispositions for critical thinking]. Stockholm: Natur & Kultur.Google Scholar
  74. Bonhomme, M. (1987). Linguistique de la métonymie [Linguistics of metonymy]. Bern: Peter Lang.Google Scholar
  75. Bonhomme, M. (1998). Les figures clés du discours [The key discourse figures]. Paris: Le Seuil.Google Scholar
  76. Bonhomme, M. (2005). Pragmatique des figures du discours [The pragmatics of discourse figures]. Paris: Champion.Google Scholar
  77. Bonhomme, M. (2006). Le discours métonymique [Metonymical discourse]. Bern: Peter Lang.Google Scholar
  78. Borges, H. F. (2005). Vida, razão e justice. Racionalidade argumentativa na motivação judiciária [Life, reason and justice. Argumentative rationality in judicial motivation]. Coimbra: Minerva Coimbra.Google Scholar
  79. Borges, H. F. (2009). Nova retórica e democratização da justiça [New rhetoric and democratization of justice]. In H. J. Ribeiro (Ed.), Rhetoric and argumentation in the beginning of the 21st Century (pp. 297–308). Coimbra: Coimbra University Press.Google Scholar
  80. Bose, I., & Gutenberg, N. (2003). Enthymeme and prosody. A contribution to empirical research in the analysis of intonation as well as argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the fifth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 139–140). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  81. Bowker, J. K., & Trapp, R. (1992). Personal and ideational dimensions of good and poor arguments in human interaction. In F. H. van Eemeren & R. Grootendorst (Eds.), Argumentation illuminated (pp. 220–230). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  82. Braet, A. (1979–1980). Taaldaden. Een leergang schriftelijke taalbeheersing [Speech acts. A curriculum on writing and reading]. Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff.Google Scholar
  83. Braet, A. (1987). The classical doctrine of status and rhetorical theory of argumentation. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 20, 79–93.Google Scholar
  84. Braet, A. (1995). Schrijfvaardigheid Nederlands [Writing skills in Dutch]. Bussum: Coutinho.Google Scholar
  85. Braet, A. (1996). On the origin of normative argumentation theory. The paradoxical case of the Rhetoric to Alexander. Argumentation, 10, 347–359.Google Scholar
  86. Braet, A. (1999). Argumentatieve vaardigheden [Argumentative skills]. Bussum: Coutinho.Google Scholar
  87. Braet, A. (2004). Hermagoras and the epicheireme. Rhetorica, 22, 327–347.Google Scholar
  88. Braet, A. (2007). De redelijkheid van de klassieke retorica. De bijdrage van klassieke retorici aan de argumentatietheorie [The reasonableness of classical rhetoric. The contribution of classical rhetoricians to the theory of argumentation]. Leiden: Leiden University Press.Google Scholar
  89. Braet, A., & Schouw, L. (1998). Effectief debatteren. Argumenteren en presenteren over beleid [Debating effectively. Policy argumentation and presentation]. Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff.Google Scholar
  90. Bregant, J., & Vezjak, B. (2007). Zmote in napake v argumentaciji. Vodič po slabi argumentaciji v družbenem vsakdanu [Fallacies in argumentation. A guide through bad argumentation in everyday life]. Maribor: Subkulturni azil.Google Scholar
  91. Breivega, K. R. (2003). Vitskaplege argumentasjonsstrategiar [Scientific argumentation strategies]. Oslo: Norsk sakprosa.Google Scholar
  92. Breton, P. (1996). L’argumentation dans la communication [Argumentation in communication] (Coll. Repères). Paris: La Découverte.Google Scholar
  93. Breton, P., & Gauthier, G. (2011). Histoire des théories de l’argumentation [History of argumentation theory]. Paris: La Découverte.Google Scholar
  94. Briushinkin, V. (2000). Sistemnaya model arguementacii [Systematic model of argumentation]. In Trancendental anthropology and logic. The Proceeding of International workshop ‘Anthropology from a modern stand’ (pp. 133–155). 7th Kantian Symposium. Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad University Press.Google Scholar
  95. Briushinkin, V. (2008). Argumentorika. Ishodnaya abstrakciya b metodologiya [Argumentoric. Initial concept and approach]. In V. Briushinkin (Ed.), Modelling reasoning-2. Argumentation and rationality (pp. 7–19). Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad University Press.Google Scholar
  96. Briushinkin, V. (2010). O dvoyakoi roli ritoriki v sistemnoi modeli argumentcii [On twofold role of rhetorics in the systematic model of argumentation]. [web-journal], 3, 3–14.Google Scholar
  97. Browne, M. N., & Keeley, S. M. (2004). Asking the right questions. A guide to critical thinking (7th ed.). Prentice Hall: Pearson. Chinese transl. 2006.Google Scholar
  98. Brumark, Å. (2007). Argumentation at the Swedish dinner table. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 169–177). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  99. Brutian, G. [A.] (1991). The architectonics of argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the second international conference of argumentation. Organized by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA) at the University of Amsterdam, June 19–22, 1990, 1A (pp. 61–63). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  100. Brutian, G. A. (1992). The theory of argumentation, its main problems and investigative perspectives. In J. Pietarinen (Ed.), Problems of philosophical argumentation (Reports from the Department of Practical Philosophy Kätytánnöllisen Filosofian Julkaisuja, 5, pp. 5–17). Turku: University of Turku.Google Scholar
  101. Brutian, G. [A.] (1998). Logic, language, and argumentation in projection of philosophical knowledge. Lisbon: Grafica de Coimbra.Google Scholar
  102. Brutian, G. [A.], & Markarian, H. (1991). The language of argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the second international conference of argumentation. Organized by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA) at the University of Amsterdam, June 19–22, 1990, 1A (pp. 546–550). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  103. Brutian, G. A., & Narsky, I. S. (Eds.). (1986). Problemy filosofskoi argumentatsii [Problems of philosophical argumentation]. Yerevan: Armenian SSR Publishing House.Google Scholar
  104. Brutian, L. (1991). On the types of argumentative discourse. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the second international conference of argumentation. Organized by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA) at the University of Amsterdam, June 19–22, 1990, 1A (pp. 559–563). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  105. Brutian, L. (2003). On the pragmatics of argumentative discourse. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the fifth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 141–144). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  106. Brutian, L. (2007). Arguments in child language. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 179–183). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  107. Brutian, L. (2011). Stylistic devices and argumentative strategies in public discourse. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 162–169). Amsterdam: Rozenberg-Sic Sat. CD rom.Google Scholar
  108. Budzynska, K. (2011). Structure of persuasive communication and elaboration likelihood model. In F. Zenker (Ed.), Proceedings of OSSA 2011. Argumentation. cognition & community. Windsor, ON: Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. CD rom.Google Scholar
  109. Budzynska, K. (2012). Circularity in ethotic structures. Synthese, 190, 3185–3207.Google Scholar
  110. Budzynska, K., & Dębowska, K. (2010). Dialogues with conflict resolution. Goals and effects. In P. Lupkowski & M. Purver (Eds.), Aspects of semantics and pragmatics of dialogue (pp. 59–66). Poznań: Polish Society for Cognitive Science.Google Scholar
  111. Budzynska, K., Dębowska-Kozłowska, K., Kacprzak, M., & Załeska, M. (2012). Interdyscyplinarność w badaniach nad argumentacją i perswazją [Interdisciplinarity in the studies on argumentation and persuasion]. In A. Chmielewski, M. Dudzikowa & A. Grobler (Eds.), Interdyscyplinarnie o interdyscyplinarności [Interdisciplinarity interdisciplinarily] (pp. 147–166). Kraków: Impuls.Google Scholar
  112. Budzynska, K., & Kacprzak, M. (2008). A logic for reasoning about persuasion. Fundamenta Informaticae, 85, 51–65.Google Scholar
  113. Budzynska, K., Kacprzak, M., & Rembelski, P. (2009). Perseus. Software for analyzing persuasion process. Fundamenta Informaticae, 93(1–3), 65–79.Google Scholar
  114. Budzynska, K., & Reed, C. (2012). The structure of ad hominem dialogues. In B. Verheij, S. Szeider & S. Woltran (Eds.), Frontiers in artificial intelligence and applications. Proceedings of 4th international conference on computational models of argument (COMMA 2012) (pp. 410–421). Amsterdam: IOS Press.Google Scholar
  115. Burger, M. (2005). Argumentative and hierarchical dimensions of a broadcast debate sequence. A micro analysis. In M. Dascal, F. H. van Eemeren, E. Rigotti, A. Rocci, & S. Stati (Eds.), Argumentation in dialogic interaction (Special issue studies in communication sciences, pp. 249–264). Lugano: Università della Svizzera italiana.Google Scholar
  116. Burger, M., Jacquin, J., & Micheli, R. (Eds.). (2011). La parole politique en confrontation dans les médias [Political language in confrontations in the media]. Bruxelles: de Boeck.Google Scholar
  117. Burger, M., & Martel, G. (Eds.). (2005). Argumentation et communication dans les medias [Argumentation and communication in the media]. Québec: Nota Bene.Google Scholar
  118. Bustamante, T. R. (2012). Teoria do precedente judicial. A justificação e a aplicação das regras jurisprudenciais [Theory of judicial precedent. The justification and application of legal rules]. São Paulo: Noeses.Google Scholar
  119. Calheiros, M. C. (2008). Verdade, prova e narração [Truth, proof and narration]. In Revista do Centro de Estudos Judiciários [Journal of the Centre for Judicial Studies], 10, 281–296.Google Scholar
  120. Camargo, M. M. L. (2010a). A prática institucional e a representação argumentativa no Caso Raposa Serra do Sol (primeira parte) [The institutional practice and argumentative representation in the Raposa Serra do Sol case (1st part)]. Revista Forense, 408, 02–19.Google Scholar
  121. Camargo, M. M. L. (2010b). A prática institucional e a representação argumentativa no Caso Raposa Serra do Sol (segunda parte) [The institutional practice and argumentative representation in the Raposa Serra do Sol case (2nd part)]. Revista Forense, 409, 231–269.Google Scholar
  122. Canale, D., & Tuzet, G. (2008). On the contrary. Inferential analysis and ontological assumptions of the a contrario argument. Informal Logic, 28(1), 31–43.Google Scholar
  123. Canale, D., & Tuzet, G. (2009). The a simili argument. An inferentialist setting. Ratio Juri, 22(4), 499–509.Google Scholar
  124. Canale, D., & Tuzet, G. (2010). What is the reason for this rule? An inferential account of the ratio legis. Argumentation, 24(3), 197–210.Google Scholar
  125. Canale, D., & Tuzet, G. (2011). The argument from legislative silence. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the seventh international conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 181–191). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  126. Cantù, P., & Testa, I. (2006). Teorie dell’argomentazione. Una introduzione alle logiche del dialogo [Theories of argumentation. An introduction into the dialogue logics]. Milan: Bruno Mondadori.Google Scholar
  127. Cantù, P., & Testa, I. (2011). Algorithms and arguments. The foundational role of the ATAI-question. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the seventh international conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 192–203). Amsterdam: Rozenberg-Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  128. Carbonell, F. (2011). Reasoning by consequences. Applying different argumentation structures to the analysis of consequentialist reasoning in judicial decisions. Cogency, 3(2), 81–104.Google Scholar
  129. Cárdenas, A. (2005). Patrones de argumentación en alumnos de enseñanza media superior [Argumentative patterns of secondary school pupils]. Doctoral dissertation, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico.Google Scholar
  130. Cardona, N. K. (2008). Yo lo sabía cuando era pequeño. Discurso argumentativo en niños de dos a cuatro años [I knew it when I was little. Argumentative discourse in children of two to four years old]. Doctoral dissertation, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico.Google Scholar
  131. Carrascal, B., & Mori, M. (2011). Argumentation schemes in the process of arguing. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference on argumentation of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 225–236). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  132. Carrilho, M. M. (1990). Verdade, suspeita e argumentação [Truth, suspicion and argumentation]. Lisbon: Presença.Google Scholar
  133. Carrilho, M. M. (1992). Rhétoriques de la modernité [Rhetorics and modernity]. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.Google Scholar
  134. Carrilho, M. M. (1995). Aventuras da interpretação [Adventures of interpretation]. Lisbon: Presença.Google Scholar
  135. Carrilho, M. M. (Ed.). (1994). Retórica e comunicação [Rhetoric and communication]. Porto: Asa.Google Scholar
  136. Carrilho, M. M., Meyer, M., & Timmermans, B. (1999). Histoire de la rhétorique [History of rhetoric]. Paris: Le Livre de Poche.Google Scholar
  137. Carvalho, J. C., & Carvalho, A. (Eds.). (2006). Outras retóricas [Other rhetorics]. Lisbon: Colibri.Google Scholar
  138. Castelfranchi, C., & Paglieri, F. (2011). Why argue? Towards a cost-benefit analysis of argumentation. Argument and Computation, 1(1), 71–91.Google Scholar
  139. Cattani, A[delino]. (1990). Forme dell’argomentare. Il ragionamento tra logica e retorica [Forms of arguing. Logical and rhetorical aspects of reasoning]. Padova: Edizioni GB.Google Scholar
  140. Cattani, A[delino]. (1995). Discorsi ingannevoli. Argomenti per difendersi, attaccare, divertirsi [Deceitful reasoning. Arguments for defending, attacking and amusing]. Padova: Edizioni GB.Google Scholar
  141. Cattani, A[delino]. (2001). Botta e risposta. L’arte della replica [Cut and thrust. The art of retort]. Bologna: Il Mulino.Google Scholar
  142. Cattani, A[delino], Cantù, P., Testa, I., & Vidali, P. (Eds.). (2009). La svolta argomentativa. Cinquant’anni dopo Perelman e Toulmin [The argumentative turn. Fifty years after Perelman and Toulmin]. Naples: Loffredo University Press.Google Scholar
  143. Cattani, A.[nnalisa]. (2003). Argumentative mechanisms in advertising. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the fifth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 127–133). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  144. Cattani, A.[nnalisa]. (2007). The power of irony in contemporary advertising. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 223–231). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  145. Cattani, A[nnalisa]. (2009). Pubblicità e retorica [Advertising and rhetoric]. Milano: Lupetti.Google Scholar
  146. Cavazza, N. (2006). La persuasione [Persuasion] (2nd ed.). Bologna: Il Mulino. (1st ed. 1996).Google Scholar
  147. Charaudeau, P. (1992). Le mode d’organisation argumentatif [The argumentative way of organising]. In Grammaire du sens et de l’expression [A grammar of meaning and utterance] (pp. 779–833). Paris: Hachette.Google Scholar
  148. Charaudeau, P. (2008). L’argumentation dans une problématique d’influence [Argumentation in a problematic case concerning influence]. Argumentation et Analyse du Discours, 1. [on line].Google Scholar
  149. Chateauraynaud, F. (2011). Argumenter dans un champ de forces. Essai de balistique sociologique [Arguing in a field of force. Essay on sociological ballistics]. Paris: Pétra.Google Scholar
  150. Cherkasskaya, N. (2009). Strategii i taktiki v apelliativvnom rechevom zhanre [Strategies and tactics in the appellative speech genre]. Doctoral dissertation, Udmurt State University, Izhevsk.Google Scholar
  151. Chesnevar, C., McGinnis, J., Modgil, S., Rahwan, I., Reed, C., Simari, G., South, M., Vreeswijk, G. A., & Willmott, S. (2006). Towards an argument interchange format. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 21(4), 293–316.Google Scholar
  152. Coelho, A. (1989). Desafio e refutação [Challenge and refutation]. Lisbon: Livros Horizonte.Google Scholar
  153. Collin, F., Sandøe, P., & Stefansen, N. C. (1987). Derfor. Bogen om argumentation [Therefore. A book on argumentation]. Copenhagen: Hans Reitzel.Google Scholar
  154. Comesaña, J. (1998). Lógica informal, falacias y argumentos [Informal logic, fallacies and arguments]. Buenos Aires: EUDEBA.Google Scholar
  155. Constantinescu, M., Stoica, G., & Uţă Bărbulescu, O. (Eds.). (2012). Modernitate şi interdisciplinaritate în cercetarea lingvistică. Omagiu doamnei profesor Liliana Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu [Modernity and interdisciplinarity in linguistics. A festschrift in honour of Professor Liliana Ionexcu-Ruxăndoiu] (pp. 227–241). Bucharest: Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti.Google Scholar
  156. Crawshay-Williams, R. (1957). Methods and criteria of reasoning. An inquiry into the structure of controversy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
  157. Crespo, C. (2005). La importancia de la argumentación matemática en el aula [The importance of mathematical argumentation in the classroom]. Premisa. Revista de la Sociedad Argentina de Educación Matemática, 7(23), 23–29.Google Scholar
  158. Crespo, C., & Farfán, R. (2005). Una visión de las argumentaciones por reducción al absurdo como construcción sociocultural [A vision of reduction to absurd argumentation as socio-cultural construction]. Relime, 8(3), 287–317.Google Scholar
  159. Crespo, N. (1995). El desarrollo ontogenético del argumento [The ontogenetic development of argument]. Revista Signos, 37, 69–82.Google Scholar
  160. Cuenca, M. J. (1995). Mecanismos lingüísticos y discursivos de la argumentación [Linguistic and discursive mechanisms of argumentation]. Comunicación, lenguaje y educación, 25, 23–40.Google Scholar
  161. Cunha, P. F., & Malato, M. L. (2007). Manual de retórica & direito [Handbook of rhetoric & law]. Lisbon: Quid Juris.Google Scholar
  162. Cunha, T. C. (2004). Argumentação e crítica [Argumentation and criticism]. Coimbra: Minerva Coimbra.Google Scholar
  163. D’Agostini, F. (2010). Verità avvelaneta. Buoni e cattivi argomenti nel dibattito publico [Poisoned truth. Good and bad arguments in the public debate]. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri.Google Scholar
  164. D’Agostini, F. (2011). Ad ignorantiam arguments, epistemicism and realism. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the seventh international conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. Amsterdam: Sic Sat. CD rom.Google Scholar
  165. Damele, G. (2012). “A força das coisas”. O argumento naturalista na jurisprudência constitucional, entre a impotência do legislador e a omnipotência do juiz [“The force of things”. The naturalistic argument in constitutional case-law, between legislator’s powerlessness and judge’s omnipotence]. Revista Brasileira de Filosofia, 239, 11–34.Google Scholar
  166. Damele, G., Dogliani, M., Matropaolo, A., Pallante, F., & Radicioni, D. P. (2011). On legal argumentation techniques. Towards a systematic approach. In M. A. Biasiotti & F. Sebastiano (Eds.), From information to knowledge. On line access to legal information. Methodologies, trends and perspectives (pp. 105–118). Amsterdam: IOS Press.Google Scholar
  167. Damele, G., & Savelka, J. (2011). Rhetoric and persuasive strategies in High Courts’ decisions. Some remarks on the Portuguese Tribunal Constitucional and the Italian Corte Costituzionale. In M. Araszkiewicz, M. Myška, J. Smejkalová, J. Savelka, & M. Skop (Eds.), Argumentation 2011. International conference on alternative methods of argumentation in law (pp. 81–94). Brno: Masaryk University.Google Scholar
  168. Danblon, E. (2002). Rhétorique et rationalité. Essai sur l’émergence de la critique et de la persuasion [Rhetoric and rationality. Essay on the emergence of criticism and persuasion]. Brussels: Éditions de l’Université Libre de Bruxelle.Google Scholar
  169. Danblon, E. (2004). Argumenter en démocratie [Arguing in democracy]. Brussels: Labor.Google Scholar
  170. Danblon, E. (2005). La function persuasive. Anthropologie du discours rhétorique. Origins et actualité [The persuasive function. Anthropology of rhetorical discourse. Origins and actuality]. Paris: Armand Colin.Google Scholar
  171. Danblon, E. (2013). L’homme rhétorique. Culture, raison, action [The rhetorical man. Culture, reason, action]. Paris: Éditions du Cerf.Google Scholar
  172. Dascal, M. (1993). Interpreting and understanding. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (Portuguese transl. as Interpretação e compreensão. São Leopoldo: Editora da Unisinos, 2006).Google Scholar
  173. Dascal, M. (1994). Epistemology, controversies, and pragmatics. Revista da Sociedade Brasileira de Historia da Ciência, 12, 73–98.Google Scholar
  174. Dascal, M. (1998). Types of polemics and types of polemical moves. In S. Cmejrkova, J. Hoffmannova, O. Mullerova, & J. Svetla (Eds.), Dialogue analysis, I (pp. 15–33). Tübingen: Niemeyer.Google Scholar
  175. Dascal, M. (2001). How rational can a polemic across the analytic-continental ‘divide’ be? International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 9(3), 313–339.Google Scholar
  176. Dascal, M. (2005). Debating with myself and debating with others. In P. Barrotta & M. Dascal (Eds.), Controversies and subjectivity (pp. 31–73). Amsterdam: John Benjamins (Portuguese transl. as ‘O auto-debate é possível? Dissolvendo alguns de seus supostos paradoxos’. Revista Internacional de Filosofia, 29(2), 319–349, 2006).Google Scholar
  177. Dascal, M. (2007). Traditions of controversy and conflict resolution. In M. Dascal & H. L. Chang (Eds.), Traditions of controversy. Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins.Google Scholar
  178. Dascal, M. (2008). Dichotomies and types of debate. In F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Controversy and confrontation. Relating controversy analysis with argumentation theory (pp. 27–49). Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins.Google Scholar
  179. Dascal, M. (2009). Dichotomies and types of debates. In F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Controversy and confrontation (pp. 27–49). Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins.Google Scholar
  180. Dascal, M., & Boantza, V. D. (Eds.). (2011). Controversies in the scientific revolution. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.Google Scholar
  181. Dascălu Jinga, L. (2002). Corpus de română vorbită (CORV). Eşantioane [Corpus of spoken Romanian (CORV). Samples]. Bucharest: Oscar Print.Google Scholar
  182. Dębowska, K. (2010). Model pragma-dialektyczny a rozumowanie abdukcyjne [The pragma-dialectical model and abductive reasoning]. Forum Artis Rhetoricae, 20–21(1–2), 96–124.Google Scholar
  183. Deimer, G. (1975). Argumentative Dialoge. Ein Versuch zu ihrer sprachwissenschaftlichen Beschreibung [Argumentative dialogue. An attempt at linguistic description]. Tübingen: Niemeyer.Google Scholar
  184. Demaître-Lahaye, C. (2011). De la représentation discursive à la communication dissuasive. Perspectives pragmatiques en matière de prévention du suicide [From discursive representation to dissuasive communication. Pragmatic perspectives on the prevention of suicide]. Saarbrücken: Éditions Universitaires Européennes.Google Scholar
  185. Deppermann, A., & Hartung, M. (2003). Argumentieren in Gesprächen [Argumentation in conversation]. Tübingen: Stauffenburg.Google Scholar
  186. Dias, A. (2008). O discurso da violência – As marcas da oralidade no jornalismo popular [The discourse of violence – The tokens of violence in popular journalism]. São Paulo: Cortez Editora.Google Scholar
  187. Dichy, J. (2003). Kinâya, a tropic device from medieval Arabic rhetoric, and its impact on discourse theory. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the 5th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 237–241). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  188. van Dijk, T. A. (2001). Multidisciplinary CDA. A plea for diversity. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of critical discourse analysis (pp. 95–120). London: Sage.Google Scholar
  189. Dimiškovska Trajanoska, A. (2001). Прагматиката и теоријата на аргументацијата [Pragmatics and argumentation theory]. Skopје: Djurgjа.Google Scholar
  190. Dimiškovska Trajanoska, A. (2006). Логиката, аргументацијата и јазикот. помеѓу аналитиката и дијалектиката [Logic, argumentation and language. Between analytics and dialectics], Филологические заметки/Филолошки студии/Filološke pripombe, 1(4), Пермский государстевенный университет, Россия, Институт за македонска литература, Скопје, Македонија, Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija, Пермь-Skopьe-Любляна, 103–119.Google Scholar
  191. Dimiškovska [Trajanoska], А. (2009). Субверзијата во аргументативниот дискурс и стратегии за справување со неа [Subversion in argumentative discourse and strategies for dealing with it]. Философија, 26(мај 2009), 93–111.Google Scholar
  192. Dimiškovska Trajanoska, А. (2010). The logical structure of legal justification: Dialogue or ‘trialogue’? In D. M. Gabbay, P. Canivez, S. Rahman, & A. Thiercelin (Eds.), Approaches to legal rationality (pp. 265–280). Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  193. Dimiškovska [Trajanoska], А. (2011). Truth and nothing but the truth? The argumentative use of fictions in legal reasoning. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 366–378). Amsterdam: Sic Sat. CD rom.Google Scholar
  194. Discini, N. (2008) Paixão e éthos [Passion and ethos]. In Anais do III Simpósio Internacional sobre análise do discurso: emoções, éthos e argumentação, III (pp. 1–9). Belo Horizonte: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais.Google Scholar
  195. Djidjian, R. (1992). Transformational analysis and inner argumentation. In J. Pietarinen (Ed.), Problems of philosophical argumentation, II, special problems. Turku: Turun Yliopisto.Google Scholar
  196. Dolinina, I. B. (1992). Change of scientific paradigms as an object of the theory of argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation illuminated (pp. 73–84). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  197. Dolinina, I. B. (2007). Arguments against/pro directives: Taxonomy. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 337–342). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  198. Douay-Soublin, F. (1990a). Non, la rhétorique française au 18e siècle n’est pas “restreinte” aux tropes [No, French rhetoric in the 18th century was not “restricted” to tropes]. Histoire Epistémologie Langage, 12(1), 123–132.Google Scholar
  199. Douay-Soublin, F. (1990b). “Mettre dans le jour d’apercevoir ce qui est.” Tropologie et argumentation chez Dumarsais [“Bring to light the world as it is.” Dumarsais’s tropology and argumentation]. In M. Meyer & A. Lempereur (Eds), Figures et Conflits Rhétoriques [Figures and rhetorical conflicts] (pp. 83–102). Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles.Google Scholar
  200. Douay-Soublin, F. (1994a). Y-a-t-il renaissance de la rhétorique en France au XIXe siècle? [Is there a revival of rhetoric in France in the 19th century?]. In S. I. Jsseling & G. Vervaecke (Eds.), Renaissances of rhetoric (pp. 51–154). Leuven: Leuven University Press.Google Scholar
  201. Douay-Soublin, F. (1994b). Les figures de rhétorique. Actualité, reconstruction, remploi [Rhetorical figures. Topicality, redevelopment, re-use]. Langue Française, 101, 13–25.Google Scholar
  202. Doury, M., Plantin, C., & Traverso.V. (Eds.). (2000). Les émotions dans les interactions [Emotions in interactions]. Lyon: PUL/ARCI.Google Scholar
  203. Doury M., & Traverso, V. (2000). Usage des énoncés généralisants dans la mise en scène de lignes argumentatives en situation d’entretien [The use of generalizing utterances in the production of lines of argument in a conversational context]. In G. Martel (Ed.), Autour de l’argumentation. Rationaliser l’expérience quotidienne [Around argumentation. Rationalising everyday experiences] (pp. 47–80). Québec: Editions Nota Bene.Google Scholar
  204. Drop, W., & Vries, J. H. L. de (1974). Taalbeheersing. Handboek voor taalhantering [Speech communication. Handbook of speech management]. Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff.Google Scholar
  205. Ducrot, O. (1986). Polifonía y argumentación [Polyphony and argumentation]. Cali: Facultad de Humanidades, Universidad de Cali.Google Scholar
  206. Ducrot, O., Bourcier, D., Bruxelles, S., Diller, A.-M., Foucquier, E., Gouazé, J., Maury, L., Nguyen, T. B., Nunes, G., Ragunet de Saint-Alban, L. Rémis, A., & Sirdar-Iskander, C. (1980). Les mots du discours [The words of discourse]. Paris: Minuit.Google Scholar
  207. Dufour, M. (2008). Argumenter [Arguing]. Paris: Armand Colin.Google Scholar
  208. Dufour, M. (2010). Explication scientifique et explication non scientifique [Scientific and non-scientific explanation]. In E. Bour & S. Roux (Eds.), Lambertiana (pp. 411–435). Paris: Vrin.Google Scholar
  209. Dumarsais, C. C. (1988). Des tropes, ou des différents sens [About tropes or about the different meanings]. In F. Douay-Soublin (Ed.). Paris: Flammarion.Google Scholar
  210. Dunin-Kęplicz, B., Strachocka, A., Szałas, A., & Verbrugge, R. (2012). A paraconsistent approach to speech acts. ArgMAS’2012: 9th International workshop on argumentation in multi-agent systems, pp. 59–78.Google Scholar
  211. Dunin-Kęplicz, B., & Verbrugge, R. (2010). Teamwork in multi-agent systems. A formal approach. Chichester: Wiley.Google Scholar
  212. Eabrasu, M. (2009). A reply to the current critiques formulated against Hoppe’s argumentation ethics. Libertarian Papers, 1(20), 1–29.Google Scholar
  213. Eco, U. (1987). Il messaggio persuasivo [The persuasive message]. In E. Mattioli (Ed.), Le ragioni della retorica (pp. 11–27). Modena: Mucchi.Google Scholar
  214. Engdahl, E., Glang, M., & O’Brien, A. The rhetoric of store-window mannequins. In F. Zenker (Ed.), Argumentation. Cognition and community. Proceedings of the 9 th international conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA). Windsor, ON. CD rom.Google Scholar
  215. Engelhardt, H. T., & Caplan, A. L. (Eds.). (1987). Scientific controversies. Case studies in the resolution and closure of disputes in science and technology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  216. Eriksson, L. (1998). Traditions of rhetorical proof. Pauline argumentation in 1 Corinthians. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. Doctoral dissertation, University of Lund, Lund.Google Scholar
  217. Evers, J. (1970). Argumentationsanalys för jurister [Argumentation analysis for lawyers]. Lund: Gleerups.Google Scholar
  218. Fairclough, N. (2001). Language and power (2nd ed.). London: Longman (1st ed. 1989).Google Scholar
  219. Fairclough, N. (2003). Analysing discourse. Textual analysis for social research. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  220. Fairclough, I., & Fairclough, N. (2012). Political discourse analysis. A method for advanced students. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  221. Faria, A. A. M. (2001). Interdiscurso, intradiscurso e leitura. O caso de Germinal [Interdiscourse, intradiscourse and reading. The case of Germinal]. In H. Mari, R. de Mello & I. L. Machado (Eds.). Análise do discurso. Fundamentos e práticas [Discourse analysis. Foundations and practices)]. Belo Horizonte: Núcleo de Análise do discurso - Faculdade de Letras da UFMG.Google Scholar
  222. Ferrari, A., & Manzin, M. (Eds.). (2004). La retorica fra scienza e professione legale. Questioni di metodo [Rhetoric between science and the legal profession. Methodological questions]. Milan: Guffrè.Google Scholar
  223. Ferraz Jr., T. S. (1997a). Direito, retórica e comunicação [Law, rhetoric and communication] (2nd ed.). São Paulo: Saraiva.Google Scholar
  224. Ferraz Jr., T. S. (1997b). Teoria da norma juridical. Ensaio de pragmática da comunicação normativa [Theory of legal norm. An essay on pragmatics of normative communication] (3rd ed.). Rio de Janeiro: Forense.Google Scholar
  225. Ferreira, A. (2008). On the role of pragmatics, rhetoric and dialectics in scientific controversies. In F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Controversy and confrontation. Relating controversy analysis with argumentation theory (pp. 125–133). Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins.Google Scholar
  226. Ferreira, A. (2009). On the role of pragmatics, rhetoric and dialectic in scientific controversies. In F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Controversy and confrontation (pp. 125–133). Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins.Google Scholar
  227. Ferreira, I., & Serra, P. (Eds.). (2011). Rhetoric and mediatisation, I: Proceedings of the 1st meeting on rhetoric at UBI. Covilhã: LabCom Books.Google Scholar
  228. Ferreira, L. A. (2010). Leitura e persuasão. Princípios de análise reórica [Reading and persuasion. Principles of rhetorical analysis]. São Paul: Contexto.Google Scholar
  229. Ferreira, L. A. (Ed.). (2012). A retórica do medo [The rhetoric of fear]. Franca: Cristal.Google Scholar
  230. Feteris, E. T. (1999). Fundamentals of legal argumentation. A survey of theories on the justification of judicial decisions. Dordrecht: Kluwer c. (trans. into Chinese (2005) & Spanish (2007)).Google Scholar
  231. Feteris, E. T. (2005). [Chinese title]. Beijing: Law department University of Central Finance and Economy. [trans.: Qi Yuhan of Feteris, E. T. (1999). Fundamentals of legal argumentation. A survey of theories on the justification of legal decisions. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic].Google Scholar
  232. Feteris, E. T. (2007). Fundamentos de la argumentación jurídica. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia. [trans.: Feteris, E. T. (1999). Fundamentals of legal argumentation. A survey of theories on the justification of legal decisions. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic].Google Scholar
  233. Filliettaz, L., & Roulet, E. (2002). The Geneva model of discourse analysis. An interactionist and modular approach to discourse organization. Discourse Studies, 4(3), 369–393.Google Scholar
  234. Focas, J. D. (2010). A ética do discurso como uma virada linguística [The ethics of discourse as a linguistic turn]. Revista Litteris, 4, 1–12.Google Scholar
  235. Føllesdal, D., Walloe L., & Elster J. (1986). Rationale Argumentation. Ein Grundkurs in Argumentations- und Wissenschafstheorie [Rational argumentation. An introduction in the theory of argumentation and science]. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter.Google Scholar
  236. Fontanier, P. (1968). Les figures du discours [The figures of discourse]. (Combined edition of the Manuel classique pour l’étude des tropes, 1821 and Des Figures du discours autres que les tropes, 1827). Paris: Flammarion.Google Scholar
  237. Forchtner, B., & Tominc, A. (2012). On the relation between the discourse-historical approach and pragma-dialectics. Journal of Language and Politics, 11(1), 31–50.Google Scholar
  238. Fowler, R., & Kress, G. (1979). Critical linguistics. In R. Fowler, B. Hodge, G. Kress, & T. Trew (Eds.), Language and control (pp. 185–214). London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  239. Freeman, J. B. (2011). The logical dimension of argumentation and its semantic appraisal in Bermejo-Luque’s Giving reasons. Theoria, 72, 289–299.Google Scholar
  240. Fritz, G. (2008). Communication principles for controversies. A historical perspective. In F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Controversy and confrontation. Relating controversy analysis with argumentation theory (pp. 109–124). Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins.Google Scholar
  241. Frixen, G. (1987). Struktur und Dynamik natürlichsprachlichen Argumentierens [Structure and dynamics of everyday argumentation]. Papiere zur Linguistik, 36, 45–111.Google Scholar
  242. Frumeșelu, M. D. (2007). Linguistic and argumentative typologies of concession. An integrating approach. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 425–431). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  243. Frydman, B., & Meyer, M. (Eds.). (2012). Chaïm Perelman (1912–2012) – De la nouvelle rhétorique à la logique juridique [Chaïm Perelman (1912–2012) – From the new rhetoric to the legal logic]. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.Google Scholar
  244. Fuentes, C., & Kalawski, A. (2007). Toward a ‘pragma-dramatic’ approach to argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 433–436). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  245. Gabrielsen, J. (2003). Is there a topical dimension to the rhetorical example? In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the fifth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 349–353). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  246. Gabrielsen, J. (2008). Topik. Ekskursioner i den retoriske toposlaere [Topica. Excursions into the rhetorical doctrine of topos]. Åstorp: Retoriksforlaget.Google Scholar
  247. Gabrielsen, J., Just, S. N., & Bengtsson, M. (2011). Concepts and contexts – Argumentative forms of framing. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 533–543). Amsterdam: Sic Sat. CD rom.Google Scholar
  248. Ganea, A. (2011). Strategically manoeuvring with reporting in the argumentation stage of a critical discussion. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 544–552). Amsterdam: Rozenberg-Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  249. Ganea, A. (2012). Evidentialité et argumentation. L’expression de la source de l’information dans le discours [Evidentiality and argumentation. Expressing the source of information in discourse]. Cluj-Napoca: Casa Cărţii de Ştiinţă.Google Scholar
  250. Ganea, A., & Gâţă, A. (2009). On the use of evidential strategies in Romanian. The case of cum că. Interstudia 2. Language, Discourse, Society, 3, 50–59.Google Scholar
  251. Ganea, A., & Gâţă, A. (2010). Identification and terming. Dissociation as strategic maneuvering in the Romanian public space. In S. N. Osu, G. Col, N. Garric & F. Toupin (Eds.), Construction d’identité et processus d’identification [Identity building and process(es) of identification] (pp. 109–121). Bern: Peter Lang.Google Scholar
  252. Garavelli, M. B. (1989). Manuale di retorica [Handbook of rhetoric]. Milan: Bompiani.Google Scholar
  253. Gaspar, A. (1998). Instituições da retórica forense [Institutions of forensic rhetoric]. Coimbra: Minerva.Google Scholar
  254. Gâţă, A. (2007). La dissociation argumentative. Composantes, mise en discours et ajustement stratégique [Argumentative dissociation. Constitutive elements, discourse structuring, and strategic maneuvering]. In V. Atayan & D. Pirazzini (Eds.), Argumentation. théorie – langue – discours. Actes de la section Argumentation du XXX. Congrès des Romanistes Allemands Vienne, septembre 2007 [Argumentation theory – language – discourse. Proceedings of the section Argumentation of the 30th Congress of German Romanists in Vienna, 3–18 September 2007] (pp. 3–18). Frankfurt am Main-Vienna: Peter Lang.Google Scholar
  255. Gâţă, A. (2010). Identification, dissociation argumentative et construction notionnelle [Identification, argumentative dissociation, and notional construction]. In S. N. Osu, G. Col, N. Garric & F. Toupin (Eds.), Construction d’identité et processusd’identification [Identity building and process(es) of identification] (pp. 469–482). Bern: Peter Lang.Google Scholar
  256. Gauthier, G. (2004). L’argumentation autour de l’élection présidentielle française de2002 dans la presse québécoise. L’application d’une approche analytique de l’argumentation [The argumentation concerning the French presidential elections of 2002 in the Quebec press. The application of an analytical approach to argumentation]. In P. Maarek (Ed.), La communication politique française après le tournant de 2002 [French political communication after the turning-point of 2002] (pp. 187–201). Paris: L’Harmattan.Google Scholar
  257. Gelang, M., & Kjeldsen, J. E. (2011). Nonverbal communication as argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 567–576). Amsterdam: Sic Sat. CD rom.Google Scholar
  258. Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping. A theoretical framework for analogy. Cognitive Science, 7, 155–170.Google Scholar
  259. Gerhardus, D., Kledzig, S. M., & Reitzig, G. H. (1975). Schlüssiges Argumentieren. Logisch Propädeutisches Lehr- und Arbeitsbuch [Sound arguing. Logical pre-school text book]. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.Google Scholar
  260. Gil, F. (Ed.). (1999). A ciência tal qual se faz [Science as it is made]. Lisbon: Ministério da Ciência e da Tecnologia/Edições Sá Costa.Google Scholar
  261. Gilardoni, A. (2008). Logica e argomentazione. Un prontuario [Logic and argumentation. A handbook] (3d ed.). Milan: Mimesis. (1st ed. 2005).Google Scholar
  262. Gol[o]ubev, V. (1999). Looking at argumentation through communicative intentions: Ways to define fallacies. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the fourth international conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 239–245). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  263. Golubev, V. (2001). American print media persuasion dialogue: An argumentation recipient’s perspective. In Pragmatics in 2000. Selected papers from the seventh international pragmatics conference, 2 (pp. 249–262). Antwerp: International Pragmatics Association.Google Scholar
  264. Golubev, V. (2002a). The 2000 American Presidential TV debate. Dialogue or fight? In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the fifth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 397–402). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  265. Golubev, V. (2002b). Argumentation dialogue in the American newspaper. An interdependence of discourse logical and communicative aspects. In G. T. Goodnight (Ed.), Arguing communication and culture, 2. Selected papers from the twelfth NCA/AFA conference on argumentation (pp. 75–83). National Communication Association.Google Scholar
  266. Golubev, V. (2007). Putin’s terrorism discourse as part of democracy and governance debate in Russia. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 471–477). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  267. Gómez, A. L. (2003). Argumentos y falacias [Argumentation and fallacies]. Cali: Editorial Facultad de Humanidades Universidad de Valle.Google Scholar
  268. Gómez, A. L. (2006). Seis lecciones sobre teoría de la argumentación [Six lectures on argumentation theory]. Cali: Editorial Alego.Google Scholar
  269. Goodman, N. (1976). Languages of art. An approach to a theory of symbols (2nd ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett. (1st ed. 1968).Google Scholar
  270. Goudkova, K. (2009). Kognitivno-pragmatichesky analiz argumentatsii v analiticheskoy gazetnoy statye [Cognitive-pragmatical analysis of argumentation of the analytical newspaper article]. Doctoral dissertation, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg.Google Scholar
  271. Goudkova, K. V., & Tretyakova, T. P. (2011). Binary oppositions in media argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference on argumentation of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 656–662). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  272. Grabnar, B. (1991). Retorika za vsakogar [Rhetoric for everyone]. Ljubljana: Državna založba SlovenijeGoogle Scholar
  273. Grácio, R. A. (1993). Perelman’s rhetorical foundation of philosophy. Argumentation, 7, 439–449.Google Scholar
  274. Grácio, R. A. (1998). Consequências da retórica. Para uma revalorização do múltiplo e do controverso [Consequences of rhetoric. Towards a revaluation of the multiple and the controversial]. Coimbra: Pé de Página.Google Scholar
  275. Grácio, R. A. (2010). A interacção argumentativa [The argumentative interaction]. Coimbra: Grácio Editor.Google Scholar
  276. Grácio, R. A. (2011). Para uma teoria geral da argumentação. Questões teóricas e aplicações didácticas [Towards a general argumentation theory. Theoretical questions and didactic applications]. Braga: Universidade do Minho. Doctoral dissertation, University of Minho, Minho.Google Scholar
  277. Grasso, F., & Paris, C. (2011). Preface to the special issue on personalization for e-health. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, 21, 333–340.Google Scholar
  278. Graver, H.-P. (2010). Rett, retorikk og juridisk argumentasjon. Keiserens garderobe og andre essays [Justice, rhetoric, and judicial argumentation. The emperor’s new clothes and other essays]. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.Google Scholar
  279. Grewendorf, G. (1975). Argumentation und Interpretation. Wissenschaftstheoretische Untersuchungen am Beispiel germanistischer Lyrikinterpretationen [Argumentation and interpretation. A study of interpretations of German poetry]. Kronberg: Scriptor.Google Scholar
  280. Grewendorf, G. (1980). Argumentation in der Sprachwissenschaft [Argumentation in linguistics]. Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik, 38(39), 129–151.Google Scholar
  281. Grinsted, A. (1991). Argumentative styles in Spanish and Danish negotiation interaction. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the second international conference on argumentation (organized by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation at the University of Amsterdam, June 19–22, 1990) (pp. 725–733). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  282. Groupe μ. (1970). Rhétorique générale. [A general rhetoric]. Paris: Éditions Larousse.Google Scholar
  283. Groupe μ. (1981). A general rhetoric (English translation of Rhétorique génerale (1970), Paris: Éditions Larousse). Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
  284. Groupe μ. (1992). Traité du signe visuel. Pour une rhétorique de l’image [Treatise on the visual sign. Towards a rhetoric of the image]. Paris: Le Seuil.Google Scholar
  285. Gruber, H. (1996). Streitgespräche. Zur Pragmatik einer Diskursform [Arguments. On the pragmatics of a form of discourse]. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.Google Scholar
  286. Guimarães, E. R. J. (1987). Texto e argumentação, semántica do acontecimento e história da semántica [Text and argumentation, semantic of the event and history of semantic]. Campinas: Pontes.Google Scholar
  287. Gulotta, G., & Puddu, L. (2004). La persuasione forense. Strategie e tattiche [Forensic persuasion. Strategies and tactics]. Milan: Giuffrè.Google Scholar
  288. Gunnarsson, M. (2006). Group decision making language and interaction (p. 32). Gothenburg: Gothenburg Monographs in Linguistics.Google Scholar
  289. Guseva, O. A. (2006). Ritoriko-argumentativnyje harakteristiki politicheskogo diskursa [Rhetorical-argumentative characteristics of political discourse]. Doctoral dissertation, Kaluga State University, Kaluga.Google Scholar
  290. Gutenberg, N. (1984). Hören und Beurteilen [Hearing and judging]. Frankfurt/Main: Scriptor.Google Scholar
  291. Gutenberg, N. (1987). Argumentation and dialectical logic. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation. Perspectives and approaches. Proceedings of the conference on argumentation 1986 (pp. 397–403). Dordrecht/Providence: Foris.Google Scholar
  292. Habermas, J. (1971). Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der Kommunikativen Kompetenz [Preliminary remarks on a theory of communicative competence]. In J. Habermas & H. Luhmann, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie. Was leistet die Systemforschung? [Theory of society or social technology. What can be gained by system theory?] (pp. 107–141). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.Google Scholar
  293. Habermas, J. (1973). Wahrheitstheorien [Theories of truth]. In H. Fahrenbach (Ed.), Wirklichkeit und Reflexion. Festschrift für Walter Schulz zum 60. Geburtstag [Reality and reflection. Festschrift for Walter Schulz in celebration of his 60th birthday] (pp. 211–265). Pfullingen: Günther Neske.Google Scholar
  294. Habermas, J. (1981). Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns [A theory of communicative action], Vols. I, II). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.Google Scholar
  295. Habermas, J. (1991). Moral consciousness and communicative action (English transl. of Moralbewusstsein un kommunikatives Handeln, 1983, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  296. Hahn, U., & Hornikx, J. (2012). Reasoning and argumentation. Special issue Thinking and Reasoning, 18(3).Google Scholar
  297. Hahn, U., Oaksford, M., Bonnefon, J.-F., & Harris, A. (2011). Argumentation, fallacies and reasoning biases. In B. Kokinov, A. Karmiloff-Smith, & N. J. Nersessian (Eds.), European perspectives on cognitive science. Proceedings of the European conference on cognitive science. Sofia: New Bulgarian University Press.Google Scholar
  298. Haidar, J. (2010). La argumentación. Problemática, modelos operativos [Argumentation: problems, operative models]. Documentacion en Ciencias de la Comunicacion ITESO-CONACYT, 1, 67–98.Google Scholar
  299. Hample, D., & Benoit, P. (1999). Must arguments be explicit and violent? A study of naïve social actors’ understandings. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the fourth international conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 306–310). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  300. Hample, D., & Dallinger, J. (1986). The judgment phase of invention. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation. Across the lines of discipline. Proceedings of the conference on argumentation 1986 (pp. 225–234). Dordrecht/Providence: Foris.Google Scholar
  301. Hample, D., & Dallinger, J. M. (1987). Cognitive editing of argument strategies. Human Communication Research, 14, 123–144.Google Scholar
  302. Hample, D., & Dallinger, J. M. (1991). Cognitive editing of arguments and interpersonal construct differentiation. Refining the relationship. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the second international conference on argumentation (organized by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation at the University of Amsterdam, June 19–22, 1990) (pp. 567–574). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  303. Hample, D., Paglieri, F., & Na, L. (2011). The costs and benefits of arguing. Predicting the decision whether to engage or not. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 718–732). Amsterdam: Rozenberg-Sic Sat. CD rom.Google Scholar
  304. Hannken-Illjes, K. (2006). In the field. The development of reasons in criminal proceedings. Argumentation, 20(3), 309–325.Google Scholar
  305. Hannken-Illjes, K. (2007). Undoing premises. The interrelation of argumentation and narration in criminal proceedings. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 569–573). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  306. Hannken-Illjes, K. (2011). The absence of reasons. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the seventh conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 733–737). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  307. Harada, E. (Ed.). (2011). Pensar, razonar y argumentar [Thinking, reasoning, and arguing]. Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.Google Scholar
  308. Hasanbegović, J. (1988). Perelmanova pravna logika kao nova retorika [Perelman’s legal logic as new rhetoric] (pp. 1–118). Beograd: Biblioteka Izazovi.Google Scholar
  309. Hastings, A. C. (1962). A reformulation of the modes of reasoning in argumentation. Doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston.Google Scholar
  310. Hatim, B. (1990). A model of argumentation from Arabic rhetoric. Insights for a theory of text types. Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies), 17(1), 47–54.Google Scholar
  311. Hatim, B. (1991). The pragmatics of argumentation in Arabic. The rise and fall of a text type. Text – Interdisciplinary Journal for the Study of Discourse, 11(2), 189–199.Google Scholar
  312. Hazen, M. D. (1982). Report on the 1980 United States debate tour of Japan. Journal of the American Forensic Association, 5, 9–26.Google Scholar
  313. Hendricks, V. F. (2007). Tal en tanke [Language and thought]. Copenhagen: Forlaget Samfundslitteratur.Google Scholar
  314. Hendricks, V. F., Elvang-Gøransson, M., & Pedersen, S. A. (1995). Systems of argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Reconstruction and application. Proceedings of the third international conference on argumentation, III (pp. 351–367). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  315. Herbig, A. F. (1992). ‘Sie argumentieren doch scheinheilig!’ Sprach- und sprechwissenschaftliche Aspekte einer Stilistik des Argumentierens [“You are arguing hypocritically!” Linguistic aspects of a stylistics of argumentation]. Bern: Peter Lang.Google Scholar
  316. Herman, T. (2005). L’analyse de l’ethos oratoire [The analysis of oratorical ethos]. In P. Lane (Ed.), Des discours aux texte: Modèles d’analyse [From discourse to text: Models of analysis] (pp. 157–182). Rouen/Le Havre: Presses Universitaires de Rouen et du Havre.Google Scholar
  317. Herman, T. (2008a). Narratio et argumentation [Narration and argumentation]. In E. Danblon (Ed), Argumentation et narration [Argumentation and narration]. Brussels: Université Libre de Bruxelles.Google Scholar
  318. Herman, T. (2008b). Au fil du discours. La rhétorique de Charles de Gaulle (1940–1945) [As the discourse unfolds itself. The rhetoric of Charles de Gaulle (1940–1945)]. Limoges: Lambert Lucas.Google Scholar
  319. Herman, T. (2011). Le courant du Critical Thinking et l’évidence des normes [The Critical Thinking movement and the self-evidence of norms]. A Contrario, 2(16), 41–62.Google Scholar
  320. Hietanen, M. (2002). Profetian är primärt inte för de otrogna. En argumentationsanalys av 1 Kor 14:22b [Prophecy is primarily not for the unbelievers. An argumentation analysis of 1 Corinthians 14:22b]. Svensk Exegetisk Årsbok, 67, 89–104.Google Scholar
  321. Hietanen, M. (2003). Paul’s argumentation in Galatians 3.6-14. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the fifth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 477–483). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  322. Hietanen, M. (2007a). Paul’s argumentation in Galatians. A pragma-dialectical analysis. London: T&T Clark.Google Scholar
  323. Hietanen, M. (2007b). Retoriken vid Finlands universitet [Rhetoric in Finnish universities]. Finsk tidskrift, 9–10, 522–536.Google Scholar
  324. Hietanen, M. (2007c). The gospel of Matthew as an argument. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 607–613). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  325. Hietanen, M. (2010). Suomalainen työläisretoriikka Kaurismäen mukaan – puhe- ja argumentaatiokulttuuri Varjoja paratiisissa [Finnish working-class rhetoric according to Kaurismäki. The culture of argumentation in Shadows in paradise]. Lähikuva, 23(2), 68–82.Google Scholar
  326. Hietanen, M. (2011a). ‘Mull’ on niinku viesti jumalalta’ – Vakuuttamisen strategiat Nokia Missionherätysretoriikassa [“I have like a message from God”. Persuasive strategies in the revival rhetoric of Nokia Missio]. Teologinen aikakauskirja, 116(2), 109–122.Google Scholar
  327. Hietanen, M. (2011b). The gospel of Matthew as a literary argument. Argumentation, 25(1), 63–86.Google Scholar
  328. Hintikka, J. (1989). The role of logic in argumentation. The Monist, 72, 3–24. Reprinted in Hintikka, J. (1999). Inquiry as inquiry. A logic of scientific discovery (Jaakko Hintikka Selected Papers, 5; pp. 25–46). Dordrecht: Kluwer.Google Scholar
  329. Hintikka, J., & Bachman, J. (1991). What if …? Toward excellence in reasoning. Mountain View: Mayfield Publishing Company.Google Scholar
  330. Hirsch, R. (1987). Interactive argumentation. Ideal and real. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation. Perspectives and approaches. Proceedings of the conference on argumentation 1986 (pp. 434–441). Dordrecht/Providence: Foris.Google Scholar
  331. Hirsch, R. (1989). Argumentation, information and interaction. Gothenburg: Department of Linguistics, University of Göteborg.Google Scholar
  332. Hirsch, R. (1991). Belief and interactive argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the second international conference on argumentation (organized by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation at the University of Amsterdam, June 19–22, 1990) (pp. 591–603). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  333. Hirsch, R. (1995). Desiderata for the representation of process and product in face-to-face interactive argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Analysis and evaluation. Proceedings of the third ISSA conference on argumentation (University of Amsterdam, June 21–24, 1994), II (pp. 68–78). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  334. Hitchcock, D. L. (2011a). Arguing as trying to show that a target-claim is correct. Theoria, 72, 301–309.Google Scholar
  335. Hoeken, H. (2001). Anecdotal, statistical, and causal evidence. Their perceived and actual persuasiveness. Argumentation, 15, 425–437.Google Scholar
  336. Hoeken, H., & Hustinx, L. (2009). When is statistical evidence superior to anecdotal evidence in supporting probability claims? The role of argument type. Human Communication Research, 35, 491–510.Google Scholar
  337. Hoeken, H., Timmers, R., & Schellens, P. J. (2012). Arguing about desirable consequences. What constitutes a convincing argument? Thinking & Reasoning, 18(3), 225–416.Google Scholar
  338. Hoffnagel, J. C. (2010). Temas em antropologia e linguística [Topics in anthropology and linguistics]. Recife: Bagaço.Google Scholar
  339. Hołówka, T. (2005). Kultura logiczna w przykładach [Logical culture in examples]. Warsaw: PWN.Google Scholar
  340. Hommerberg, C. (2011). Persuasiveness in the discourse of wine. The rhetoric of Robert Parker. Gothenburg: Linnaeus University Press. Linnaeus University dissertations 71/2011.Google Scholar
  341. Hoppmann, M. (2012). Review of Harald Wohlrapp’s ‘Der Begriff des Arguments’. Argumentation, 26(2), 297–304.Google Scholar
  342. Hornikx, J. M. A. (2005). Cultural differences in persuasiveness of evidence types in France and the Netherlands. Doctoral dissertation University of Nijmegen, Nijmegen.Google Scholar
  343. Hornikx, J., & de Best, J. (2011). Persuasive evidence in India. An investigation of the impact of evidence type and evidence quality. Argumentation and Advocacy, 47, 246–257.Google Scholar
  344. Hornikx, J., & Hoeken, H. (2007). Cultural differences in the persuasiveness of evidence types and evidence quality. Communication Monographs, 74(4), 443–463.Google Scholar
  345. Houtlosser, P. (1998). Points of view. Argumentation, 12, 387–405.Google Scholar
  346. Hovhannisian, H. (2006). Yerevan school of argumentation on the threshold of the 21st century. The problem of foundation. News and Views, 12.Google Scholar
  347. Hu, Z. (1995). An evidentialistic analysis of reported argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Perspectives and approaches. Proceedings of the third ISSA conference on argumentation (University of Amsterdam, June 21–24, 1994) (pp. 102–119). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  348. Huerta, M. (2009). Diagnóstico de las representaciones estudiantiles en textos escritos, construcción del otro en alumnos del Plantel Naucalpan del CCH, propuesta didáctica para abordar el texto argumentativo [Diagnosis of students’ representations in written texts, construction of the Otherness in students of Plantel Naucalpan of CCH. Didactic proposal to analyze the argumentative text]. Doctoral dissertation, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico.Google Scholar
  349. Hultén, P., Hultman, J., & Eriksson, L. T. (2009). Kritiskt tänkande [Critical thinking]. Malmö: Liber.Google Scholar
  350. Ieţcu, I. (2006). Discourse analysis and argumentation theory. Analytical framework and applications. Bucharest: Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti.Google Scholar
  351. Ieţcu-Fairclough, I. (2008). Branding and strategic maneuvering in the Romanian presidential election of 2004. A critical discourse-analytical and pragma-dialectical perspective. Journal of Language and Politics, 7(3), 372–390.Google Scholar
  352. Ieţcu-Fairclough, I. (2009). Legitimation and strategic maneuvering in the political field. In F. H. van Eemeren (Ed.), Examining argumentation in context. Fifteen studies on strategic maneuvering (pp. 131–151). Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins.Google Scholar
  353. Ieţcu-Preoteasa, I. (2006). Dialogue, argumentation and ethical perspective in the essays of H.-R. Patapievici. Bucharest: Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti.Google Scholar
  354. Ihnen Jory, C. (2012a). Instruments to evaluate pragmatic argumentation. A pragma-dialectical perspective. In F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Topical themes in argumentation theory. Twenty exploratory studies (pp. 143–159). Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  355. Ihnen Jory, C. (2012b). Pragmatic argumentation in law-making debates. Instruments for the analysis and evaluation of pragmatic argumentation at the second reading of the British parliament. Amsterdam: Sic Sat-Rozenberg. Doctoral dissertation University of Amsterdam.Google Scholar
  356. Ihnen [Jory], C., & Richardson, J. E. (2011). On combining pragma-dialectics with critical discourse analysis. In E. Feteris, B. Garssen, & F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Keeping in touch with pragma-dialectics. In honor of Frans H. van Eemeren (pp. 231–243). Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins. (Republished as Ihnen [Jory], C., & Richardson, J. E. (2012). On combining pragma-dialectics with critical discourse analysis. In R. Wodak (Ed.), Critical discourse analysis. Newbury Park: Sage).Google Scholar
  357. Ilie, C. (1994). What else can I tell you? A pragmatic study of English rhetorical questions as discursive and argumentative acts. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.Google Scholar
  358. Ilie, C. (1995). The validity of rhetorical questions as arguments in the courtroom. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Special fields and cases. Proceedings of the third ISSA conference on argumentation (University of Amsterdam, June 21–24, 1994), IV (pp. 73–88). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  359. Ilie, C. (2007). Argument refutation through definitions and re-definitions. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 667–674). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  360. Ilie, C., & Hellspong, L. (1999). Arguing from clichés. Communication and miscommunication. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the fourth international conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 386–391). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  361. Inbar, M. (1999). Argumentation as rule-justified claims. Elements of a conceptual framework for the critical analysis of argument. Argumentation, 13(1), 27–42.Google Scholar
  362. Ionescu Ruxăndoiu, L. (2008). Discursive perspective and argumentation in the Romanian parliamentary discourse. A cased study. L’analisi linguistica e letteraria, 16, 435–441.Google Scholar
  363. Ionescu Ruxăndoiu, L. (2010). Straightforward vs. mitigated impoliteness in the Romanian parliamentary discourse. The case of in absentia impoliteness. Revue Roumaine de Linguistique [Romanian Journal of Linguistics], 4, 243–351.Google Scholar
  364. Ishii, D. (1992). Buddhist preaching. The persistent main undercurrent of Japanese traditional rhetorical communication. Communication Quarterly, 40, 391–397.Google Scholar
  365. Itaba, Y. (1995). Reconstructing Japanese rhetorical strategies. A study of foreign-policy discourse during the pre-Perry period, 1783–1853. Twin Cities: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
  366. Iversen, S. M. (2010). Logik og argumentationsteori [Logic and argumentation theory]. Aarhus: Systime.Google Scholar
  367. Ivin, A. (1997). Osnovy teorii argumentatsii [The basics of argumentation theory]. Moscow: Vlados.Google Scholar
  368. Iwashita, M. (1973). The principles of debate. Tokyo: Gakushobo.Google Scholar
  369. Jacquin, J. (2012). L’argumentation de Georges Pompidou face à la crise. Une analyse textuelle des allocutions des 11 et 16 mai 1968 [George Pompidou’s argumentation during the crisis. A textual analysis of the speeches given between 11 and 16 May 1968]. Sahrbrücken: Éditions Universitaires européennes.Google Scholar
  370. Jaśkowski, S. (1948) Rachunek zdań dla systemów dedukcyjnych sprzecznych [Propositional calculus for contradictory deductive systems]. Studia Societatis Scientiarum Torunensis, Sect. A. 1, 5, 57–77. [English trans. in Studia Logica, 24 (1969), pp. 143–160].Google Scholar
  371. Jelvez, L. (2008). Esquemas argumentativos en textos escritos. Un estudio descriptivo en alumnos de tercero medio de dos establecimientos de Valparaíso [Argumentative schemes in written texts. A descriptive study of third-grade pupils of two schools in Valparaíso]. Cyber Humanitatis 45.
  372. Johannesson, K. (1990). Retorik – eller konsten att övertyga [Rhetoric – or the art of persuasion]. Stockholm: Norstedts.Google Scholar
  373. Johansen, A., & Kjeldsen, J. E. (2005). Virksomme ord. Politiske taler 1814–2005 [Working word. Political speeches 1814–2005]. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.Google Scholar
  374. Jørgensen, C. (1995). Hostility in public debate. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Special fields and cases. Proceedings of the third ISSA conference on argumentation (University of Amsterdam, June 21–24, 1994), III (pp. 363–373). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  375. Jørgensen, C. (2003). The Mytilene debate. A paradigm for deliberative rhetoric. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the fifth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 567–570). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  376. Jørgensen, C. (2007). The relevance of intention in argumentation. Argumentation, 21(2), 165–174.Google Scholar
  377. Jørgensen, C. (2009). Interpreting Perelman’s universal audience. Gross versus Crosswhite. Argumentation, 23(1), 11–19.Google Scholar
  378. Jørgensen, C. (2011). Fudging speech acts in political argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 906–913). Amsterdam: Sic Sat. CD rom.Google Scholar
  379. Jørgensen, C., & Kock, C. (1999). The rhetorical audience in public debate and the strategies of vote-gathering and vote-shifting. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the fourth international conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 420–423). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  380. Jørgensen, C., Kock, C., & Rørbach, L. (1994). Retorik der flytter stemmer. Hvordan man overbeviser I offentlig debat [Rhetoric that shifts votes. How to persuade in public debates]. Ödåkra: Retorikforlaget. 2nd ed., 2011.Google Scholar
  381. Jørgensen, C., Kock, C., & Rørbach, L. (1998). Rhetoric that shifts votes. An exploratory study of persuasion in issue-oriented public debates. Political Communication, 15(3), 283–299.Google Scholar
  382. Jovičič, T. (2003a). Evaluation of argumentative strategies. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the fifth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 571–580). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  383. Jovičič, T. (2003b). New concepts for argument evaluation. In J. A. Blair, D. Farr, H. V. Hansen, R. H. Johnson, & C. W. Tindale (Eds.), Informal logic @ 25: Proceedings of the Windsor conference. Windsor, ON: Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation.Google Scholar
  384. Ju, S. (2010). The cultural relativity of logic. Social sciences in China, 31(4), 73–89.Google Scholar
  385. Just, S. (2003). Rhetorical criticism of the debate on the future of the European Union. Strategic options and foundational understandings. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the fifth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 581–586). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  386. Juthe, A. (2005). Argument by analogy. Argumentation, 19(1), 1–27.Google Scholar
  387. Juthe, A. (2009). Refutation by parallel argument. Argumentation, 23(2), 133–169.Google Scholar
  388. Kakkuri-Knuuttila, M.-L. (1993). Dialectic and enquiry in Aristotle., Helsinki School of Econmics, Helsinki.Google Scholar
  389. Kakkuri-Knuuttila, M.-L. (Ed.), (1998). Argumentti ja kritiikki. Lukemisen, keskustelun ja vakuuttamisen taidot [Argument and critique. The skills of reading, discussing and persuading]. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. 7th ed., 2007.Google Scholar
  390. Kalashnikova, S. (2007). Lingvisticheskiye aspekty stiley myshleniya v argumentativnom diskurse [Linguistic aspects of thinking styles in argumentative discourse]. Doctoral dissertation, Kaluga State University, Kaluga.Google Scholar
  391. Kamiński, S. (1962). Systematyzacja typowych błędów logicznych [A classification of typical logical fallacies]. Roczniki Filozoficzne, 10(1), 5–39.Google Scholar
  392. Kanke, T. (2007). Reshaping Emperor Hirohito’s persona. A study of fragmented arguments in multiple texts. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the 6th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 733–738). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  393. Kanke, T., & Morooka, J. (2011). Youth debates in early modern Japan. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 914–926). Amsterdam: Sic Sat. CD rom.Google Scholar
  394. Kasyanova, J. (2008). Strukturno-semanticheskij analiz argumentatsii v monologicheskom diskurse [A structural-semantic analysis of argumentation in a monological discourse]. Doctoral dissertation, Udmurt State University, Izhevsk.Google Scholar
  395. Kennedy, G. (1999). Classical rhetoric & its Christian and secular tradition. From ancient to modern times (2 revised enlargedth ed.). Chapel Hill/London: The University of North Carolina Press.Google Scholar
  396. Kertész, A., & Rákosi, C. (2009). Cyclic vs. circular argumentation in the conceptual metaphor theory. Cognitive Linguistics, 20, 703–732.Google Scholar
  397. Kienpointner, M. (1991). Argumentation in Germany and Austria. An overview of the recent literature. Informal Logic, 8(3), 129–136.Google Scholar
  398. Kienpointner, M. (1992). Alltagslogik. Struktur und Funktion vom Argumentationsmustern [Everyday logic. Structure and function of argumentative patterns]. Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.Google Scholar
  399. Kienpointner, M. (1993). The empirical relevance of Ch. Perelman’s new rhetoric. Argumentation, 7(4), 419–437.Google Scholar
  400. Kienpointner, M. (1996). Whorf and Wittgenstein. Language, world view and argumentation. Argumentation, 10(4), 475–494.Google Scholar
  401. Kindt, W. (1988). Zur Logik von Alltagsargumentationen [On the logic of everyday argumentation]. Fachbericht 3 Erziehungswissenschaftliche Hochschule Koblenz. Koblenz: Hochschule Koblenz.Google Scholar
  402. Kindt, W. (1992a). Organisationsformen des Argumentierens in natürlicher Sprache [The organisation of argumentation in everyday speech]. In H. Paschen & L. Wigger (Eds.), Pädagogisches Argumentieren [Educational argumentation] (pp. 95–120). Weinheim: Deutscher Studienverlag.Google Scholar
  403. Kindt, W. (1992b). Argumentation und Konfliktaustragung in Äusserungen über den Golfkrieg [Argumentation and conflict resolution in statements on the Gulf War]. Zeitschrift für Sprachwissenschaft, 11, 189–215.Google Scholar
  404. Kiseliova, V.V. (2006). Varyirovaniye verbalnyh reaktsij v argumentativnom diskurse [Variability of verbal reactions in argumentative discourse]. Doctoral dissertation, Udmurt State University, Izhevsk.Google Scholar
  405. Kišiček, G., & Stanković, D. (2011). Analysis of fallacies in Croatian parliamentary debate. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 939–948). Amsterdam: Sic Sat. CD rom.Google Scholar
  406. Kjeldsen, J. E. (1999a). Visual rhetoric. From elocutio to inventio. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the fourth international conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 455–463). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  407. Kjeldsen, J. E. (1999b). Retorik i Norge. Et retorisk øy-rike [Rhetoric in Norway. A rhetorical island-kingdom]. Rhetorica Scandinavica, 12, 63–72.Google Scholar
  408. Kjeldsen, J. E. (2002). Visual rhetoric. Doctoral dissertation, University of Bergen, Bergen: Universitetet i Bergen.Google Scholar
  409. Kjeldsen, J. E. (2007). Visual argumentation in Scandinavian political advertising. A cognitive, contextual, and reception oriented approach. Argumentation & Advocacy, 42(3/4), 124–132.Google Scholar
  410. Kjeldsen, J. E. (2011a). Visual argumentation in an Al Gore keynote presentation on climate change. In F. Zenker (Ed.), Argumentation. Cognition and community. Proceedings of the 9th international conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA) (pp. 1–11). Windsor, ON. CD rom.Google Scholar
  411. Kjeldsen, J. E. (2011b). Visual tropes and figures as visual argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Topical themes in argumentation theory. Twenty exploratory studies. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  412. Kjeldsen, J. E., & Grue, J. (2011). The study of rhetoric in the Scandinavian countries. In J. E. Kjeldsen & J. Grue (Eds.), Scandinavian studies in rhetoric (pp. 7–39). Ödåkra: Retorikförlaget.Google Scholar
  413. Klein, J. (1987). Die konklusiven Sprechhandlungen. Studien zur Pragmatik, Semantik, Syntax und Lexik von Begründen, Erklären-warum, Folgern und Rechtfertigen [Conclusive speech acts. Studies of the pragmatic, semantic, syntactic and lexical aspects of supporting, explaining why, concluding, and justifying]. Tübingen: Niemeyer.Google Scholar
  414. Kline, S. L. (1995). Influence opportunities and persuasive argument practices in childhood. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the third ISSA conference on argumentation (pp. 261–275). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  415. Klopf, D. (1973). Winning debate. Tokyo: Gakushobo.Google Scholar
  416. Kluev, E. (1999). Ritorika. Inventsiya, dispozitsiya, elocutsiya [Rhetoric. Invention, disposition, elocution]. Moscow: Prior.Google Scholar
  417. Klujeff, M. L. (2008). Retoriske figurer og stil som argumentation [Rhetorical figures and style as argumentation]. Rhetorica Scandinavica, 45, 25–48.Google Scholar
  418. Koch, I. G. V. (1984). Argumentação e linguagem [Argumentation and language]. São Paulo: Cortez.Google Scholar
  419. Kock, C. (2003). Gravity too is relative: On the logic of deliberative debate. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the fifth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 628–632). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  420. Kock, C. (2007a). Is practical reasoning presumptive? Informal Logic, 27, 91–108.Google Scholar
  421. Kock, C. (2007b). Norms of legitimate dissensus. Informal Logic, 27(2), 179–196.Google Scholar
  422. Kock, C. (2007c). The domain of rhetorical argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 785–788). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  423. Kock, C. (2009a). Arguing from different types of speech acts. In J. Ritola (Ed.), Argument cultures. Proceedings of the 8th OSSA conference at the University of Windsor in 2009. Windsor, ON: University of Windsor. CD rom.Google Scholar
  424. Kock, C. (2009b). Choice is not true or false: The domain of rhetorical argumentation. Argumentation, 23(1), 61–80.Google Scholar
  425. Kolflaath, E. (2004). Språk og argumentasjon – med eksempler fra juss [Language and argumentation – with examples from law]. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.Google Scholar
  426. Komlósi, L. I. (1990). The power and fallability of a paradigm in argumentation. A case study of subversive political discourse. In F. H. van Eemeren & R. Grootendorst (Eds.), Proceedings of the second international conference on argumentation (pp. 994–1005). Amsterdam: Sic Sat-ISSA.Google Scholar
  427. Komlósi, L. I. (1997). Inferential pragmatics and cognitive structures. Situated language use and cognitive linguistics. Budapest: Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó.Google Scholar
  428. Komlósi, L. I. (2003). The conceptual fabric of argumentation and blended mental spaces. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & A. F. Snoeck-Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the fifth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 632–635). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  429. Komlósi, L. I. (2006). Rhetorical effects of entrenched argumentation and presumptive arguments. A four-handed piece for George W. Bush and Tony Blair. In F. H. van Eemeren, M. D. Hazen, P. Houtlosser, & D. C. Williams (Eds.), Contemporary perspectives on argumentation. Views from the Venice argumentation conference (pp. 239–257). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  430. Komlósi, L. I. (2007). Perelman’s vision. Argumentation schemes as examples of generic conceptualization in everyday reasoning practices. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 789–796). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  431. Komlósi, L. I. (2008). From paradoxes to presumptive fallacies. The way we reason with counter-factual mental spaces. In J. Andor, B. Hollósy, T. Laczkó, & P. Pelyvás (Eds.), When grammar minds language and literature (pp. 285–292). Debrecen: Debrecen University Press.Google Scholar
  432. Komlósi, L. I., & Knipf, E. (1987). Negotiating consensus in discourse interaction schemata. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation. Perspectives and approaches (pp. 82–89). Dordrecht: Foris.Google Scholar
  433. Komlósi, L. I., & Tarrósy, I. (2010). Presumptive arguments turned into a fallacy of presumptuousness. Pre-election debates in a democracy of promises. Journal of Pragmatics, 42, 957–972.Google Scholar
  434. Konishi, T. (2007). Conceptualizing and evaluating dissociation from an informal logical perspective. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the 6th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 797–802). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  435. Kopperschmidt, J. (1975). Pro und Contra im Fernsehen [Pro and contra on television]. Der Deutschunterricht, 27, 42–62.Google Scholar
  436. Kopperschmidt, J. (1976a). Allgemeine Rhetorik. Einführung in die Theorie der persuasiven Kommunikation [General rhetoric. Introduction to the theory of persuasive communication]. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.Google Scholar
  437. Kopperschmidt, J. (1976b). Methode statt Appell. Versuch einer Argumentationsanalyse [Method instead of appeal. An attempt at argument analysis]. Der Deutschunterricht, 28, 37–58.Google Scholar
  438. Kopperschmidt, J. (1977). Von der Kritik der Rhetorik zur kritischen Rhetorik [From criticism of rhetoric to a critical rhetoric]. In H. F. Plett (Ed.), Rhetorik. Kritische Positionen zum Stand der Forschung [Rhetoric. A critical survey of the state of the art] (pp. 213–29). München: Fink.Google Scholar
  439. Kopperschmidt, J. (1978). Das Prinzip vernünftiger Rede [Principles of rational speech]. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.Google Scholar
  440. Kopperschmidt, J. (1980). Argumentation [Argumentation]. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.Google Scholar
  441. Kopperschmidt, J. (1987). The function of argumentation. A pragmatic approach. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation. Across the lines of discipline. Proceedings of the conference on argumentation 1986 (pp. 179–188). Dordrecht/Providence: Foris.Google Scholar
  442. Kopperschmidt, J. (1989a). Methodik der Argumentationsanalyse [Methodology of argumentation analysis]. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.Google Scholar
  443. Kopperschmidt, J. (1989b). Öffentliche Rede in Deutschland [Public speaking in Germany]. Muttersprache, 99, 213–230.Google Scholar
  444. Kopperschmidt, J. (1990). Gibt es Kriterien politischer Rhetorik? Versuch einer Antwort [Do criteria for political rhetoric exist? A tentative answer]. Diskussion Deutsch, 115, 479–501.Google Scholar
  445. Kopperschmidt, J. (1995). Grundfragen einer allgemeinen Argumentationstheorie unter besonderer Berücksichtigung formaler Argumentationsmuster [Fundamental questions for a general theory of argumentation arising from an analysis of formal patterns of argumentation]. In H. Wohlrapp (Ed.), Wege der Argumentationsforschung [Roads of argumentation research] (pp. 50–73). Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.Google Scholar
  446. Kopperschmidt, J. (Ed.), (1990). Rhetorik, 1. Rhetorik als Texttheorie [Rhetoric, 1. Rhetoric as a theory of text]. Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchgesellschaft.Google Scholar
  447. Kopperschmidt, J. (Ed.), (1991). Rhetorik, 2. Wirkungsgeschichte der Rhetorik [Rhetoric, 2. A history of effective rhetoric]. Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchgesellschaft.Google Scholar
  448. Kopperschmidt, J. (Ed.), (2006) Die neue Rhetorik. Studien zu Chaim Perelman [The new rhetoric. Studies on Chaim Perelman]. Paderborn/München: Fink.Google Scholar
  449. Korolko, M. (1990). Sztuka retoryki [The art of rhetoric]. Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna.Google Scholar
  450. Korta, K., & Garmendia, J. (Eds.). (2008). Meaning, intentions and argumentation. Stanford: CSLI Publications.Google Scholar
  451. Koszowy, M. (2004). Methodological ideas of the Lvov-Warsaw School as a possible foundation for a fallacy theory. In T. Suzuki, Y. Yano, & T. Kato (Eds.), Proceedings of the 2nd Tokyo conference on argumentation and social cognition (pp. 125–130). Tokyo: Japan Debate Association.Google Scholar
  452. Koszowy, M. (2011). Pragmatic logic. The study of argumentation in the Lvov-Warsaw School. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference on argumentation of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 1010–1022). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  453. Koszowy, M. (2013). The methodological approach to argument evaluation. Rules of defining as applied to assessing arguments. Filozofia nauki, 1(81), 23–36.Google Scholar
  454. Kraus, M. (2006). Arguing by question. A Toulminian reading of Cicero’s account of the enthymeme. In D. Hitchcock & B. Verheij (Eds.), Arguing on the Toulmin model. New essays in argument analysis and evaluation (pp. 313–325). Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  455. Kraus, M. (2007). From figure to argument. Contrarium in Roman rhetoric. Argumentation, 21(1), 3–19.Google Scholar
  456. Kraus, M. (2012). Cultural diversity, cognitive breaks, and deep disagreement. Polemic argument. In F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Topical themes in argumentation theory. Twenty exploratory studies. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  457. Kurki, L., & Tomperi, T. (2011). Väittely opetusmenetelmänä – Kriittinen ajattelu, argumentaatio ja retoriikka käytännössä [Debate as a teaching method. Critical thinking, argumentation and rhetorics in practice]. Tampere: Niin &Näin/Eurooppalaisen filosofian seura.Google Scholar
  458. Kusch, M., & Schröder, H. (Eds.). (1989). Text – Interpretation – Argumentation. Hamburg: Helmut Buske.Google Scholar
  459. Kutrovátz, G. (2008). Rhetoric of science, pragma-dialectics, and science studies. In F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Controversy and confrontation. Relating controversy analysis with argumentation theory (pp. 231–247). Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins.Google Scholar
  460. Kutrovátz, G. (2010). Trust in experts. Contextual patterns of warranted epistemic dependence. Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 1, 57–68.Google Scholar
  461. Kvernbekk, T. (2003a). Narratives as informal arguments. In J. A. Blair, D. Farr, H. V. Hansen, R. H. Johnson, & C. W. Tindale (Eds.), Informal logic @ 25: Proceedings of the Windsor conference. Windsor, ON: Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation.Google Scholar
  462. Kvernbekk, T. (2003b). On the argumentative quality of explanatory narratives. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the fifth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 651–657). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  463. Kvernbekk, T. (2007a). Argumentation practice. The very idea. In J. A. Blair, H. Hansen, R. Johnson, & C. Tindale (Eds.), OSSA proceedings 2007. Windsor, ON: University of Windsor. CD rom.Google Scholar
  464. Kvernbekk, T. (2007b). Theory and practice. A metatheoretical contribution. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 841–846). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  465. Kvernbekk, T. (2009). Theory and practice. Gap or equilibrium. In J. Ritola (Ed.), Argument cultures. Proceedings of the 8th OSSA conference at the University of Windsor in 2009. Windsor, ON: University of Windsor. CD rom.Google Scholar
  466. Kvernbekk, T. (2011). Evidence-based practice and Toulmin. In F. Zenker (Ed.), Argumentation. Cognition and community. Proceedings of the 9th international conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA). Windsor, ON. CD rom.Google Scholar
  467. Lanzadera, M., García, F., Montes, S., & Valadés, J. (2007). Argumentación y razonar. Cómo enseñar y evaluar la capacidad de argumentar [Argumentation and reasoning. How to teach and evaluate the argumentative capacity]. Madrid: CCS.Google Scholar
  468. Lausberg, H. (1969). Elementi di retorica [Elements of rhetoric]. Bologna: Il Mulino.Google Scholar
  469. Leal Carretero, F., Ramírez González, C. F., & Favila Vega, V. M. (Eds.), (2010). Introducción a la teoría de la argumentación [Introduction to argumentation Theory]. Guadalajara: Editorial Universtaria.Google Scholar
  470. Leeten, L. (2011). Moral argumentation from a rhetorical point of view. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the seventh conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 1071–1075). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  471. Leitão, S. (2000). The potential of argument in knowledge building. Human Development, 6, 332–360.Google Scholar
  472. Lessl, T. M. (2008). Scientific demarcation and metascience. The National Academy of Sciences on greenhouse warming and evolution. In F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Controversy and confrontation. Relating controversy analysis with argumentation theory (pp. 77–91). Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins.Google Scholar
  473. Lewiński, M. (2010a). Collective argumentative criticism in informal online discussion forums. Argumentation and Advocacy, 47(2), 86–105.Google Scholar
  474. Lewiński, M. (2010b). Internet political discussion forums as an argumentative activity type. A pragma-dialectical analysis of online forms of strategic manoeuvring with critical reactions. Amsterdam: Sic Sat. Doctoral dissertation, University of Amsterdam.Google Scholar
  475. Lewiński, M. (2013). Debating multiple positions in multi-party online deliberation. Sides, positions, and cases. Journal of Argumentation in Context, 2(1), 151–177.Google Scholar
  476. Lewiński, M., & Mohammed, D. (2013). Argumentation in political deliberation. Journal of Argumentation in Context, 2(1), 1–9.Google Scholar
  477. Liang, Q., & Xie, Y. (2011). How critical is the dialectical tier? Exploring the critical dimension in the dialectical tier. Argumentation, 25(2), 229–242.Google Scholar
  478. Lichański, J. Z. (1992). Retoryka od średniowiecza do baroku. Teoria i praktyka [Rhetoric from medival times to baroque. Theory and practice]. Warsaw: PWN.Google Scholar
  479. Lima, H. M. R. (2011). L’argumentation à la Cour d’Assises brésilienne. Les émotions dans le genre du rapport de police [Argumentation at the Brazilian trial court. Emotions in the genre of police report]. Argumentation et analyse du discours, 7, 57–79.Google Scholar
  480. Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2001). Are question-begging arguments necessarily unreasonable? Philosophical Studies, 104, 123–141.Google Scholar
  481. Lisanyuk, E. (2008). Ad hominem in legal discourse. In T. Suzuki, T. Kato, & A. Kubota (Eds.), Proceedings of the 3rd Tokyo conference on argumentation. Argumentation, law and justice (pp. 175–181). Tokyo: Japanese Debate Association.Google Scholar
  482. Lisanyuk, E. (2009). Silnykh argumentov net [There are no ad baculum arguments]. In V. Briushinkin (Ed.), Modelling Reasoning, 3 (pp. 92–100). Kaliningrad: Baltic Federal University Press.Google Scholar
  483. Lisanyuk, E. (2010). Pravila i oshibki argumentacii. [Argumentation. Rules and fallacies]. In A. Migounov, I. Mikirtoumov, & B. Fedorov (Eds.), Logic (pp. 588–658). Moscow: Prospect Publishers.Google Scholar
  484. Lisanyuk, E. (2011). Formal’naya dialektika i ritorika [Formal dialectics and rhetoric]. In V. Briushinkin (Ed.), Modelling reasoning, 4. Argumentation and rhetoric (pp. 37–52). Kaliningrad: Baltic Federal University Press.Google Scholar
  485. Lisanyuk, E. (2013). Cognitivnye kharakteristiki agentov argumentacii [Argumentation and Cognitive Agents]. Vestnik SPBGU, 6, 1. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Press.Google Scholar
  486. Livnat, Z. (2014). Negotiating scientific ethos in academic controversy. Journal of Argumentation in Context, 3(2).Google Scholar
  487. López, C. (2007). The rules of critical discussion and the development of critical thinking. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 901–907). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  488. López, C., & Vicuña, A. M. (2011). Improving the teaching of argumentation through pragma-dialectical rules and a community of inquiry. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference on argumentation of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 1130–1140). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  489. López de la Vieja, M. T. (2010). La pendiente resbaladiza [The slipery slope]. Madrid: Plaza y Valdés Editores.Google Scholar
  490. Łoziński, P. (2011). An algorithm for incremental argumentation analysis in Carneades. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 23(36), 155–171.Google Scholar
  491. Łoziński, P. (2012), Wnioskowanie w logikach argumentacyjnych zależne od kontekstu [Context-dependent reasoning in argumentative logics]. Doctoral dissertation, Institute of Computer Science, Warsaw University of Technology, Warsaw.Google Scholar
  492. Lumer, C. (1990). Praktische Argumentationstheorie. Theoretische Grundlagen, praktische Begründung un Regeln wichtiger Argumentationsarten [A practical theory of argumentation. Theoretical foundations and practical justifications, and rules for major types of argument]. Braunschweig: Vieweg.Google Scholar
  493. Lumer, C. (1991). Structure and function of argumentation – An epistemological approach to determining criteria for the validity and adequacy of argumentations. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the second international conference on argumentation organized by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation at the University of Amsterdam, June 19–22, 1990 (pp. 89–107). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  494. Lumer, C. (2005). The epistemological theory of argument-how and why? Informal Logic, 25(3), 214–232.Google Scholar
  495. Lumer, C. (2011). Probabilistic arguments in the epistemological approach to argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 1141–1154). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  496. Lundquist, L. (1980). La cohérence textuelle. Syntaxe, sémantique, pragmatique [Textual coherence. Syntax, semantics, and pragmatics]. Copenhagen: Arnold Busck, Nyt Nordisk Forlag.Google Scholar
  497. Lundquist, L. (1983). L’analyse textuelle. Méthode, exercises [Textual analysis. Methods, exercises]. Paris: CEDIC.Google Scholar
  498. Lundquist, L. (1987). Towards a procedural analysis of argumentative operators in texts. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation. Perspectives and approaches. Proceedings of the conference on argumentation 1986 (pp. 61–69). Dordrecht/Providence: Foris.Google Scholar
  499. Lumer, C. (1991). Structure and function of argumentation – An epistemological approach to determining criteria for the validity and adequacy of argumentations. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the second international conference on argumentation organized by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation at the University of Amsterdam, June 19–22, 1990 (pp. 89–107). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  500. Łuszczewska-Romahnowa, S. (1966). Pewne pojęcie poprawnej inferencji i pragmatyczne pojęcie wynikania [A notion of valid inference and a pragmatic notion of entailment]. In T. Pawłowski (Ed.), Logiczna teoria nauki [Logical theory of science] (pp. 163–167). Warsaw: PWN.Google Scholar
  501. Lüken, G.-L. (1991). Incommensurability, rules of argumentation, and anticipation. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the second international conference on argumentation organized by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation at the University of Amsterdam, June 19–22, 1990 (pp. 244–252). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  502. Lüken, G.-L. (1992). Inkommensurabilität als Problem rationalen Argumentierens [Incommensurability as a problem of rational argumentation]. Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.Google Scholar
  503. Lüken, G.-L. (1995). Konsens, Widerstreit und Entscheidung. Überlegungen anlässlich Lyotards Herausforderung der Argumentationstheorie [Consensus, dissent, and decision. Thoughts on Lyotard’s challenge to argumentation theory]. In H. Wohlrapp (Ed.), Wege der Argumentationsforschung [Roads of argumentation research] (pp. 358–385). Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.Google Scholar
  504. Lüttich, E. W. B. (2007). (Pseudo-) argumentation in TV-debates. Journal of Pragmatics, 39, 1360–1370.Google Scholar
  505. Macagno, F., & Walton, D. (2010). Dichotomies and oppositions in legal argumentation. Ratio Juris, 23(2), 229–257.Google Scholar
  506. Machamer, P., Pera, M., & Baltas, A. (Eds.). (2000). Scientific controversies. Philosophical and historical perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  507. Maillat, D., & Oswald, S. (2009). Defining manipulative discourse. The pragmatics of cognitive illusions. International Review of Pragmatics, 1(2), 348–370.Google Scholar
  508. Maillat, D., & Oswald, S. (2011). Constraining context. A pragmatic account of cognitive manipulation. In C. Hart (Ed.), Critical discourse studies in context and cognition (pp. 65–80). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.Google Scholar
  509. Maingueneau, D. (1994). Argumentation et analyse du discours. L’exemple des Provinciales [Argumentation and discourse analysis. The example of the Provinciales]. L’Année Sociologique, 3(44), 263–280.Google Scholar
  510. Maingueneau, D. (1996). Ethos et argumentation philosophique. Le cas du Discours de la methode [Ethos and philosophical argumentation. The case of the Discours de la methode]. In: F. Cossutta (Ed.), Descartes et l’argumentation philosophique [Descartes and philosophical argumentation] (pp. 85–110). Paris: PUF.Google Scholar
  511. Manfrida, G. (2003). La narrazione psicoterapeutica. Invenzione, persuasione e tecniche retoriche in terapia relazionale [Psychotherapeutic narration. Invention, persuasion and rhetorical techniques in relation therapy] (2nd ed.). Milan: Franco Angeli. (1st ed. 1998).Google Scholar
  512. Mann, W. C., & Thompson, S. A. (1988). Rhetorical structure theory. Toward a functional theory of text organization. Text, 8, 243–281.Google Scholar
  513. Manzin, M. (2012a). A rhetorical approach to legal reasoning. The Italian experience of CERMEG. In F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Exploring argumentative contexts (pp. 135–148). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.Google Scholar
  514. Manzin, M. (2012b). Vérité et logos dans la perspective de la rhétorique judiciaire. Contributions perelmaniennes à la culture juridique du troisième millénaire [Truth and logos from the perspective of legal rhetoric. Perelmanian contributions to the legal culture of the third millenium]. In B. Frydman & M. Meyer (Eds.), Chaïm Perelman. De la nouvelle rhétorique à la logique juridique [Chaïm Perelman. From new rhetoric to legal logic] (pp. 261–288). Paris: Presses universitaires de France.Google Scholar
  515. Manzin, M., & Puppo, F. (Eds.), (2008). Audiatur et altera pars. Il contraddittorio fra principioe regola [Hear the other side too. The crossexamination between principle and rule]. Milano: Giuffrè.Google Scholar
  516. Marafioti, R. (2003). Los patrones de la argumentación [The patterns of argumentation]. Buenos Aires: Biblos.Google Scholar
  517. Marafioti, R. (2007). Argumentation in debate. The parliamentary speech in critical contexts. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 929–932). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  518. Marafioti, R., Dumm, Z., & Bitonte, M. E. (2007). Argumentation and counter-argumentation using a diaphonic appropriation in a parliamentary debate. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Proceedings of the sixth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 933–937). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  519. Marafioti, R., Pérez de Medina, E., & Balmayor, E. (Eds.), (1997). Recorridos semiológicos. Signos, enunciación y argumentación [Semiological paths. Signs, enunciation and argumentation]. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.Google Scholar
  520. Marciszewski, W. (1969). Sztuka dyskutowania [The art of discussing]. Warsaw: Iskry.Google Scholar
  521. Marga, A. (1992). Introducere în metodologia şi argumentarea filosofică [An introduction to philosophical methodology and argumentation]. Cluj-Napoca: Editura Dacia.Google Scholar
  522. Marga, A. (2009). Raţionalitate, comunicare, argumentare [Rationality, communication, argumentation] (2nd enlarged and revised ed.). Cluj-Napoca: Editura Grinta.Google Scholar
  523. Marga, A. (2010). Argumentarea [Argumentation]. Bucharest: Editura Academiei.Google Scholar
  524. Margitay, T. (2004). Az érvelés mestersége [The art of reasoning]. Budapest: Typotex.Google Scholar
  525. Marinkovich, J. (2000). Un intento de evaluar el conocimiento acerca de la escritura en estudiantes de enseñanza básica [An attempt to evaluate the knowledge about writing among primary school students]. Revista Signos, 33(47), 101–110.Google Scholar
  526. Marinkovich, J. (2007). La interacción argumentativa en el aula. Fases de la argumentación y estrategias de cortesía verbal [Argumentative interaction in the classroom. Stages of argumentation and verbal courtesy strategies]. In C. Santibáñez & B. Riffo (Eds.), Estudios en argumentación y retórica. Teorías contemporáneas y aplicaciones [Studies in argumentation and rhetoric. Contemporary theories and applications] (pp. 227–252). Concepción: Editorial Universidad de Concepción.Google Scholar
  527. Marques, C. M. (2010). A argumentação oral formal em contexto escolar [The formal oral argumentation in school context]. Doctoral dissertation, University of Coimbra, Coimbra.Google Scholar
  528. Marques, M. A. (2007a). Discordar no parlamento. Estratégias de argumentação [Disagreement in parliament: argumentation strategies]. Revista Galega de Filoloxía, 8, 99–124.Google Scholar
  529. Marques, M. A. (2007b). Narrativa e discurso político: Estratégias argumentativas [Narrative and political discourse: Argumentative strategies]. In A. G. Macedo & E. Keating (Eds.), O poder das narrativas, as narrativas do poder: Actas dos Colóquios de Outono 2005–2006 [The power of narratives, the narratives of power: Proceedings of the 2005–2006 Autumn Colloquium] (pp. 303–316). Braga: Universidade do Minho.Google Scholar
  530. Marques, M. A. (2011). Argumentação e(m) discursos [Argumentation in/and discourse(s)]. In I. Duarte & O. Figueiredo (Eds.), Português, língua e ensino [Portuguese, language and teaching] (pp. 267–310). Porto: Porto Editorial.Google Scholar
  531. Marras, C., & Euli, E. (2008). A ‘dialectic ladder’ of refutation and dissuasion. In F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), Controversy and confrontation. Relating controversy analysis with argumentation theory (pp. 135–147). Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins.Google Scholar
  532. Marraud, H. (2013). ¿Es lógic@? Análisis y evaluación de argumentos [Is it logic(al)? Analysis and evaluation of arguments]. Madrid: Cátedra.Google Scholar
  533. Martel, G. (2008). Performance…et contre-performance communicationelles. Des stratégies argumentatives pour le débat politique télévisé [Communicational performance and counter-performance. Argumentative strategies in political television debate]. Argumentation et analyse du discours, 1 [on line]
  534. Martínez Solis, M. C. (2005). La construcción del proceso argumentativo en el discurso [The construction of the argumentative process in discourse]. Cali: Artes gráficas, Facultad de Humanidades, Universidad del Valle.Google Scholar
  535. Martínez Solis, M. C. (2006). Las dimensiones del sujeto discursivo. Prácticas en Módulos 1, 2 y 3 del curso virtual para el desarrollo de estrategias de comprensión y producción de textos [The dimensions of the discursive subject. Practices in modules 1, 2 and 3 of the virtual course for the development of comprehension strategies and text production]. Cali: Education for All section of, Universidad del Valle.
  536. Martínez Solis, M. C. (2007). La orientación social de la argumentación en el discurso. Una propuesta integrativa [The social orientation of argumentation in discourse. An integrative approach]. In R. Marafioti (Ed.), Parlamentos. Teoría de la argumentación y debate parlamentario [Parliaments. Argumentation theory and parliamentary debate]. Buenos Aires: Biblos.Google Scholar
  537. Marttunen, M. (1995). Practicing argumentation through computer conferencing. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Reconstruction and application. Proceedings of the third ISSA conference on argumentation (University of Amsterdam, June 21–24), III (pp. 337–340). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  538. Marttunen, M. (1997). Studying argumentation in higher education by electronic mail. Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research. Doctoral dissertation, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä.Google Scholar
  539. Marttunen, M., & Laurinen, L. (1999). Learning of argumentation in face-to-face and e-mail environments. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the fourth international conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 552–558). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  540. Marttunen, M., & Laurinen, L. (2007). Collaborative learning through chat discussions and argument diagrams in secondary school. Journal of Research on Technology in Education, 40(1), 109–126.Google Scholar
  541. Marttunen, M., Laurinen, L., Hunya, M., & Litosseliti, L. (2003). Argumentation skills of secondary school students in Finland, Hungary and the United Kingdom. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the fifth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 733–739). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  542. Maslennikova, A. A., & Tretyakova, T. P. (2003). The rhetorical shift in interviews. New features in Russian political discourse. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the fifth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 741–745). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  543. Matlon, R. J. (1978). Report on the Japanese debate tour, May and June 1978. JEFA Forensic Journal, 2, 25–40.Google Scholar
  544. Mavrodieva, I. (2010). Виртуална реторика. От дневниците до социалните мрежи [Virtual rhetoric. From the diary to the social web]. Sofia: Sofia University Press.Google Scholar
  545. Mazilu, S. (2010). Dissociation and persuasive definitions as argumentative strategies in ethical argumentation on abortion. Doctoral dissertation, University of Bucharest, Bucharest.Google Scholar
  546. Mazzi, D. (2007a). The construction of argumentation in judicial texts. Combining a genre and a corpus perspective. Argumentation, 21(1), 21–38.Google Scholar
  547. Mazzi, D. (2007b). The linguistic study of judicial argumentation. Theoretical perspectives, analytical insights. Modena: Il Fiorino.Google Scholar
  548. Melin, L. (2003). Manipulera med språket [Manipulate with speech]. Stockholm: Nordstedts ordbok.Google Scholar
  549. Melo Souza Filho, O. (2011). From polemical exchanges to dialogue. Appreciations about an ethics of communication. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the seventh conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA) (pp. 1248–1258). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  550. Memedi, V. (2007). Resolving deep disagreement: A case in point. SEEU Review, 3(2), 7–18.Google Scholar
  551. Memedi, V. (2011). Intractable disputes. The development of attractors. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 1259–1265). Amsterdam: Sic Sat. CD rom.Google Scholar
  552. Mengel, P. (1991). The peculiar inferential force of analogical arguments. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the second international conference on argumentation (Organized by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation at the University of Amsterdam, June 19–22, 1990) (pp. 422–428). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  553. Mengel, P. (1995). Analogien als Argumente [Analogies as arguments]. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.Google Scholar
  554. Mercier, H. (2011). Looking for arguments. Argumentation, 26(3), 305–324.Google Scholar
  555. Mercier, H. (2012). Some clarifications about the argumentative theory of reasoning. A reply to Santibáñez Yáñez (2012). Informal Logic, 32(2), 259–268.Google Scholar
  556. Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34, 57–111.Google Scholar
  557. Meyer, M. (1976). De la problématologie. Philosophie, science et langage [Of problematology. Philosophy, science, and language]. Brussels: Pierre Mardaga.Google Scholar
  558. Meyer, M. (1982a). Logique, langage et argumentation [Logic, language, and argumentation]. Paris: Hachette. (English transl. 1995).Google Scholar
  559. Meyer, M. (1982b). Argumentation in the light of a theory of questioning. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 15(2), 81–103.Google Scholar
  560. Meyer, M. (1986b). From logic to rhetoric. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. [trans. of M. Meyer (1982a). Logique, langage et argumentation. Paris: Hachette].Google Scholar
  561. Meyer, M. (1988). The rhetorical foundation of philosophical argumentation. Argumentation, 2(2), 255–270. [trans. of M. Meyer (1982a). Argumentation in the light of a theory of questioning. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 15(2), 81–103].Google Scholar
  562. Meyer, M. (1995). Of problematology: Philosophy, science and language. London: Bloomsbury. [trans. of M. Meyer (1976). De la problématologie. Philsophy, Science et langage. Brussels: Pierre Mardaga].Google Scholar
  563. Meyer, M. (2000). Questionnement et historicité [Questioning and historicity]. Paris: Puf.Google Scholar
  564. Meyer, M. (2008). Principia rhetorica. Une théorie générale de l’argumentation. [Principia Rhetorica. A general theory of argumentation]. Paris: Fayard.Google Scholar
  565. Meza, P. (2009). Las interacciones argumentativas orales en la sala de clases. Un análisis dialéctico y retórico [Oral argumentative interactions in the classroom. A dialectic and rhetorical analysis]. Doctoral dissertation, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso.Google Scholar
  566. Micheli, R. (2010). Lémotion argumentée. L’abolition de la peine de mort dans le débat parlementaire français [Well-argued emotion. The abolition of the death penalty in French parliamentary debate]. Paris: Le Cerf.Google Scholar
  567. Micheli, R. (2012). Arguing without trying to persuade? Elements for a non-persuasive definition of argumentation. Argumentation, 26(1), 115–126.Google Scholar
  568. Migunov, A. I. (2002). Analitika i dialektika. Dva aspekta logiki [Analytics and dialectics: two aspects of logic]. In Y. A. Slinin and us: To the 70th anniversary of Professor Yaroslav Anatolyevich Slinin. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Press/Philosophical Society Publication.Google Scholar
  569. Migunov, A. I. (2004). Teoriia argumentatcii kak logiko-pragmaticheskoe issledovanie argumentativnoi’ kommunikatcii [Theory of argumentation as logical-pragmatic research of argumentative communication]. In S. I. Dudnik (Ed.), Communication and education. The collection of articles. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Press.Google Scholar
  570. Migunov, A. I. (2005). Kommunikativnaia priroda istiny i argumentatciia [Communicative nature of truth and argumentation. Logical-philosophical studies, 3. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Press.Google Scholar
  571. Migunov, A. I. (2007a). Entimema v argumentativnom diskurse [Enthymeme in an argumentative discourse]. In Logical-philosophical studies, 4. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Press/Philosophical Society Publication.Google Scholar
  572. Migunov, A. I. (2007b). Semantika argumentativnogo rechevogo akta [Semantics of the argumentative speech act]. In Thought. The yearbook of the Petersburg Philosophical Society, 6. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Press.Google Scholar
  573. Migunov, A. I. (2009). Argumentologiia v kontekste prakticheskogo povorota logiki [Argumentology in a context of the practical turn of logic]. Logical-philosophical studies, 7. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Press.Google Scholar
  574. Migunov, A. I. (2011). Sootnoshenie ritoricheskikh i argumentativnykh aspektov diskursa [A relationship of discourse rhetorical and argumentative aspects]. In V. I. Bryushinkin (Ed.), Models of reasoning, 4. Argumentation and rhetoric. Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad University Press.Google Scholar
  575. Miovska-Spaseva, S., & Ačkovska-Leškovska, E. (2010). Критичкото мислење во универзитетската настава [Critical thinking in university education]. Skopje: Foundation Open Society Institute - Macedonia.Google Scholar
  576. Miranda, T. (1998). El juego de la argumentación [The game of argumentation]. Madrid: Ediciones de la Torre.Google Scholar
  577. Miranda, T. (2002). Argumentos [Arguments]. Alcoy: Editorial Marfil.Google Scholar
  578. Moeschler, J. (1985). Argumentation et conversation [Argumentation and conversation]. Paris: Hatier.Google Scholar
  579. Mohammed, D. (2011). Strategic manoeuvring in simultaneous discussions. In F. Zenker (Ed.), Argumentation. Cognition and community. Proceedings of the 9th international conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18–21, 2011. Windsor, ON. CD rom.Google Scholar
  580. Mohammed, D. (2013). Pursuing multiple goals in European parliamentary debates. EU immigration policies as a case in point. Journal of Argumentation in Context, 2(1), 47–74.Google Scholar
  581. Monteiro, C. S. (2006). Teoria da argumentação jurídica e nova retórica. [Theory of legal argumentation and new rhetoric] (3rd ed.). Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris.Google Scholar
  582. Monzón, L. (2011). Argumentación. Objeto olvidado para la investigación en México [Argumentation. The forgotten object in Mexican research]. REDIE, 13(2), 41–54.Google Scholar
  583. Moore, B. N., & Parker, R. (2009). Critical thinking (9th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. (Chinese transl. 2007).Google Scholar
  584. Morrison, J. L. (1972). The absence of a rhetorical tradition in Japanese culture. Western Speech, 36, 89–102.Google Scholar
  585. Mosca, L. L. S. (Ed.), (2006). Discurso, argumentação e produção de sentido [Discourse, argumentation and making sense] (4th ed). São Paulo: Associação Editorial Humanitas.Google Scholar
  586. Mral, B., Borg, N., & Salazar, P.-J. (Eds.). (2009). Women’s rhetoric. Argumentative strategies of women in public life. Åstorp: Retoriksförlaget. Sweden & South Africa.Google Scholar
  587. Muraru D. (2010). Mediation and diplomatic discourse. The strategic use of dissociation and definitions. Doctoral dissertation, University of Bucharest, Bucharest.Google Scholar
  588. Naqqari, H. (Ed.), (2006). Al-Taḥājuj. Tabīʻatuh wa Majālātuh wa Waẓāʼifuh [Argumentation. Its nature, contexts and functions]. Rabat: Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Mohammed V University.Google Scholar
  589. Navarro, M. G. (2009). Interpretar y Argumentar [Interpreting and arguing]. Madrid: Plaza y Valdes Editores.Google Scholar
  590. Navarro, M. G. (2011). Elements for an argumentative method of interpretation. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference on argumentation of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 1347–1356). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  591. Nettel, A. N. (2011). The enthymeme between persuasion and argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference on argumentation of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 1359–1365). Amsterdam: Sic Sat. CD rom.Google Scholar
  592. Nettel, A. N., & Roque, G. (2012). Persuasive argumentation versus manipulation. Argumentation, 26(1), 55–69.Google Scholar
  593. Nielsen, F. S. (1997). Alfred Sidgwicks argumentationsteori [Alfred Sidgwick’s argumentation theory]. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanums forlag.Google Scholar
  594. Nikolić, D., & Tomić, D. (2011). Employing the Toulmin model in rhetorical education. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference on argumentation of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 1366–1380). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  595. Noemi, C. (2011). Intertextualidad a partir del establecimiento de status. Alcances sobre la relación entre contenido y superestructura en los discursos de juicios orales [Intertextuality from status. Notes about the relationship between content and superstructure in oral trial discourses]. Signos, 44(76), 118–131.Google Scholar
  596. Novani, S. (2011a). Thought experiments in criminal trial. Available at SSRN: or
  597. Novani, S. (2011b). The testimonial argumentation. Available at SSRN: or
  598. O’Keefe, D. J. (2006). Pragma-dialectics and persuasion effects research. In P. Houtlosser & M. A. van Rees (Eds.), Considering pragma-dialectics. A festschrift for Frans H. van Eemeren on the occasion of his 60th birthday (pp. 235–243). Mahwah/London: Lawrence Erlbaum.Google Scholar
  599. Öhlschläger, G. (1979). Linguistische Überlegungen zu einer Theorie der Argumentation [Linguistic arguments for a theory of argumentation]. Tübingen: Niemeyer.Google Scholar
  600. Okabe, R. (1986–1988). Research conducted by grant of the Japanese Government [An analysis of the influence of Western rhetorical theory on the early Meiji era speech textbooks in Japan].
  601. Okabe, R. (1989). Cultural assumptions of East and West. Japan and the United States. In J. L. Golden, G. F. Berquist, & W. E. Coleman (Eds.), The rhetoric of Western thought (4th ed., pp. 546–565). Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Publishing.Google Scholar
  602. Okabe, R. (1990). The impact of Western rhetoric on the east. The case of Japan. Rhetorica, 8(4), 371–388.Google Scholar
  603. Okabe, R. (2002). Japan’s attempted enactments of Western debate practice in the 16th and the 19th centuries. In R. T. Donahue (Ed.), Exploring Japaneseness. On Japanese enactments of culture and consciousness (pp. 277–291). Westport/London: Ablex.Google Scholar
  604. Okuda, H. (2007). Prime Minister Mori’s controversial “Divine Nation” remarks. A case study of Japanese political communication strategies. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Proceedings of the 6th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 1003–1009). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  605. Okuda, H. (2011). Obama’s rhetorical strategy in presenting “A world without nuclear weapons. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 1396–1404). Amsterdam: Sic Sat. CD rom.Google Scholar
  606. Olmos, P., & Vega, L. (2011). The use of the script concept in argumentation theory. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference on argumentation of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 1405–1414). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.Google Scholar
  607. Omari, M. el (1986). Fī Balāghat al-Khiṭāb al-Iqnā’ī. Madkhal Naẓarī wa Taṭbīqī Li Dirāsat a-Khiṭābah al-‘Arabīyah: al-Khiṭābah fī al-Qarn al-Awwal Namūdhajan [The rhetoric of argumentative discourse. A preface to the theoretical and applied study of Arabic oration. Oration in the first Hijra Century as an example]. Rabat: Dār al-Thaqāfah. (2nd ed., 2002. Casablanca: Ifrīqiya-al-Sharq).Google Scholar
  608. Orlandi, E. (2000). Análise do discurso. Princípios e procedimentos [Discourse analysis. Principles and procedures]. Campinas: Pontes.Google Scholar
  609. Orlandi, E., & Lagazzi-Rodrigues, S. (2006). Discurso e textualidade [Discourse and textuality]. Campinas: Pontes.Google Scholar
  610. Ortega de Hocevar, S. (2003). Los niños y los cuentos. La renarración como actividad de comprensión y producción discursiva [Children and tales. Renarration as an activity for discoursive comprehension and production]. In Niños, cuentos y palabras. Colección 0 a 5. La educación en los primeros años. [Children, tales and words. 0 to 5 Series. Education in the first years]. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Novedades Educativas.Google Scholar
  611. Ortega de Hocevar, S. (2008). In M. Castilla (Ed.), ¿Cómo determinar la competencia argumentativa de alumnos del primer ciclo de la Educación básica? [How to determine argumentative competence in primary school students?]. Mendoza: Universidad Nacional de Cuyo.Google Scholar
  612. Oshchepkova, N. (2004). Strategii i taktiki v argumentativnom diskurse. Pragmalingvisticheskij analiz ubeditelnosti rassuzhdeniya [Strategies and tactics in argumentative discourse. A pragmalinguistic analysis of the persuasiveness of reasoning]. Doctoral dissertation, Kaluga State University, Kaluga.Google Scholar
  613. Osorio, J. (2006). Estructura conceptual metafórica y práctica argumentativa [Metaphorical conceptual structure and argumentative practice]. Praxis, 8(9), 121–136.Google Scholar
  614. Oswald, S. (2007). Towards an interface between pragma-dialectics and relevance theory. Pragmatics and Cognition, 15(1), 179–201.Google Scholar
  615. Oswald, S. (2010). Pragmatics of uncooperative and manipulative communication. Doctoral dissertation, University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland.Google Scholar
  616. Oswald, S. (2011). From interpretation to consent. Arguments, beliefs and meaning. Discourse Studies, 13(6), 806–814.Google Scholar
  617. Paavola, S. (2006). On the origin of ideas. An abductivist approach to discovery. Philosophical Studies from the University of Helsinki, 15. Doctoral dissertation, University of Helsinki, Helsinki.Google Scholar
  618. Padilla, C. (1997). Lectura y escritura. Adquisición y proyecciones pedagógicas [Reading and writing. Acquisition and pedagogical projections]. San Miguel de Tucumán: Universidad Nacional de Tucumán.Google Scholar
  619. Padilla, C., & López, E. (2011). Grados de complejidad argumentativa en escritos de estudiantes universitarios de humanidades [Degrees of argumentative complexity in written texts of humanities college students]. Revista Praxis, 13(20), 61–90.Google Scholar
  620. Paiva, C. G. (2004). Discurso parlamentar. Bases para elaboração ou como é que se começa? [Parliamentary discourse. Basis for the elaboration, or how we start it?]. Brasília: Aslegis.Google Scholar
  621. Pajunen, J. (2011). Acceptance. Epistemic concepts, and argumentation theory. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 1428–1437). Amsterdam: Sic Sat. CD rom.Google Scholar
  622. Palczewski, C. (1989). Parallels between Japanese and American debate. A paper presented at the Central States Communication Association Annual Conference in Kansas City, Missouri.Google Scholar
  623. Palczewski, C. H., Fritch, J., & Parrish, N. C. (Eds.), (2012). Forum: Argument scholars respond to Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory of human reason. Argumentation and Advocacy, 48(3).Google Scholar
  624. Parodi, G. (2000). La evaluación de la producción de textos escritos argumentativos. Una alternancia cognitivo/discursiva [The evaluation of written argumentative texts production. A cognitive/discoursive alternation). Revista Signos, 33(47), 151–16.Google Scholar
  625. Paul, R., & Elder, L. (2002). Critical thinking. Tools for taking charge of your professional and personal life. Upper Saddle River: Financial Times Press. (Chinese transl. 2010).Google Scholar
  626. Pedersen, S. H. (2011). Reasonable non-agreement in discussions. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 1486–1495). Amsterdam: Sic Sat. CD rom.Google Scholar
  627. Peón, M. (2004). Habilidades argumentativas de alumnos de primaria y su fortalecimiento [Argumentative skills and their reinforcement in primary school students]. Doctoral dissertation, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico.Google Scholar
  628. Pera, M. (1991). Scienza e retorica [Science and rhetoric]. Bari: Laterza.Google Scholar
  629. Pera, M. (1994). The discourses of science (Trans. of Scienza e retorica. Bari: Laterza, 1991). Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  630. Perdue, D. E. (1992). Debate in Tibetan Buddhism. New York: Snow Lion Publications.Google Scholar
  631. Pereda, C. (1992a). Razón e incertidumbre [Reason and Uncertainty]. México: Siglo XXI.Google Scholar
  632. Pereda, C. (1992b). Vértigos argumentales. Una ética de la disputa [Argumentative Vertigos. An ethics of dispute]. Barcelona: Anthropos.Google Scholar
  633. Perelman, C. (1968). Recherches interdisciplinairs sur l’argumentation [Interdisciplinary research on argumentation]. Logique et analyse, 11(44), 502–511.Google Scholar
  634. Perelman, C. (1969). Le champ de l’argumentation [The field of argumentation]. Brussels: Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles.Google Scholar
  635. Perelman, C. (1974). Perspectives rhétoriques sur les problemes sémantiques [Rhetorical perspectives on semantic problems]. Logique et analyse, 17(67–68), 241–252.Google Scholar
  636. Perelman, C. (1977). L’empire rhétorique. Rhétorique et argumentation [The realm of rhetoric. Rhetoric and argumentation]. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. (trans. into Portuguese (1992), Spanish (1997)).Google Scholar
  637. Perelman, C. (1979b). The new rhetoric and the humanities. Dordrecht: Reidel.Google Scholar
  638. Perelman, C. (1992). O império retórico. Retórica e argumentação, 1992. Porto: Asa. [trans.: Grácio, R. A. & Trindade, F. of C. Perelman (1977). L’empire rhétorique. Rhétorique et argumentation. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin].Google Scholar
  639. Perelman, C. (1997). El imperio retórico. Retórica y argumentación. Bogota: Norma. [trans.: Gómez, A. L. of C. Perelman (1977). L’empire rhétorique. Rhétorique et argumentation. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin].Google Scholar
  640. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1958). La nouvelle rhétorique. Traité de l'argumentation [The new rhetoric. Treatise on argumentation]. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. (3rd ed. Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles). [trans. into Italian (1966), English (1969), Portuguese (1996), Rumanian (2012), Spanish (1989)].Google Scholar
  641. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1966). Trattato dell'argomentazione. La nuova retorica. Turin: Einaudi. [trans. of C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958). La nouvelle rhétorique. Traité de l'argumentation. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. (3rd ed. Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles)].Google Scholar
  642. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The new rhetoric. A treatise on argumentation. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. [trans.: Wilkinson, J. & and Weaver, P. of C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958). La nouvelle rhétorique. Traité de l'argumentation. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. (3rd ed. Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles)].Google Scholar
  643. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1989). Tratado de la argumentación. La nueva retórica. Madrid: Gredos. [trans.: Sevilla, J. of C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958). La nouvelle rhétorique. Traité de l'argumentation. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. (3rd ed. Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles)].Google Scholar
  644. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1996). Tratado da argumentação. A nova retórica. São Paulo: Martins Fontes. [trans.: Pereira, M. E. G. G. of C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958). La nouvelle rhétorique. Traité de l'argumentation. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. (3rd ed. Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles)].Google Scholar
  645. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (2012). Tratat de argumentare. Noua Retorică. Iaşi: Editura Universităţii “Alexandru Ioan Cuza”. [trans.: Stoica, A. of C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958). La nouvelle rhétorique. Traité de l'argumentation. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. (3rd ed. Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles)].Google Scholar
  646. Pery-Borissov, V., & Yanoshevsky, G. (2011). How authors justify their participation in literary interviews. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, & G. Mitchell (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 1504–1514). Amsterdam: Rozenberg-Sic Sat. CD rom.Google Scholar
  647. Piazza, F. (2004). Linguaggio, persuasione e verità. La retorica del Novecento [Language, persuasion and truth. The rhetoric of the twentieth century]. Rome: Carocci.Google Scholar
  648. Piazza, F. (2008). La retorica di Aristotele. Introduzione alla lettura. [The rhetoric of Aristotle. An introduction]. Rome: Carocci.Google Scholar
  649. Pietarinen, J. (Ed.), (1992). Problems of argumentation, I & II. Turku: Reports from the Department of Practical Philosophy, 5.Google Scholar
  650. Pineda, O. (2004). Propuesta metodológica para la enseñanza de la redacción de textos argumentativos. Revisión del programa de taller de lectura y redacción II del Colegio de Bachilleres [A methodological proposal for teaching argumentative texts writing skills. A revision of the program of the workshop on reading and writing II of Colegio de Bachilleres]. Doctoral dissertation, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico.Google Scholar
  651. Pinto, R. (2006). Argumentação em géneros persuasivos – um estudo contrastivo [Argumentation in persuasive genres – a contrastive study]. Lisbon: Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Doctoral dissertation New University of Lisbon.Google Scholar
  652. Pinto, R. (2010). Como argumentar e persuadir? Prática política, jurídica, jornalistica [How to argue and persuade? Political, legal and journalistic practice]. Lisbon: Quid Juris.Google Scholar
  653. Pinto, R. C. (2011). The account of warrants in Bermejo-Luque’s Giving reasons. Theoria, 72, 311–320.Google Scholar
  654. Plantin, C. (2005). L’argumentation. Histoire, théories, perspectives [Argumentation. History, theories, perspectives]. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. (trans. into Portuguese (2008)).Google Scholar
  655. Plantin, C. (2008). A argumentação. História, teorias, perspectivas L’argumentation. São Paulo: Parábola. [trans.: by Marcionilo, M. of C. Plantin (2005). L’argumentation. Histoire, théories, perspectives. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France].Google Scholar
  656. Poblete, C. (2003). Relación entre competencia textual argumentativa y metacognición [The relationship between textual argumentative competence and metacognition]. Doctoral dissertation, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso.Google Scholar
  657. Polya, G. (1968). Mathematics and plausible reasoning, 2. Patterns of plausible inference. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  658. Posada, P. (2010). Argumentación, teoría y práctica. Manual introductorio a las teorías de la argumentación [Argumentation, theory and practice. Introductory handbook of argumentation theories]. (2nd ed.). Cali: Programa Editorial Univalle.Google Scholar
  659. Povarnin, S. I. (1923). Iskusstvo spora. O teorii i praktike spora [The art of argument. On the theory and practice of arguing]. Petrograd: Nachatki znanii.Google Scholar
  660. Prakken, H. (2013). Argumentación jurídica, derrotabilidad e Inteligencia artificial [Legal argumentation, defeasibility and artificial intelligence]. Santiago: Universidad Diego Portales.Google Scholar
  661. Prian, J. (2007). Didáctica de la argumentación. Su enseñanza en la Escuela Nacional Preparatoria [Argumentation didactics. Its teaching in the Escuela Nacional Preparatoria]. Doctoral dissertation, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico.Google Scholar
  662. Puchkova, A. (2011). Rechevoj zhanr ‘kantseliarskaya otpiska’. Lingvo-argumentativnyj analiz [The speech genre ‘bureaucratic runaround’. A linguo-argumentative analysis]. Doctoral dissertation, Kaluga State University, Kaluga.Google Scholar
  663. Puckova, Y. V. (2006). Argumentativno-lingvisticheskij analiz diskursa oproverzhenij [An argumentative-linguistic analysis of refutation discourse]. Doctoral dissertation, Kaluga State University, Kaluga.Google Scholar
  664. Puig, L. (2012). Doxa and persuasion in lexis. Argumentation, 26(1), 127–142.Google Scholar
  665. Quintrileo, C. (2007). Análisis como reconstrucción en la discusión parlamentaria. Una aproximación desde el enfoque de la pragma-dialéctica [Analysis as reconstruction in parliamentarian discussion. An approach from the pragma-dialectical perspective]. In C. Santibáñez & B. Riffo (Eds.), Estudios en argumentación y retórica. Teorías contemporáneas y aplicaciones [Studies in argumentation and rhetoric. Contemporary theories and applications] (pp. 253–272.). Concepción: Editorial Universidad de Concepción.Google Scholar
  666. Raccah, P-Y. (2006). Polyphonie et argumentation. Des discours à la langue (et retour) [Polyphony and argumentation. From discourse to language (and back)]. In Z. Simonffy (Ed.), L’un et le multiple [The one and the multiple] (pp. 120–152). Budapest: Tinta Könyvkiadó.Google Scholar