Legal Knowledge: The Hermeneutical Point of View
One of the most recurrent discussions in legal-theoretical debates is that concerning the knowledge of law. What do we know when we know the law? What kind of knowledge is legal knowledge?
Legal knowledge denotes an activity, aiming at the representation, reconstruction, systematization, conceptualization, and explanation of phenomena regarding legal experience. This activity can proceed at more than one level. Law can be studied from different disciplines and perspectives. The term “legal knowledge” is used in various senses. It can assume different forms (Viola and Zaccaria 1999: 409–435; Peczenik 2005: 1–2, 8–10; Núñez Vaquero 2013: 53–81).
Among the phenomena which are commonly supposed to constitute a part of legal experience, “there are rules of many kinds, actions performed by judges, officials, lawyers and citizens, certain legal institutions, certain kinds of discourses including arguments produced by judges in resolving legal controversies, speeches and accounts...
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